1. The capacity of a normal person's "short-term" or "working" memory:

A. depends substantially on what particular type of items are in store.

B. is practically unlimited.

C. is limited primarily by the capacities of the long-term storage system.

D. is roughly seven items.*

92% correct, r_pb = .33. Yes, this is "the magical number seven, plus or minus two" -- the title of one of the most famous papers in psychology. Remember that the capacity of short-term memory is specified in terms of chunks of information: seven random letters, for example, but if the letters form meaningful words, seven words instead of letters.

2. Why are tests of recognition typically easier than tests of recall?

A. Only working memory is needed to store the material for recognition tests.

B. Recall, but not recognition, requires consolidation.

C. Recall requires verbal encoding but recognition requires only visual imagery.

D. Recognition tests usually provide better retrieval cues.*

89%, .29. Remember the principle of cue-dependent memory. Recognition tests provide richer, more informative cues to aid retrieval -- cues in the form of a "copy" of the item to be remembered; cued recall tests provide less cue information, and free recall tests provide hardly any cue information at all.

3. A loss of stored information as a function of time is called:

A. interference.

B. displacement.

C. consolidation failure.

D. decay. *

95%, .23. Interference (retroactive or proactive) among items stored in memory occurs at the time of retrieval. Displacement occurs when one item "knocks" another item out of memory storage, but it doesn't have anything to do with time. Consolidation failure occurs at the time of encoding. Decay occurs during storage, as a function of time.

4. Knowledge of the rules of causal attribution is represented in _____ memory.

A. declarative

B. procedural *

C. episodic

D. semantic

35%, -.04. A BAD ITEM. But procedural knowledge is knowledge of procedures, how to do things, including rules of various sorts, not the least are the rules that we use to figure out why something happened. Declarative knowledge is knowledge of facts, including the personal facts of episodic memory and the impersonal facts of semantic memory.

5. While trying to remember the license plate of a car that is speeding down the highway, 4CRT256, George notices that CRT is the abbreviation for "cathode-ray tube" and that 256 is 4 raised to the 4^th power. The success of this strategy illustrates the _____ principle of memory function.

A. elaboration*

B. organization

C. encoding specificity

D. schematic processing.

49%, .21.Elaboration is the process by which we create links between a new item of information and something we've already got stored in memory. Organization is the process by which we create links among new items of information. The encoding specificity principle states that the cue information encoded with a new item determines the most effective cues at retrieval. The schematic processing principle states that memory is better for schema-relevant events compared to schema-irrelevant ones, and that, among schema-relevant events, it is better for schema-incongruent than schema-congruent ones. George already knows what cathode-ray tubes are, and that they are abbreviated CRT; and he also knows that 256 = 4⁴. So, by recognizing the relevance of this pre-existing knowledge to the digits and letters of the license plate, he is engaging in elaborative activity.

6. During a party, Elizabeth couldn't remember the name of a particular movie star, but the name came to her on her way home. This illustrates the distinction between:

A. short-term and long-term memory.

B. availability and accessibility.*

C. state-dependency and cue-dependency.

D. reproduction and reconstruction.

87%, .21. Presumably the movie-star's name was stored -- that is, available -- in her long-term memory; otherwise she wouldn't have been able to remember it at all. But the fact that she remembered the name later indicates that her initial memory failure was one of retrieval -- that is, gaining access to information available in memory storage. Now, if she mistakenly confused the star's name with another star -- confusing Tom Cruise with Al Pacino, or Meryl Streep's with Keane Keaton's, that might be an instance of a reconstructive error.

7. According to the schematic-processing principle, which events will be remembered best?

A. Events that are relevant to our expectations.

B. Events that are irrelevant to our expectations.

C. Events that are congruent with our expectations.

D. Events that are incongruent with our expectations.*

77%, .47. See #5, above. Schema-congruent events get an advantage at retrieval, because the schema provides extra retrieval cues. Schema-incongruent events get an advantage at encoding, because they demand explanation, producing more elaborative activity. But as a rule the advantage of schema-incongruent is greater than that of schema-congruent events -- possibly because unexpected events are rare, and rare events are more salient.

8. The post-event misinformation effect, in which leading questions distort eyewitness memory, is closely related to:

A. maintenance rehearsal.

B. retroactive interference.*

C. retrograde amnesia.

D. elaborative rehearsal.

84%, .25. In the Loftus experiment presented in class, people who saw a stop sign and then were asked about a yield sign falsely remembered seeing a yield sign. Apparently, memory of the yield sign interfered with memory of the stop sign, and since the stop sign came first, the interference effect is retroactive, working backward in time.

9. A road sign showing the silhouette of a jumping deer is an example of a(n) __________ representation.

A. symbolic

B. analogical*

C. hypothetical

D. mental

55%, .44. Analog representations (like pictures) share physical features with the thing they represent; symbolic representations (like words) don't. If the sign had said simply "Deer Crossing", it would have been an example of a symbolic representation. But since it pictured the deer, it was analog in nature.

10. To which of the following questions will you probably respond most slowly?

A. Is a cat an animal?

B. Is aluminum a metal?

C. Is a penguin a bird?*

D. Is a pine a tree?

86%, .30. As a rule, the time it takes to answer a question about category membership is a function of the distance between the category name and the object name in a hierarchy. Cats are kinds of animals, and aluminum is a kind of metal, penguin a kind of bird, and pine a kind of tree. So, they're all separated by one level in a conceptual hierarchy. One exception to the rule, and it is an important exception so I felt free to ask you about it, concerns atypical category members -- about whom questions are generally answered slowly. A penguin is an atypical bird, and so it will take people relatively long for people to answer the penguin-bird question.

11. In much of human problem solving, like driving to an airport or making a medical diagnosis, each mental step toward the solution is usually:

A. the next logical one.

B. triggered or determined by the step that just preceded it.

C. relevant to the original problem and determined by both it and the preceding step.*

D. tried out in action before the next mental step is taken.

70%, .22. An awful lot of human problem solving is achieved by means of means-end processing, in which people calculate the distance from the current state to the present state, and then take some step to reduce the distance. So, the next step in a problem-solving sequence isn't determined by the prior step (as suggested by option B), but more determined by the goal (referred to in option C). A lot of people went for B, but means-end problem solving is mostly about looking ahead.

12. When we consider a number of different instances and try to determine a general rule that covers them all we are using:

A. hypothetical reasoning.

B. inductive reasoning. *

C. deductive reasoning.

D. conformational reasoning.

55%, .32. Inductive reasoning proceeds from specific instances to general principles: knowing that a bunch of different things are animals, we try to abstract the characteristics of animals in general. Deductive reasoning proceeds from general principles to specific instances: knowing what an animal is, we try to determine whether a specific object is a member of that class. We build up concepts inductively, from instances; we apply concepts deductively, to instances. Deductive reasoning often has the character of a hypothesis: If a thing is a bird, Then it has feathers and wings. I don't know what conformational reasoning is: I just made it up.

13. The prefrontal cortex seems to:

A. play an important role in working memory.*

B. be the primary center for linguistic processing.

C. be the primary center for visual processing.

D. be the primary center for auditory processing.

70%, .24. The prefrontal cortex is generally held to be the seat of human reasoning ability -- the place in the brain where we hold and juggle information while we try to work out various problems. That "holding and juggling while working" is what working memory is all about. Linguistic processing tends to take place elsewhere, such as Broca's and Wernicke's areas. Visual processing is the job of the occipital lobe, while auditory processing is the job of the temporal lobe.

14. In contrast to reasoning algorithms, judgment heuristics:

A. follow the rules of formal logic and statistical inference.

B. permit judgments to be made under conditions of uncertainty.*

C. inevitably lead to the correct solution, provided that they are correctly applied.

D. are extremely uneconomical, in terms of the time and effort required to apply them.

89%, .32. Reasoning algorithms follow logical rules and are guaranteed to yield the correct answer, but they can only be applied when all the information they require is available. One of the conditions of uncertainty is that all the information required by an algorithm isn't available. Other conditions include the unavailability of an algorithm, or the unavailability of the time or effort to use an algorithm that is available.

15. In categorization by fuzzy sets:

A. the category is represented by a list of defining features.

B. category membership is an "all or nothing" affair.

C. members of subordinate categories may not be nested under members of superordinate categories.*

D. every instance of the category is an equally good example of the type.

67%, .24. Proper sets represent category members by lists of features that are singly necessary and jointly sufficient to define a category. The reliance on defining features gives proper sets an all-or-nothing quality: you either have the features or you don't so you're either in the category or not. But fuzzy sets don't make use of defining features: they make use of characteristic features that are only imperfectly correlated with category membership. That makes the boundaries between contrasting categories fuzzy. Proper sets are homogeneous, in the sense that all their members share the same set of defining features; fuzzy sets are heterogeneous, with instances related to each other through family resemblance, and some instances more "typical" instances than others.

16. Negative racial, ethnic, and gender stereotyping may reflect the inappropriate use of _____ in judgment.

A. representativeness*

B. availability

C. simulation

D. anchoring and adjustment

74%, .19. Stereotyping is a classic example of the application of the representativeness heuristic, because (1) particular group members are taken to be representative of the whole group, without regard to whether that is so; and (2) qualities ascribed to the whole group are also ascribed to individuals, without taking into account the actual diversity among group members. Some people went for anchoring and adjustment here, which is a good second choice, but A&A would imply that the first members of a stereotyped group had the negative characteristics applied to the group as a whole, and there's no reason to think that is the case. In fact, stereotypes are so pernicious precisely because so many of the people who hold them haven't had any contact with members of the stereotyped group at all.

17. Many people believe that most homeless individuals are mentally ill, but this is not true. This error most likely reflects the inappropriate use of _____ in judgment.

A. representativeness

B. availability*

C. simulation

D. anchoring and adjustment

27%, .28. Availability refers to the ease with which instances can come to mind. The idea here was that we encounter homeless individuals who are (plausibly) mentally ill with some frequency -- if you don't believe me, just take a walk down Telegraph Avenue in Berkeley or down Market Street in San Francisco. But we don't see the large number of homeless people who are just down on their luck, and living in shelters or on the streets while going to work, attending school, and trying to keep their families together. So, the easy availability of instances of mentally ill homeless people biases our judgments of the mental health of homeless people as a whole.

18. In a criminal trial, a jury charged with determining whether a suspect is guilty focuses its deliberations on the prosecutor's evidence, rather than the arguments presented by the defense. In so doing, the jury risks error due to the _____ bias in hypothesis-testing:

A. availability

B. simulation

C. confirmatory*

D. disconfirmatory

87%, .31. In confirmatory hypothesis testing, we seek evidence that will confirm a hypothesis: if the hypothesis in a trial is that the defendant is guilty, prosecutors present evidence of a defendant's guilt, but ignore evidence of his or her innocence. In disconfirmatory hypothesis testing, we seek evidence that will disconfirm a hypothesis: defense attorneys present evidence of innocence, and ignore or explain away evidence of guilt. Of course, in the Anglo-American legal system there is the presumption of innocence, but this presumption only makes it clearer that the hypothesis at stake is that the defendant is guilty.

19. The response to "How are you?" is almost invariably "Fine." This is:

A. one of the few examples of speech behavior that easily fits into a behavioral account of language learning. *

B. an illustration of a frozen metaphor that provides evidence against an associative basis for language learning.

C. a demonstration of the difference between semantics and syntax.

D. a manifestation of a conversational rule that is both descriptive and prescriptive.

46%, .20. A BAD ITEM. The right answer is A: the virtually automatic response "Fine" is almost a classic example of conditioned verbal behavior. Almost as close to a reflex as we can get. A lot of you went for D, which was not bad: we say "Fine" no matter how we really feel -- and for that matter, we ask "How are you?" regardless of whether we're really interested, because that's what you're supposed to say. But that's not really what the conversational rules -- like cooperation or relevance -- are all about.

20. The word breadwinner contains __________ morphemes.

A. 1

B. 2

C. 3*

D. 5

78%, .43. The word contains 11 letters, 3 syllables, but it also contains 3 morphemes: bread, meaning something baked from flower; win, meaning to gain; and -er, meaning the person who does it.

21. If the psycholinguists are correct about the way in which the Sentence Analyzing Machinery works, which of the following sentences should result in the fastest reaction times?

A. The apple which the beautiful princess ate was poisoned by the wicked witch.

B. The apple which the wicked witch poisoned was eaten by the beautiful princess.

C. The beautiful princess was poisoned by the apple the wicked witch poisoned.

D. The wicked witch poisoned the apple and the beautiful princess ate that apple.*

71%, .41. SAM is very efficient at analyzing simple declarative sentences, where the surface structure is very close to the underlying (deep) structure, but takes longer the more the surface structure departs from deep structure (e.g., by being worded in the passive tense, or by using relative clauses). So are young children, which is one of the things that makes SAM interesting. Option D strings two simple declarative sentences together with a simple "and", and so this will be the easiest for SAM to understand. Some of you went for C, but the problem here is that SAM will require extra time to figure out that there is an implied which between the apple and the wicked witch poisoned.

22. Analyses of the linguistic abilities of children in the first year of life indicate that:

A. children begin to babble in order to initiate communication with their parents.

B. deaf children do not babble and they never develop speech.

C. infants have no means, other than babbling, to communicate with parents.

D. none of the above *

29%, .03. A BAD ITEM. Most of you went for A, but young children don't babble in order to initiate conversation. They don't have language yet, so they can't converse with anyone. Young children babble because they're built to babble: it's part of their innate language-acquisition mechanism, refining their vocal apparatus to produce the phonemes they hear in their language environment. Deaf children babble -- with their hands, if not vocally. Infants have lots of ways to communicate with their parents, not the least of which is crying.

23. If isolated from all forms of language, an infant such as Helen Keller would be likely to:

A. lack communication skills.

B. invent her own language forms. *

C. develop severe mental retardation.

D. remain socially isolated.

84%, .24. Language is a tool for human thought as well as a tool for human communication, and so the infant would invent her own language to represent things symbolically, and manipulate these symbols, even though nobody communicated with her.

24. There is general agreement among psychologists that chimpanzees can:

A. learn to utter most human speech sounds, even though they do not understand what it is that they utter.

B. learn a substantial number of manual signals for "words." *

C. learn rules to put words together in different sequences so as to express different meanings.

D. all of the above

78%, .31. Put bluntly, chimpanzees have semantics but not syntax. They can learn word-like symbols, such as the fact that blue star stands for banana, even if they can't speak; but they don't have the ability to use language grammar to put the "words" they know together in novel combinations to express different meanings. It's syntax that separates the smartest chimpanzee from the dullest human child. That and body hair.

25. The reactions of Asch's research participants to their experience in his study suggest that:

A. we believe that physical reality is socially shared.*

B. public opinion has little impact on privately held views.

C. our belief in physical reality is immune to social pressure.

D. human cognitive and social processes are separate and distinct.

78%, .31 (compare to the figures for #24 -- what's the chance of that?). We believe that other people see the same things we do, so when there's doubt about what we're seeing, we turn to others to help clarify the situation. Asch's subjects weren't engaged in blind conformity: they conformed more on "difficult" trials than on "easy" ones. The fact that interpersonal factors influence perceptual judgments is enough to demonstrate that human cognitive and social processes are not separate and distinct.

26. One of the factors that influences whether there is a relationship between attitudes and behavior is:

A. whether the attitude is specific or general. *

B. whether the behavior is specific or general.

C. whether the attitude is about a personal issue or an issue that affects others.

D. whether the attitude is political or religious.

36%, .22. TECHNICALLY NOT A BAD ITEM, BUT WE RESCORED IT ANYWAY. Specific attitudes are the best predictors of specific behavior. My attitude toward Gray Davis is a better predictor of my vote in the recall election than my attitude toward the Democratic party. But B was a good answer too: general attitudes may not be good predictors of specific behaviors, but they may be adequate predictors of behavior in general -- behaviors aggregated across time and context.

27. Three students are paid different amounts of money to give a speech in support of more difficult final exams, a position that is contrary to the attitudes of each of them. Sarah is paid $1, Lynn is paid $5, and Kelly is paid $20 According to dissonance theory, which student will be most likely to support difficult exams after giving the speech?

A. Kelly

B. Lynn

C. Sarah *

D. Each student will support difficult exams equally.

82%, .51. This item is about cognitive dissonance. Lynn got a lot of money, and Kelly got even more, to say something she didn't believe. So they can attribute their speech-making behavior to the reward they received. But Sarah was only paid a pittance -- not enough to justify her behavior. So, she has to resolve the cognitive dissonance by altering her attitude. So, Sarah will actually change her mind, and support difficult exams even after giving the speech and being paid, whereas the others will revert to their former opinions.

28. In evaluating information about a person in order to form an impression of his personality we tend to:

A. form an impression on the basis of the most recent information we have about him.

B. integrate initial and later information in order to form a well-rounded impression of a person's personality.

C. rely most heavily on the information which we first received about a person in forming our impressions about that person's personality. *

D. rely most heavily on recent information in forming an impression of a person, especially if our initial impression was unfavorable.

84%, .36. The primacy effect on first impressions -- the strong impact of early information on final judgments -- is a classic example of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. We do, in fact, integrate initial and later information, but the whole point about A&A is that we don't adjust our first impressions sufficiently to overcome our first impressions.

29. Attribution theory focuses on the assignment of either __________ or __________ causes for behavior:

A. dispositional; attributional

B. situational; dispositional *

C. attributional; situational

D. rational; emotional

72%, .39. Remember Lewin's formula, B=f(P,E)? Just as scientifically trained psychologists try to determine the extent to which behavior is a function of personal dispositions and situational demands, so do "naive" psychologists in the ordinary course of everyday living. Attribution theory attempts to explain how ordinary people go about explaining why people do what they do. Some people went C, but there are no "attributional" causes -- only situational or dispositional ones.

30. According to self-perception theory, we come to know ourselves:

A. through processes which are fundamentally different from those we use to learn about others.

B. by applying to our own behavior the same rules of inference we use in interpreting and understanding the behavior of others. *

C. intuitively, and by watching the reactions of others to us.

D. all of the above

50%, .40. Self-perception theory reverses the usual causal relation between attitudes and behavior: instead of our attitudes causing our behavior, as we usually think they do, Bem argued that our behavior causes our attitudes -- or, put another way, that we form attitudes that are consistent with our behaviors. In a sense, self-perception theory provides an alternative explanation for the phenomena that interest dissonance theory. But in the present context, Bem denies that we have any direct knowledge of our own attitudes. Rather, we infer our own attitudes from observations of our own behavior, just as we infer other people's attitudes from observations of their behavior.

31. The James-Lange theory of emotion and the self-perception theory both assert that:

A. our actions rarely reflect our true feelings or beliefs.

B. our actions are usually determined by our self-perceptions.

C. our feelings or beliefs are often the result of our action. *

D. our emotions and beliefs interfere with accurate self-perception.

83%, .44. The James-Lange theory of emotion is, like self-perception theory, an illustration of the principle that behavior can feedback to change the person's internal dispositions and other characteristics. For Bem, it's our beliefs and attitudes that are changed by our behavior; for James and Lange, it is our feelings.

32. Diffusion of responsibility leads to a(n) __________ probability of bystander intervention.

A. decreased *

B. increased

C. neutral

D. It depends on the situation.

86%, .30. Diffusion of responsibility refers to the fact that bystanders leave it up to other bystanders to intervene. If everybody does this, then diffusion of responsibility decreases the likelihood that anyone will intervene.

33. Consistent minorities:

A. have very little influence over other group members.

B. have faster effects than do consistent majorities.

C. often bring about social innovations. *

D. have the same effects as consistent majorities do.

62%, .43. Majorities often prevail, but if minorities hold out against the majority, over time (not immediately) they can often get the majority to shift its position. In this way, groups will come to do something different from what they ordinarily do -- in other words, something new.

34. Laboratory studies of leadership indicate that:

A. people perceived as leaders tend to be less and less outgoing than those not regarded as leaders.

B. leaders are most effective when the task to be performed is unclear or open-ended.

C. leaders are most effective when they have considerable authority, and group members get along well with each other. *

D. all of the above

85%, .31. Weak leaders are weak leaders, and its hard to lead when followers are competing with each other.

35. Deindividuation:

A. leads to an increased sense of responsibility.

B. tightens inhibitions on impulses.

C. is most likely under conditions of anonymity. *

D. seems to be a laboratory phenomenon that does not exist in the real world.

82%, .42. In an important sense, de-individuation refers to the individual's anonymity within a group setting -- that is, the person is seen only as a member of a group, and not as an individual with unique beliefs, attitudes, and so on.

36. In order to understand the meaning of an individual test score, it is necessary to know:

A. an individual's score on a criterion measure.

B. the norms of the standardization sample. *

C. the degree of construct validity.

D. none of the above

61%, .39. Test scores (like the SAT) are intended to predict criterion scores (like freshman year GPA); if we knew the individual's standing on the criterion, we wouldn't need the test scores. Individual test scores are meaningless in the absence of norms, which allow us to compare the individual's performance to that of others in the group. We get these norms from testing a "standardization sample" in the course of test development.

37. About what percentage of the U.S. population is classified as mentally retarded?

A. 0.1 percent

B. 0.6 percent

C. 2.5 percent *

D. 12 percent

59%, .17. Remember the rule of "68, 95, and 99"? That is to say, 68% of the population scores within 1 standard deviation of the mean, 95% within 2 standard deviations, and 99% within 3 standard deviations. So that means that 5% of the population have IQs more than 2 standard deviations from the mean, half (2.5%) above the mean and half (2.5%) below. The criterion for mental retardation is an IQ that is more than 2 standard deviations below the mean. So that means that, in terms of IQ, about 2.5% of the population would be classified as mentally retarded. Of course, you also have to fail to meet environmental demands in order to be classified as retarded, so the figure is a little less than that. But that is beyond the scope of this question.

38. Fluid intelligence refers to:

A. previously acquired skills and information.

B. the ability to deal with new problems. *

C. verbal ability.

D. performance measures.

83%, .42. In Cattell's theory, fluid intelligence refers to raw reasoning and problem-solving ability; crystallized intelligence refers to knowledge acquired through learning. Most of those who missed this item just got the terms backwards: but fluid intelligence is crystallized by learning, just as fluid water is crystallized by cold (well, that's actually a crummy analogy, but you get what I mean).

39. Attempts to teach memory strategies to mentally retarded individuals have had limited success because:

A. these individuals could not learn the usual strategies.

B. memory strategies did not affect recall performance.

C. the learned strategies were not generalized to new task situations. *

D. these individuals preferred to use their own strategies.

80%, .51. The mentally retarded can learn to perform specific tasks in specific situations. That's what sheltered workshops do. Where the retarded have difficulty is in generalizing what they have learned to new situations.

40. When we compare the similarity in intelligence scores for identical twins reared together with identical twins reared apart, we find that identical twins reared apart are:

A. significantly less similar than are identical twins reared together.

B. nearly as similar as identical twins reared together. *

C. as similar as identical twins reared together in mathematical skills, but significantly different in verbal abilities.

D. none of the above

79%, .26. Just as with many other individual differences, MZ twins are more similar in intelligence than DZ twins, which provides prima facie evidence for a genetic contribution to the trait. But plausibly, MZ twins also share more similar environments than do DZ twins. That's why MZ twins reared apart have been so interesting. The fact is, that MZ twins reared apart are also highly similar -- statistically, there is no significant difference. This fact is not decisive, because there are several ways to explain it without invoking heritability, but it adds weight to the claim of a genetic contribution to individual differences in intelligence.

41. Even a perfect measure of personality structure would not allow us to predict behavior with absolute accuracy because:

A. personality only provides a disposition; circumstances determine how that disposition will be expressed. *

B. personality structure is unstable and changes from moment to moment.

C. personality traits are only theoretical constructs.

D. personality structures change just because of the testing experiences.

89%, .26. Just as genotypes interact with environments to produce a phenotype that is not necessarily exactly what the genotype "planned", so personal characteristics interact with environmental demands to determine what a person will actually do when confronted with a particular situation.

42. The criticism that the Rorschach test and the TAT have little or no "incremental validity" in clinical practice means that the results of these tests:

A. add little, if any, significant information to what is known from case histories. *

B. do not improve with increased expertise of the administrator.

C. do not distinguish between major diagnostic groups.

D. are scored differently by different clinicians.

74%, .31. This is a question of the utility of personality assessment. Projective techniques are not just less valid than objective techniques; they are also less efficient. Which is to say, that there are simpler ways of getting the same assessment. Once we know the person's biography and objective test scores, projective tests tell us little that is new. And if all we have is the person's biography, objective test scores will give us more new information than projective test scores will. Projective tests may have some validity, in that they are able to distinguish between some diagnostic groups (so Option C is wrong), and they are probably more valid in the hands of experts than of novices (so Option B is wrong), but they just aren't worth the effort to administer and score them. Projective tests may be scored differently by different clinicians, because their scoring rules are sometimes pretty vague. But even when they are scored according to rigorous rules, they still don't provide much predictive power.

43. An eight-year-old boy is rated as highly aggressive because he fights with his peers a great deal. Results from longitudinal studies of traits suggest that:

A. he will show the same overt behavior as an adult.

B. his adult level of aggressiveness cannot be predicted.

C. his aggressiveness will decrease significantly over the years.

D. he will remain more aggressive than average, but exhibit it in different ways. *

74%, .28. There's some temporal stability over time to broad personality traits (such as aggression), just as there is also broad consistency across situations. Aggressiveness may diminish from childhood to adulthood, but the point of the question is that childhood aggressiveness will predict adult aggressiveness to some extent: a child who is more aggressive than average will likely grow into an adult who is also more aggressive than average. Of course, children and adults manifest aggressiveness in different ways: children may bite, but adults make "biting" remarks. It's still aggression.

44. Depression is related to the attribution of bad events to causes that are:

A. internal, global, and stable. *

B. external, local, and stable.

C. internal, local, and unstable.

D. external, global, and stable.

18%, .27. Internal attributions are attributions to the person rather than the environment; global attributions are attributions for everything as opposed to some particular thing; and stable attributions are attributions that don't change over time. According to the helplessness-hopelessness theory of depression, people become depressed because they (1) attribute negative outcomes to themselves; (2) do this every time something bad happens; and (3) think this will never change. An awful lot of you went for C, but the thing about depressives, from the H-H point of view, is that they take personal responsibility for every bad thing that happens to them. Nondepressives may take personal responsibility for some bad event, but they also think that things will be different next time, under different circumstances. This was a tough item, but it shouldn't have been that tough, because the contrast between global and local attributions, and stable and unstable attributions, is pretty clear.

45. Jack and Jill are both patients in a fear clinic. Jack rates his fear of exams as "6" on scale of 1 to 10, while Jill rates her fear of exams as "3" on the same scale. Jack rates his fear of snakes as "9" on the 1 to 10 scale, while Jill rates her fear of snakes as "6". Assuming that Jack and Jill are representative of men and women at large, and that exams and snakes are representative of fears as a whole, such a finding would illustrate the following principle:

A. personal attributes are more powerful determinants of fear than are situations.

B. situational features are more powerful determinants of fear than are personal factors.

C. personal attributes and situational features independently determine fear.*

D. personal attributes and situational features interact to determine fear.

11%, -.04. A BAD ITEM. I often ask an item like this, but this one just didn't work. Jack and Jill are persons, and you can estimate the contribution of personal factors -- individual differences between Jack and Jill -- by averaging their fear across the two situations. When you do, you get an average of 7.5 for Jack and 4.5 for Jill. So, the difference between "persons" is 3 units. The test and the snake are situations, and you can estimate the contribution of situational factors -- differences between snake stimuli and test stimuli -- by averaging the fear they induce across persons. When you do, you get an average for exams of 4.5, and an average for snakes of 7.5. So the difference between situations is also 3 units. The most important thing to note is that the difference in fear between Jack and Jill is constant across situations (3 units), and the difference in fear between exams and snakes is constant across persons (3 units). The effects of person and situation are additive, meaning that personal and situational features independently determine fear.

46. Assume that we observe that a socially desirable personality trait such as agreeableness is positively correlated with another socially desirable trait such as conscientiousness. This fact (assuming that it is true) would be consistent with the _____ assumption of the doctrine of traits.

A. coherence*

B. stability

C. consistency

D. predictability

41%, .34. Coherence has to do with the assumption that different behaviors co-occur, because they are caused by the same subordinate personality trait; and that different traits are correlated, because they are caused by the same superordinate personality trait. Thus, agreeableness and conscientiousness are positively correlated -- they hang together -- because they're different aspects of a much larger trait, known as social desirability. Stability has to do with correlations over time; consistency with correlations across situations; predictability with the correlations between traits and behaviors.

47. The "personality coefficient" is:

A. a statistic commonly used to measure the stability and consistency in social behavior.

B. the upper limit on the correlation between personality traits and specific behaviors.*

C. an index of the amount of reciprocal determinism observed in a person-by-situation interaction.

D. consistent with the weak version, but not the strong version, of the doctrine of situationism.

45%, .36. See Item #41. Personality in general (as measured, for example, by a questionnaire) predicts behavior in some situation (thus, it's about predictability, not stability or consistency; and it's about P==>B, not the reciprocal B==>P), but the correlation is limited by the fact that situations also influence behavior. Because the "personality coefficient" is relatively low (Mischel estimated it as r=.30), it is actually more consistent with the strong version of situationism, because it implies that situations are more powerful than traits.

48. The relationship between facial expressions and emotion illustrates:

A. reciprocal causality between personal attributes and behavior. *

B. reciprocal causality between situational features and behavior.

C. reciprocal causality between the person and the situation.

D. the role of conformity in emotional experience and expression.

36%, .25. See Questions #30 and 31, which ask this same question in a different way. The very notion of "facial expression" implies that the emotion comes first, and then is expressed by the face; but we also know, consistent with the James-Lange theory of emotion, that putting on different facial expressions can change our emotional states. Thus, they illustrate the reciprocal (i.e., bidirectional) causal relationship between personal attributes (like emotions) and behavior (like facial gestures).

49. In Darley and Latane's experiment on altruism (bystander intervention), pluralistic ignorance refers to the hypothesis that bystanders' reluctance to take action:

A. occurs because they believe they lack the competence to do so.

B. stems from their belief that help is already on the way.

C. is overcome when they observe someone else rendering assistance.

D. persuades others that the situation is not an emergency.*

72%, .41. Pluralistic ignorance is important, because it illustrates how behavior can shape the situation. If nobody does anything because they're looking at each other for clues as to whether the situation is really an emergency, this behavior -- or, rather, the lack thereof) effectively defines the situation as a nonemergency. The belief that help is already on the way is closer to the diffusion of responsibility (see Item #32).

50. When nursery-school children are required to wait for a highly desirable reward in the delay-of-gratification situation, they can wait longer if they:

A. can see the reward they've been promised.

B. think about what it will be like to get the reward.

C. distract themselves by playing with toys.*

D. can signal the experimenter to return to the room.

90%, .45. Some kids show high levels of delay behavior, but not because they possess some trait like ego control. Rather, it's because they do things that change the situation into one in which it's easier for them to wait -- either the objective situation, through a behavioral manipulation like self-distraction, or through a cognitive transformation, like altering the way they think about the reward.