1a. The self can be described as one's mental representation of oneself. Go beyond this broad statement to discuss one (1) form that mental representation might take, and why.

Self-knowledge can be represented as images, concepts, or memories (they can also be represented as stories, though not much is known about this form of representation, at least as it applies to the self). An answer can take any of these tacks.

Images are perception-based knowledge representations, which preserve information about perceptual structure, as opposed to meaning. The Mita et al experiment on mirror-reversed photos suggests that we have a fairly detailed mental picture of what we look like. Studies of individuals with eating disorder suggest that, at least for some people, our body images can diverge radically from objective reality.

Concepts are meaning-based knowledge representations, which preserve information about meanings, but lose information about perceptual structure. The "self-concept" can take a number of forms: as a proper set, a prototype, a set of exemplars, or as a theory. The proper-set view emphasizes the uniqueness of the self, but is an inadequate view of concepts generally. The prototype and exemplar views are the most well developed, but seem to require that we possess multiple self-concepts (constituting the exemplars, or summarized in the prototype). The theory view goes beyond the notion of concepts as lists of features (or as lists of examples), to represent and explain the relations among features or examples.

Memories are also meaning-based knowledge representations, and a distinction can be drawn between semantic (trait) and episodic (autobiographical) knowledge about oneself. Both kinds of knowledge can be represented as propositions within an associative network model. One question concerns the structural relations between semantic and episodic self-knowledge. One possible structure is hierarchical, with nodes representing traits fanning off a node representing the self, and nodes representing specific trait-relevant events fanning of their respective trait-nodes. However, studies of priming, and of brain-damaged patients, indicate that semantic and episodic self-knowledge are represented independently of each other (because processing one does not facilitate processing the other).
 

1.b "The self is a person, like any other". How do mental representations of the self differ from mental representations of other people? What factors might be responsible for this difference?

The literature is full of "self-other" differences. The self-other difference in causal attribution; egocentricity; beneffectance; self-other differences in achievement attributions; the reversal of at least some of these differences in depressives. The question is whether these differences are intrinsic to the difference between self and other, or whether there is some confound. So, for example, according to the motivational hypothesis, the self-other differences protects self-esteem; the question then is whether we show the self-other difference for positive as well as negative outcomes. Or, according to the informational hypothesis, the self-other difference merely reflects differences in the availability of consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness information; the question then is whether we make self-like causal attributions for others whom we know really well. Or, according to the perceptual hypothesis, the self-other difference reflects differences in visual perspective; the question then is whether we make other-like causal attributions for actions that we view ourselves performing on video (note: thesis topic here).

There is also an interesting literature, summarized by Kunda, on the use of the self as a reference point in judgments of others, and the complementary use of others as a reference point for judging the self.

There is also Tesser's "self-evaluation maintenance model", which seeks to explain how we compare ourselves to others.
 

2a. Discuss neuropsychological evidence (e.g., studies of brain-damaged patients) that bears on the question of how episodic and semantic information about the self is represented in memory.

This question could be addressed with respect to either self or others (given the assumption that, in many respects at least, the self is a person like any other). Basically, there are two lines of evidence. First, amnesic patients who have no episodic memory nevertheless can make accurate judgments about their own personality traits (an aspect of semantic memory). Second, amnesic patients who have no episodic memory can learn about the general characteristics (traits) of other people -- so there is not reason to think they could not do the same about themselves.
 

2b. Describe Forgas' "Affect Infusion Model" (AIM). Cite some evidence supporting it. Under what circumstances, according to AIM, will emotion affect social judgment?

Mood has many effects on social judgment, most of which parallel the effects of mood on memory. In particular, there is a mood-congruence effect: people who are happy tend to make positive judgments, people who are sad tend to make negative ones. Interestingly, despite the parallel between mood-congruent memory and mood-congruent judgment, Forgas argues that mood won't affect (pardon the pun) judgments that are based on memory retrieval. Go figure. Moreover, he argues that mood won't affect judgments guided by directional goals, because in this case the motives will override the emotions. But mood will affect judgments that are based on short-cut heuristic judgments; in this case, according to the theory, mood provides easily accessible information. If you're happy, positive features will come to mind. Mood will also affect judgments that are based on "substantive" processes involving elaborate analyses and systematic reasoning; in this case, the person's mood acts as a prime to facilitate mood-congruent judgments. If you're happy, you'll think make positive evaluations.
 

3a. Some theorists argue that the acquisition of a "theory of mind" (TOM) is the endpoint of cognitive development. What does this mean? What are the elements of a ToM? Compare mental retardation and autism in terms of the development of ToM.

By "theory of mind", we mean the belief that other people have minds like our own, although their contents can differ, and that we can make inferences about other people's mental states from their behaviors.

One view of theory of mind makes a distinction among (1) the understanding that we ourselves have minds that we can control; (2) metacognitive knowledge of he contents of our own minds, and of the principles by which our minds operate; and (3) knowledge of other minds -- that others have mental states, too, which we can infer from their behavior.

Another view, associated with Baron-Cohen, breaks the theory of mind down into four components: (1) an intentionality detector, by which we infer volitional mental states (goals and purposes) from behavior; (2) an eye-direction detector, by which we infer perceptual mental states from behavior; (3) a shared-attention mechanism which relates self, other, and object; and (4) theory-of-mind mechanism for inferring epistemic states such as thinking, knowing, believing, guessing, imaging, dreaming, and deceiving. The general idea is that autistic children lack the theory-of-mind mechanism, and may lack the shared-attention mechanism as well, resulting in specific deficits in social cognition and social relations. Mentally retarded individuals, however, are generally impaired intellectually, but have no particular deficits in social cognition.
 

3b. Traditionally, psychology has involved a search for "universal" principles of mental structure and function. Describe some evidence that suggests that there are cultural differences "between East and West" in social cognition.

By "universal" we mean the idea that there are principles of mental life that apply to all normal humans, in the same way that physical laws like gravity apply to all physical objects and biological laws like photosynthesis that apply to all (OK, most) plants, or evolution by natural selection that apply to all living things. Most psychological laws -- like the principles underlying size constancy, or relating attention to memory, or the rules of grammar -- apply to everyone everywhere.
But beyond these universals, cultural psychologists seem to have discovered some differences in how mind operates, across cultures. Kunda summarizes a number of these: independent vs. interdependent construals of self, asymmetries in the perceived similarity between self and other, gloabal versus contxtualized self-descriptions, the fundamental attribution error (which doesn't seem so fundamental, viewed cross-culturally), strategies for dissonance reduction, and self-enhancement vs. self-criticism. Each and every one of these need not be described, but a sample of them should be, along with clear definitions and examples.
 

4a. Describe Searle's distinction between observer-independent and observer-relative knowledge. How does this distinction relate to the distinction between intrinsic and derived intentionality? When one person constructs a mental representation of another person (e.g., George believes that Martha is extraverted), is the intentionality involved in this belief intrinsic or derived? How about when one group constructs a collective mental representation of another group (e.g., when George and Martha both believe that masculinity involves aggressiveness, and femininity involves emotionality).

This is intended to be a basic, lowest-common denominator "Searle" question, easily answerable by those who read the book: a good answer doesn't have to be particularly detailed. By working through the "Martha" question, I just want to give the student the opportunity to grapple with some of Searle's ideas. The particular answer you give to this question doesn't matter so much as the way in which you reason about it.

Basically, the distinction is between that knowledge whose truth-value (i.e., whether it is true or false) is independent of whose belief it is, and that knowledge whose truth-value depends on whose belief it is. The so-called natural sciences ostensibly deal with observer-independent knowledge: it's true that the Earth revolves around the Sun, and false that the Earth is the center of the Universe, regardless of what anyone believes. This is the kind of knowledge referred to by the physicist Steven Weinberg, when he says that "The laws of nature are inexorable", and would be discovered by anyone anywhere.

By contrast, observer-relative (or observer-dependent) knowledge is knowledge that is only true from a particular observer's (or society's, or culture's) perspective. I remember a particular event from my childhood, but not everyone else remembers it (and nobody remembers it quite like I do). The question in social science is to what extent its facts are observer-independent, and to what extent its facts are observer-relative.

Remember that in philosophy, intentionality has to do with reference, not with what we intend (philosophy can be difficult that way). As a general rule, intrinsic intentionality is observer-independent: the referent has to do with the features of the object or event, in and of itself. But derived intentionality is observer-relative, because the truth of the statement is based on some other fact or principle.

A statement such as "I am hungry" is observer-independent because it's true (or false) that I am hungry regardless of what anyone else believes. Similarly, my belief that Martha is extraverted is observer-independent: it's true that I believe that, regardless of what anyone else thinks. However, it may not be true that Martha is extraverted: my observer-relative belief may not match observer-independent reality. This can be checked by measuring Martha's degree of extraversion, as by a personality scale. But this strategy only works if extraversion is an observer-independent feature of Martha (and other people), one subject to objective measurement. But measuring personality traits is not necessarily like measuring physical traits such as height, weight, and hair color. This is because the social labels that we apply to people, such as neurotic or extraverted (or masculine or feminine, for that matter), may not be observer-independent features of people like Martha. They may be social constructions -- that is, labels or categories that are shared within a society or culture, but which have no meaning outside that group of people. So, whether and to what degree Martha is extraverted, and thus the truth-value of my (or society's) evaluation of her as extraverted, depends on the nature of these basic features of personality: are they observer-independent or not? Answering this question is critical for determining what kind of science psychology is.
 

4b. What are the characteristics of automatic, as opposed to controlled, processes? Under what circumstances are people most likely to engage in automatic as opposed to controlled social cognition?

Automatic processes (1) occur outside conscious awareness, (2) are executed without conscious intention, (3) cannot be stopped once their execution begins, and (4) consume few or no cognitive (attentional) resources. Controlled processes are the oppose of this. Whereas traditional views of describe social cognition as deliberate, thoughtful, and controlled, a popular revisionist view is that there is much about social cognition that is automatic and mindless, almost reflex-like. For example, Nisbett and Wilson point out failures of introspection (we don't know why we do what we do); Zajonc argues that mere exposure increases likeing, regardless of what one things; Bargh and his colleagues emphasize the role of unconscious priming in social judgments. In theory (and in much data, too), automatic processes prevail when people have little time, energy, or motivation to act thoughtfully (according to some theorists, this is most of the time, because at heart we are "cognitive misers"). So, when we are in mundane social situations; when we have to make snap judgments; and when we are simultaneously engaged in cognitively demanding activities, social judgments will occur more or less automatically, and get translated more or less automatically into social behavior.
 

5a. Knowledge of both individuals and groups can be represented conceptually. Distinguish between the classical, prototype, and exemplar views of conceptual structure, and give an example of how each view would apply to the organization of knowledge about individual persons or groups of people.

Concepts are mental representations of categories, and categories consist of objects (instances, exemlars) that are similar to each other in some respect. From the classical view, all objects in a category share certain defining (singly necessary and jointly sufficient) features in common. The set of defining features summaries the contents of the category. The prototype view retains the notion of a summary, but abandons the notion of defining features: instances of the category share a famil resemblance, and the summary prototype is an instance, real or imagined, which possess many category-consistent features, and few features that are category-inconsistent. The exemplar view abandons the notion of concept as summary: rather than a list of defining or characteristic features, the exemplar view holds that concepts are represented by a list of instances of the category. Any social concept can be construed under each view. One appropriate example would be the self-concept. Another appropriate example would be social stereotypes, which can be thought of as concepts about members of social groups.
 

5b. Much social cognition involves attributing traits to other people. How do we go about making these attributions? In answering this question, be sure to discuss the role of both judgment algorithms and judgment heuristics (and be sure to define these terms).

There are lots of ways to answer this question. One tack would be to describe correspondent inference theory. Another would be to describe Kelley's "covariation" calculus for causal attribution, based on consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness information. Yet another would be to describe Weiner's variant on the covariation calculus, according to which people make attributions concerning success and failure based on consensus and consistency information. Another would be to abandon such algorithmic approaches in favor of judgment heuristics and biases, such as the fundamental attribution error (itself a variant on correspondent inferences) or any of the self-other differences. Another would be to discuss Gilbert's distinction between automatic and controlled processes in attribution, whereby we automatically make dispositional attributions (invoking the fundamental attribution error), but then delibertely correcting them in order to make more appropriate situational attributions.
 

6a. Distinguish between self-schema (Markus), self-complexity (Linville), and self-guides (Higgins).

According to one traditional view, the self is just a self-description, containing those features or attributes that are true of the self. But Markus argued that the self is more organized than that, focusing on those features that are particularly important to the self. Thus, a person might be objectively described as extraverted, but extraversion would not become part of the self-schema unless extraversion was important to the way he or she viewed him- or herself. The self-schema, then, has a kind of observer-dependent flavor: it is not the person as he or she might be objectively described. Linville argued that some selves are monolithic, organized around a very few salient attributes, while other selves are complex, including many different features or aspects. People with high levels of self-complexity are, in theory, more flexible in their thought and action, because they have available a wider variety of ways to interpret self-relevant events. Higgins argued that there were three important aspects of the self: the actual self (one's representation of what one really is like), the ideal self (one's representation of the person he or she would like to be), and the ought self (one's representation of the person significant others would like him or her to be. In theory, at least, discrepancies between real and ideal selves are associated with depression, while discrepancies between real and ought selves are associated with anxiety.
 

6b. What is the role of motivation in social cognition? Distinguish between cognitive and motivational accounts of bias in social cognition. What are the roles of accuracy goals and closure goals?

Social cognition is about perception, memory, thought, and language, and the question is whether these cognitive processes stand alone, or alternatively are influenced by other, non-cognitive processes such as motivation and emotion. Kunda thinks they are, and she summarized this material under the label of "hot" (as opposed to cold, heartless) cognition. So, for example, the biases that infect social cognition could be purely cognitive in nature (e.g., due to some sort of automatic processing), or they could reflect affective or motivational influences (like the maintenance of self-esteem or positive affect). For another example, self-other difference in causal attribution could be given a purely cognitive explanation, in terms of differences in available information or differences in visual perspective; or they could be given a motivational explanation, in terms of self-esteem. When judgments of actions are affected by their outcomes (positive or negative), then something other than "purely" cognitive factors may be in play. Motivation is about goals, just as emotion is about feelings, and Kunda summarizes the literature about two broad kinds of goals: accuracy and closure. Many goals are directional in nature: to achieve one thing, or to avoid something else. Maintenance of self-esteem is an important directional goal in social cognition. But there are other relavant goals, such as accuracy and closure. In accuracy, the goal is arriving at the best conclusion, regardless of whether it is good or bad. Accuracy goals increase the complexity, and decrease the automaticity, of thought. In closure, the goal is to arrive at a firm, clear, conclusion, regardless of whether it is correct (accurate), and regardless of whether it is positive or negative, good or bad. Closure goals may invoke heuristic reasoning -- getting to a conclusion quickly and with the least expenditure of effort.