Introduction
Hailed by the United Nations as a model for peace, the 2016 peace deal in Colombia marked the ending of a fifty year civil war between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a Marxist guerilla terrorist organization otherwise known as FARC.
Three years later, however, the leader of FARC, Iván Márquez, denounced Colombia’s government for failing to uphold the peace accords and has declared a return to war. As Colombia faces unprecedented levels of violence from smaller armed groups fighting for control of the underground drug trade and over one million Venezuelans seeking refuge in the country, FARC’s official return to arms worsens Colombia’s political instability and adds to the violent turmoil between growing paramilitary groups, the government, and the people who get caught in between.
In order to sustain the 2016 peace accords, the Colombian government must reevaluate the root causes of armed conflict, particularly in rural areas, and take the necessary steps to work with community leaders to bring durable reform and security for groups and regions that are vulnerable to terrorist recruitment tactics.
The History and Significance of the Peace Accords
Following Colombia’s civil war, known as La Violencia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was created from pockets of communist communities uniting together against the Colombian military in 1964. In retaliation against the growth of FARC’s peasant revolt and seizure of massive land plots, Colombian landowners hired private armed groups which evolved into right-wing paramilitaries.
During the next fifty-two years, FARC waged a violent war against the Colombian military and paramilitary groups as well as other guerilla insurgencies which resulted in as many as 220,000 deaths. By the 1990s, FARC’s near monopoly on the production and trafficking of cocaine as a source of revenue for their military operations further exacerbated the conflict, which impacted an estimated 8.6 million victims, including nearly 50,000 disappearances, 32,000 kidnappings, and 7 million internally displaced people. Their growth was quickly stunted with Plan Colombia, in which the U.S. provided aid and military troops to help combat Colombia’s guerilla violence and drug trade, and the Uribe administration’s crackdown both contributed to significantly weakening the terrorist group.
As the 21st century neared, the Colombian government initiated peace talks with rebel forces, including FARC. After several abandoned ceasefires and unsuccessful treaty attempts, Colombia’s government successfully initiated a peace process negotiation in 2012 under the supervision of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Ratified in 2016, the peace accord addressed six key issues: the need for comprehensive rural reform, political participation, illicit drug trafficking, reconciliation for victims, and implementation.
Colombia’s peace process is unique in comparison to other peace accords because of its commitment to transitional justice for former FARC fighters and victims of the war. Both victims and FARC leaders were allowed to participate in these negotiations, and the accords created provisions for a special tribunal dedicated to determining accountability for human rights violators, a commission on missing persons, and protections for ex-FARC fighters.
In addition to a comprehensive justice and reconciliation system, the peace accords promised massive rural development initiatives, including land and education for marginalized and indigenous communities, and most unusually, guaranteed congressional seats for FARC members.
The 2016 Peace Accords ultimately reflected monumental shifts in the international dialogue on civil warfare, reconciliation processes, and state building processes that emphasize rural development and the need for stronger security institutions.
Why the Accords have Failed
Although the peace deal was ratified three years ago, many aspects of the accords, such as promised “transition communities” and agricultural reform in rural communities, either face severe limitations or have yet to be implemented. In disappointment, hundreds of former FARC members have left the government’s “transition communities” otherwise known as ETCRs (short for Territorial Spaces for Training and Reincorporation) and have regrouped in the jungles of Colombia. Another reason for the group’s return to arms can be attributed to the accelerated rise of assassinations of community leaders with leftist agendas.
The deterioration of the peace process was ultimately due to the unpopularity of the deal on both ends. Conservatives, led by former President Uribe and current President Duque view it to be too lenient on FARC, and FARC believes the lack of enforcement policies for reintegration and protection services delegitimizes the accords. In a referendum to pass the peace accords, 50.21% of Colombians voted to reject the deal. In the words of Gustavo Arnavat, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the fact that Colombians narrowly rejected the accord in their 2016 referendum “This vote shows you that while Colombians may want peace, they are very divided as to how that peace should be achieved.”
Despite the majority vote, President Santos continued the peace process with minor alterations and signed it into effect. In 2018, Iván Duque Márquez
was elected to the presidency, shortly thereafter creating a counterinsurgency campaign to roll back parts of the peace process he believed to be too lenient on former FARC fighters and leaders.
Constructed by the Colombian government after the accords, transition communities known as ETCRs function as safe havens for former FARC fighters to reintegrate into the Colombian workforce and social life. President Duque slashed funding for these ETCRs, a decision that went into effect a few weeks before FARC announced their return to arms. Along with these camps, former FARC members have also lost the protection services of the Colombian army. This loss of protection poses serious concern for former FARC fighters as it coincides with the recent release of several paramilitary leaders, such as “El Aleman,” as well as other guerilla groups wanting to eradicate FARC.
The violence in Colombia seems perpetual. FARC engages in violence as a means to their protection and declares war against the Colombia government. Eventually, they agree to lay down their arms, but then face severe attacks from other insurgency groups and consequently revert back to self-protective measures. The 2016 accords lays out ambitious platforms towards achieving durable peace, but arguably don’t account for Colombia’s lack of government infrastructure and established security institutions.
Solution for Peace: Civil Society
Civil societies play an instrumental role in peacebuilding through their functions of protecting, advocating and monitoring politically marginalized communities. Unfortunately, there is not much research on the ways in which civil societies can directly bring measures of peace to war-torn nations with weak security systems. These limited findings, however, do not negate the importance of existing civil societies, specifically non-profit organizations that have done and continue to work towards the betterment of societies.
From the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia to the Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco, there are several non-profit organizations that are dedicated to promoting and implementing sustainable agricultural reforms to rural communities in the country.
The Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia (FNC), in particular, provides a strong case study for the ability of non-profits to incorporate business models involving family-based farms as a means to provide financial stability for many rural communities. The FNC has created several national campaigns, such as the Juan Valdez movement to bring awareness of workers’ rights and promotes higher standards of living amongst coffee growers.
Because civil societies function at a grassroots level, they have the ability to represent the voices and concerns of communities with government agencies. Utilizing the influence of non-profit organization to promote sustainable peace would effectively restore the government’s relationship with marginalized groups.
Security in Colombia
Right-wing paramilitaries are of growing concern in the country. They were originally hired by politicians and wealthy landlords to prevent FARC’s land seizures and growing influence; however, much of their operations involve the protection of illicit drug trafficking.
Additionally, because they have been historically supported by government officials, solutions to the demobilization of paramilitary groups are harder to address. Although some of the groups, such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) has been designated as a terrorist group, their relationships with several government officials make accountability measures difficult and unlikely.
The Colombian government, however, is taking steps to address elected officials’ involvement with the AUC. Former President Alvaro Uribe has been charged with forming a paramilitary group during the 1990s and if indicted, will be the first former president to be imprisoned for their crimes. Holding leaders of paramilitary groups accountable regardless of their relationship with the Colombian government, is an important step towards establishing an intolerance towards insurgency groups engaged in egregious human rights violations.
Conclusion
FARC’s official return to arms worsens Colombia’s political instability and adds to the violent turmoil many Colombians experience. The 2016 peace accord, as controversial and unpopular as it has become, signifies a monumental shift towards peace in a post-colonial, rapidly modernizing world. Upholding the peace accord is important not just for Colombia, but for destabilized countries hoping to achieve peace. The government should make intentional efforts to collaborate with social leaders and non-profit organizations, and they should take the appropriate steps to terminate the unofficial relationships they have with paramilitary groups.