Scoring GuideIn what follows I provide the scoring guide given to the GSIs. These are simply intended to be samples of adequate (3-point) answers. Other good answers were, of course, possible. Initial scoring of the exam yielded a mean score of 36.56 (SD = 6.55), which was about the same as the previous midterms, from Spring 2010. The reliability of the exam (Cronbach's alpha) was .76, which is pretty good.As described in the Exam Information page, I then conducted an item analysis to identify bad questions. As described in the Exam Information page, I consider any item with both a low average score and a low item-to-total correlation to be a plausible candidate for dropping, as a "bad" item.
So, there were no items that
actually met the dual criteria for a "bad" item. But
I was bothered by those two last 3-point items, #s 15 and 16, so I gave everyone full credit for those
two items. As previously announced, I had already given everyone full
credit for #12, on prototypes and
exemplars. But Item #7 was also concerned
with prototypes and exemplars, and it had a relatively
low average score, so I gave
everyone full credit for that
item, as well. Taken together, rescoring those four items (#s 7, 12, 15, and 16) raised the average to M = 40.87, SD = 5.43. That's more like it. The exam scores reported in the bSpace gradebook reflect the rescoring of the exam, as described above. Exams will be returned in your discussion section. Requests for rescoring individual items must be made in writing, and accompanied by a statement (a paragraph will do) indicating why your response is as good as, or better than, the one provided in this scoring guide. These requests due no later than 5 PM on Monday, April 7. |
Your responses should be very concise. In every case, less
than 5 sentences will do.
Write your answers in the space provided. If absolutely
necessary, you may continue on the other side of the page. Write legibly in the
space provided, and please
use ink. Exams written in pencil
will not be eligible for regrading.
A scoring guide will be posted to the course website by noon, March 19. Exams will be graded and returned (in discussion sections) as soon as possible. Requests for regrading must be made to your GSI no later than 1 week after exams are returned.
1. Describe three
ways in which social cognition appears to be
quantitatively different from nonsocial cognition.
Average score = 2.06,
item-to-toal correlation = .48. Any three of
the following will do: (a) poverty and ambiguity of
the stimulus; (b) the presence of conflicting cues; (c)
the role of emotional and motivational factors, which
color cognition; (d) contextual or figure-ground effects.
[Introduction]
2. Why does "Symbolic
Interactionism"
lie at the heart of social cognition?
M
score = 1.98,
item-to-total r = .18.
Symbolic interactionism asserts that social interactions
take place "in
the mind"
before they occur in reality. People's responses
to environmental events (also known as stimuli) are
determined by the meanings that these events have for
them. These
meanings, in turn, are acquired through social interaction
and modified by the person's own cognitive (interpretive)
processes. [Cognitive
Perspective]
3. What
is stereotype threat and how does it relate to the
self-fulfilling prophecy?
M = 2.61, r
= .24. Stereotype threat refers to a person's anxiety
that his task performance will confirm the stereotype
concerning his own social group. Stereotype
threat has its origins in the individual's awareness
of this group stereotype.
When the anxiety does, in fact, impair performance,
the person has actually fulfilled the expectations implied
by the stereotype. [Cognitive
Perspective]
4. What
makes a central traits central to impression formation?
2.80, .10.
Central traits play an inordinate role in shaping person
perception. They
have this influence because they are highly correlated
with other traits, particularly those traits that,
themselves, are central to impression formation - -such as
intellectual and social "good-bad", and (perhaps) the Big Five
traits of extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness,
neuroticism, and openness to experience. [Social
Perception]
5. Why
is facial attractiveness such an important aspect of
person perception?
2.45, .09.
In the first place, facial attractiveness is one of
the most important determinants of physical
attractiveness, which in turn is the most powerful
determinant of likability.
In the second place, facial attractiveness, and
physical attractiveness generally, influences a host of
other social judgments through what is known as the halo effect -- the
intuitive idea that desirable traits go together. Thus, someone
who is physically attractive is usually thought to be
smart (intellectually good) and warm (socially good) as
well. [Social
Perception]
6. How do
pre-existing, abstract cognitive schemata (or "schemas") affect our
memory for specific facts about a person?
2.43, .37.
Schematic knowledge provides the cognitive basis for
perception and memory.
Information that is consistent with a pre-existing
schema is favored in memory because the schema provides
additional retrieval cue information. Information that
is inconsistent
with a pre-existing schema is also favored in memory,
because extra explanatory effort creates a richer, more
elaborate memory trace.
Schema-irrelevant information is poorly remembered
because it gets neither an encoding or retrieval
advantage. [Social
Memory]
7. How
are social stereotypes structured as categories (or
concepts)?
1.74, .33.
Rescored,
full credit for everyone. Stereotypes
function as categories, because they include features that
are (allegedly) shared by members of some outgroup. But
nobody thinks that all
members of an outgroup have all the
stereotypic features in common, so stereotypes can't be
structured as classical categories, or "proper" sets. Instead, they
seem to be structured as fuzzy sets, represented by a
category prototype whose features are "typical" in the
sense that they are more likely to occur in members of the
stereotyped group than they are in the population as a
whole. [Social Categorization]
8. What is the
empirical status of the "self-other difference" in causal
attribution?
1.97, .58.
It is claimed that people tend to make situational
attributions for their own behavior, and dispositional
attributions for the behavior of other people. Early studies
seemed to reveal such a difference, which was in line with
evidence of other errors and biases, such as the
fundamental attribution error and the self-serving bias. But a thorough "meta-analysis" of the
entire literature reveals that, in fact, the self-other
difference is not very strong, and people generally
attribute both their own and other people's behavior
to a mix of internal (personal) and external (situational)
causes. [Social
Judgment and inference]
9. Briefly
distinguish among describe three (3) of the models of
social cognition described by Fiske & Taylor.
2.29, .42.
Any three of
the following will do.
(1) The consistency-seeker is motivated to reduce
any dissonance between attitudes, and between attitudes
and behavior. (2)
The naïve scientist engages in a rational analysis of
events in the social world.
(3) The cognitive miser is motivated to reduce
information-processing demand by relying on cognitive
strategies that simplify complex problems. (4) The
motivated tactician chooses among available cognitive
strategies based on goals.
The activated actor relies on automatic,
unconscious processes rather than conscious, deliberate
ones. [Fiske
& Taylor, Chapter 1]
10. What role does
priming play in "dual
process"
theories of social cognition?
1.97, .53.
Dual-process theories postulate that task performance is
mediated by some combination of automatic and controlled
processes. Priming
effects, which make certain thoughts, ideas, and emotions
more accessible, are generally thought to be mediated by
automatic processes that respond to stimulus inputs. In subliminal
priming, the prime is presented below the level of
conscious awareness, and so can't be consciously controlled
either. We
are aware of the prime in conscious priming, but even then
we can control its effects after priming has run its
course. [F&T,
Chapter 2]
11. What are "implicit
attitudes",
and why are they important to theories of cognitive
consistency?
2.13, .55.
People generally want their beliefs and attitudes to be
consistent with each other, and with their behavior:
cognitive dissonance is aversive. However, it is
possible that we have "implicit" or unconscious attitudes,
which may not be the same as our explicit or conscious
ones, and that cause us to behave in ways that are
inconsistent with our conscious beliefs. This creates a
special problem of cognitive dissonance, because if the
attitude is unconscious, and operates automatically, we
can neither change it nor control the behavior that it
generates. [F&T,
Chapter 10]
12. How does the
exemplar view of conceptual structure differ from the
prototype view?
Item dropped in
advance.
Full credit for all students. The
prototype view holds that categories are groups of objects
which share a family resemblance -- they tend to have a set of
characteristic features in common, even though there is no
set of features. The
concept, or mental representation of the category,
consists of a summary list of these characteristic
features, which constitute the category prototype. The exemplar
view abandons the view of concepts as any kind of summary,
or average, representation of category members, but rather
holds that concepts are represented as a "list" of the
instances, or exemplars, in the category itself. [F&T,
Chapter 4]
13. How does
collective memory differ from personal memory?
2.81, .08.
Personal memories are stored (somehow) in the minds (and
brains) of individuals, and reflect the individual's more or
less idiosyncratic mental representation of some episode
of experience or behavior.
Collective memories are shared by members of an
entire "mnemonic
community",
such that each member of the community has the same
representation of the event in question -- regardless of
whether he or she personally experienced the event. They are stored
in books, monuments, and place names. Collective
memories are jointly remembered by members of the mnemonic
community on particular occasions (such as September 11),
in a phenomenon known as "mnemonic synchronization" which
creates "sociobigraphical" memories. [Zerubavel,
Chapter 6]
14. How do
entitativity and essentialism play a role in stereotyping?
1.88, .49.
Groups are social constructions, existing in the minds of
perceivers who divide the world into "us" and "them", ingroups
and outgroups. But
once people have been classified into a group, that group
seems to take on a sort of objective reality -- it becomes
a thing, not
just an idea. And
the features associated with group membership are often
elevated to the status of essential features, fixed and
unchangeable. The
result is to polarize intergroup relation, and to foster
stereotypes that resist change even in the fact of
counteracting information.
[F&T, Chapter 11]
15. In Weiner's theory of
achievement, what are the dimensions along which success
and failure are evaluated, and how are they combined to
yield causal attributions for achievement?
1.44, .36.
All students received full credit. The
dimensions in question are locus (external
vs. internal), stability,
and controllability.
Various combinations of these factors yield causal
attributions. For
example, ability
is both stable and uncontrollable, while effort is
unstable and controllable; task difficulty is
stable but uncontrollable, while luck is neither
stable nor controllable.
[F&T, Chapter 6]
16. What is a linear
model of social judgment, and how does it compare with
intuitive models?
1.49, .41.
All students received full credit. Linear
models represent information in quantitative form that can
be processed according to a constant decision (such as
whether to admit a particular applicant to a particular
college) rule, usually represented by a mathematical
formula, such as "ADMIT = GPA + SAT". It seems
impersonal, but comparative studies invariably show that
such "statistical" formulas do
at least as well, and often better than, the "clinical" impressions
of judges. Precisely
because they depend on objective computational formulas,
they are certainly more reliable (consistent), and less
subject to bias and prejudice. [F&T,
Chapter 8]
17. How
does the perspective of cognitive sociology differ from
that of cognitive psychology?
1.84, .09.
While cognitive psychology is concerned with the
individual's
individual mind, brain and behavior, cognitive sociology
is concerned with individuals as members of thought
communities, and with the role of cognitive socialization
in shaping the individual's thought processes. Cognitive
sociology begins with the assumption that different
historical epochs, different cultures, and different
subcultures are characterized by distinct differences in
both the content and the mode of thought. [Zerubavel,
Chapter 1]