Chapter 2: Parmenides' challenge and Democritus' answer

Random number: 88



Summary


Our next philosopher is Parmenides of Elea. The single remaining work of Parmenides is a poem On Nature, which has survived only in fragmentary form. In this poem, Parmenides describes two different views of reality, "The way of truth"; constituting the study of what is, and how change is impossible, and existence uniform and unchanging, and "The way of opinion"; or the world of appearances, where one's sensory faculties lead to conceptions that are false and deceitful.


In his work, Parmenides describes a young man meeting a Goddess, who teaches him the way of the Truth. The Goddess first specifies the two ways of enquiry: either in your enquiry your subject (the [it]) is, and it is impossible for [it] not to be, or that it is not, and it cannot be.
Come now, and I will tell you (and you must carry my account away with you when you have heard it) the only ways of enquiry that are to be thought of. The one, that [it] is and that it is impossible for [it] not to be, is the path of Persuasion (for she attends upon Truth); the other, that [it] is not and that it is needful that [it] not be, that I declare to you is an altogether indiscernible track: for you could not know what is not - that cannot be done - not indicate it.


Parmenides concludes that it is meaningless to pursue the negative '[it] is not' line of enquiry, for how can you ever talk of something that does not exist? Parmenides follows with a warning against a second mistaken way, identified as the way of enquiry pursued by mortals; who do not make a decision to follow either the '[it] is' line of enquiry or the '[it] is not' line of enquiry, and who subsequently find themselves wandering helplessly in contradiction, taking something as both existing and not existing, and getting nowhere. By this process of elimination, Parmenides asserts that the only line of enquiry worth pursuing is the '[it] is'.
What is there to be said and thought must needs be: for it is there for being, but nothing is not. I bid you ponder that, for this is the first way of enquiry from which I hold you back, but then from that on which mortals wander knowing nothing, two-headed; for helplessness guides the wandering thought in their breasts, and they are carried along, deaf and blind at once, dazed, undiscriminating hordes, who believe that to be and not to be are the same and not the same; and the path taken by them all is backward-turning.


Parmenides draws a distinction between using your senses and using your reason. Parmenides asserts that your senses cannot be trusted, as they could lead you down the wrong the line of enquiry, '[it] is not'. Instead, by using and trusting reason, you can follow the correct line of enquiry, that '[it] is'.
For never shall this be forcibly maintained, that things that are not are, but you must hold back your thought from this way of enquiry, nor let habit, born of much experience, force you down this way, by making you use an aimless eye or an ear and a tongue full of meaningless sound: judge by reason the strife-encompassed refutation spoken by me.


So it seems that there is only one correct line of enquiry, that '[it] is'. It seems then that are an infinite number of enquiries that could possibly be made, inquiries into things that are, for instance a chair, a table, a pen, or a book. Parmenides however states his view that there is only one thing into which we can inquire, that is uncreated, imperishable, whole, of a single kind, unshaken, and perfect.
There still remains just one account of a way, that it is. On this way there are very many signs, that being uncreated and imperishable it is, whole and of a single kind and unshaken and perfect.


Parmenides describes his view that the object of our enquiry is both uncreated and imperishable. He states that because the only line of enquiry is into what is, we cannot say that this being 'is not'. For the being to grow and come out of nothing, it must have once not existed, but we cannot speak of that, so the being must be uncreated. Neither can the being perish, because to talk of the being perishing we must talk of it ceasing to exist, and becoming something that 'is not'. Hence the object of our enquiry is both uncreated and imperishable.
It never was nor will be, since it is now, all together, one, continuous. For what birth will you seek for it? How and whence did it grow? I shall not allow you to say nor to think from not being: for it is not to be said nor thought that it is not; and what need would have driven it later rather than earlier, beginning from the nothing, to grow? Thus it must either be completeley or not at all. Nor will the force of conviction allow anything besides it to come to be ever from not being. Therefore Justice has never loosed her fetters to allow it to come to be or to perish, but holds it fast. And the decision about these things lies in this: it is or it is not. But it has in fact been decided, as is necessary, to leave the one way unthought and nameless (for it is no true way), but that the other is and is genuine. And how could what is be in the future? How could it come to be? For if it came into being, it is not: nor is it if it is ever going to be in the future. Thus coming to be is extinguished and perishing unheard of.



Parmenides provides an argument that the object of our enquiry must also be Unchangeable. Parmenides argues that because it is impossible for our object to come into being or to perish, it is necessarily bounded by the limits of creation and perishing, and these bonds of a limit hold it in the same place and as the same thing. Furthermore, change implies that that 'it is not', for it to be and always to be it must necessarily be unchangeable. HELP
But changeless within the limits of great bonds it exists without beginning or ceasing, since coming to be and perishing have wandered very far away, and true conviction has thrust them off. Remaining the same and in the same place it lies on its own and thus fixed it will remain. For strong Necessity holds it within the bounds of a limit, which keeps it on every side.


Parmenides argues that the object of our enquiry must also be Perfect, because differentiation implies that it's character is different in different places, and this contradicts 'it is', as it has to be in entirety the same thing.

This is Parmenides' Challenge. He has reduced all of reality to 'The One', a uniform, perfect, uncreated and imperishable object.
Therefore it is right that what is should not be imperfect; for it is not deficient - if it were it would be deficient in everything. The same thing is there to be thought and is why there is thought. For you will not find thinking without whatis, in all that has been said. For there neither is nor will be anything else besides what is, since Fate fettered it to be whole and changeless. Therefore it has been named all the names which mortals have laid down believing them to be true - coming to be and perishing, being and not being, changing place and altering in bright colour. But since there is a furthest limit, it is perfected, like the bulk of a ball well-rounded on every side, equally balanced in every direction from the centre. For it needs must not be somewhat more or somewhat less here or there. For neither is it non-existent, which would stop it from reaching its like, nor is it existent in such a way that there would be more being here, less there, since it is all inviolate: for being equal to itself on every side, it lies uniformly within its limits.


To answer Parmenides' Challenge, Democritus proposes two first principles, Atoms, and the Void. There are infinitely many atoms that have all sorts of form and shapes, and these atoms collide with each other to form aggregates that constitute the objects around us. This solves Parmenides' Challenge by not only challenging Parmenides' assumption that one cannot talk about what 'is not' by assuming the existence of the Void, but also suggests that coming to be and change are due to the association and dissociation of eternal and immutable first principles.
Democritus calls space by these names - 'the void', 'nothing', and 'the infinite', while each individual substance he calls 'thing', the 'compact', and 'being'. He thinks substances are so small as to elude our senses, but they have all sorts of forms and shapes and differences in size. So he is already enabled from them, as from elements, to create by aggregation bulks that are perceptible to sight and the other senses. They [Leucippus,Democritus,Epicurus] said that the first principles were infinite in number, and thought they were indivisible atoms and impassible owing to their compactness, and without any void in them; divisibility comes about because of the void in compound bodies.


Democritus explains how worlds arise from the collision of atoms in giant whirpools. As the atoms spin together, the finer and lighter particles are thrown to the edges, and the heavier ones form a sphere inside. There is a membrane on the outside that continues to whirl. Democritus explains that because the atoms have different shapes, the atoms can hook together to form larger objects, i.e. compound bodies, which populate the world around us.
...Hence arise innumerable worlds... They come into being as follows: many bodies of all sorts of shapes move 'by abscission from the infinite' into a great void; they come together there and produce a single whirl, in which...they begin to separate aprt, like to like... Democritus holds the same view as Leucippus about the elements, full and void... he spoke as if the things that are were in constant motion in the void; and there are innumerable worlds, which differ in size...some hooked, some concave, some convex... these atoms move in the infinite void, becoming intertwined one with another according to the congruity of their shapes, sizes, positions and arrangements, stay together and so effect the coming into being of compound bodies.