A. semantic or generic memory.
B. working memory.
*C. secondary or long-term memory.
D. implicit memory.

47% correct, item-to-total r = .38. Primacy and recency are the two components of the serial-position effect in memory -- the fact that items from the beginning and the end of a list are more likely to be remembered than items from the middle. The usual explanation for the serial position effect is that recency reflects retrieval from short-term (primary) or working memory, while primacy reflects retrieval from long-term (secondary) memory.

A. was never placed into long-term memory.
B. cannot be retrieved from working memory.
C. is lost forever in working memory.
*D. is presently unretrievable from long-term memory.

90%, .26. Encoding processes make knowledge available in memory storage; retrieval processes gain access to available knowledge so that it can be put to use in mental activities. Explanations of forgetting basically boil down to two classes: failures of availability (e.g., a failure to encode a memory in the first place, or its loss from storage due to decay or displacement) and failures of accessibility (i.e., a failure to retrieve an available memory). So, access failures are all retrieval failures.

*A. short-term or primary memory.
B. long-term or secondary memory.
C. episodic or autobiographical memory.
D. semantic or generic memory.

73%, .31. Classical associationistic theories of learning and memory emphasized the role of rehearsal or repetition, but we now know that rote rehearsal does little more than maintain information in an active state -- e.g., short-term (primary) or working memory. In order to encode a more permanent trace in long-term (secondary) memory, the information must be subject to elaborative rather than maintenance rehearsal -- establishing relations between individual items of new information and previously stored knowledge (elaboration) or establishing relations among individual , or organizing in

A. simpler; less
B. simpler; greater
C. more elaborate; less
*D. more elaborate; greater

91%, .39. Elaboration has to do with connecting new knowledge to old knowledge. The more such connections are established, the richer (more elaborate) the trace is. And the richer the trace, the easier it is to retrieve.

A. proactive interference.
*B. retroactive interference.
C. displacement.
D. decay.

60%, .28. This episode of forgetting could, in principle, reflect decay or displacement, but decay and displacement are not the primary modes of forgetting in long-term (secondary) memory. Most such cases of forgetting are due to retrieval failures, and the general framework for understanding retrieval failure is interference. In this case, where new information makes older information hard to remember, the interference is retroactive, acting backward (retro) in time. In cases where old information makes newer information hard to remember, the interference is proactive, acting forward (pro) in time.

A. richness and informativeness
*B. type or quality
C. organization
D. elaboration

37%, .17. A BAD ITEM, although the answer is pretty clear. The encoding specificity principle is an extension of the cue-dependency principle. Cue-dependency states that memory is a function of the richness and informativeness of the cues presented at the time of retrieval; encoding specificity states that it's not so much the quantity of cues available, as it is of the quality of the cues: that is, the best retrieval cues are those that match the cue information processed at the time of encoded. Put another way, it's the type of cues, not simply the number of cues, that matters. Elaboration and organization are two principles that govern the encoding, not the retrieval, of memories.

A. organization
B. cue-dependency
*C. schematic processing
D. encoding specificity

61%, .22. This is intended as an application of the schematic-processing principle. The subjects' pre-experimental attitudes favoring Nader can be thought of as constituting a schema, and memory favors both schema-congruent information (e.g., arguments favoring Nader) and schema-incongruent information (e.g., arguments opposing Nader). According to the most prominent theory of schematic processing, memory for schema-congruent information is enhanced because the schema provides additional retrieval cues at the time of retrieval, but memory for schema-incongruent information is enhanced because of additional processing at the time of encoding, as the subject tries to reconcile the discrepancy between schema and reality.

*A. aspects of declarative memory acquired prior to his surgery and procedural memory of things learned both before and since his surgery.
B. procedural memory for most things acquired prior to his surgery and episodic memory of things learned both before and since his surgery.
C. procedural memory for most things acquired prior to his surgery and semantic memory for events that have happened since his surgery.
D. implicit memories prior to his surgery and explicit memories since then.

70%, .45. The amnesic syndrome resulting from bilateral damage to the hippocampus and other structures in the "medial temporal-lobe memory system" primarily affects explicit expressions of episodic memory, and leaves semantic memory, procedural memory, and implicit expressions of episodic memory relatively intact. Accordingly, HM shows little retrograde amnesia, retains declarative and procedural knowledge acquired before his surgery, and has been able to acquire new procedural knowledge, expressed implicitly in behavioral changes in the absence of conscious recollection, since then.

A. people are incapable of reasoning logically.
*B. choices are made to optimize gains and minimize losses.
C. choices are made without regard to the efficiency of achieving goals.
D. people reason according to fuzzy logic.

93%, .15. The normative model assumes that people reason according to the principles of logic and statistical inference; that they make choices that optimize rational self-interest by maximizing gains and minimizing losses; and further that their choices achieve optimality in the most efficient way possible.

A. features are only imperfectly correlated with category membership.
*B. subsets are created by adding defining features to supersets.
C. there are sharp horizontal, but fuzzy vertical, boundaries between adjacent categories.
D. categorization is not based on a calculation of similarity.

68%, .21. According to the classical view, categories are groups of objects that share in common a set of defining features that are singly necessary and jointly sufficient to determine category membership. According to this view, defining features are perfectly correlated with category membership; because membership in the set is defined by features whose presence has an all-or-none quality, both horizontal and vertical boundaries between adjacent categories sharply defined; and categorization depends wholly on similarity -- i.e., whether the features of the object include the defining features of the category. In the proper set view, categories are arrayed vertically into hierarchies in which supersets are created by subtracting defining features, and subsets are created by adding defining features.

A. hierarchical structure of these concepts in semantic memory.
B. relative difficulty in access to episodic memory.
C. memory activation.
*D. typicality.

74%, .42. According to the traditional view of the hierarchical organization of concepts, response latencies in a concept-verification task ("Is a robin a bird?) vary according to the distance between the levels at which the subject (robin) and referent (bird) are represented. So, a potential hierarchy of concepts would look like: thing
|
animal
|
bird
|
penguin
|
Emperor penguin. The prediction is that it would take longer to verify that penguin is an animal than it would to take longer to verify that a penguin is a bird. In this example, robin and penguin lie at the same level of the conceptual hierarchy, so it should take equally long to verify the statements at issue. But it takes longer to verify that penguins are birds than that robins are birds. This is because penguins are not typical birds. Such typicality effects are inconsistent with the classical view of categories as proper sets, and led to the development of the revisionist view of categories as fuzzy sets.

*A. always leads to a solution to a problem.
B. represents the quickest way of solving a problem.
C. involves forming some hypothesis about a likely solution to the problem and using this hypothesis to direct the problem solving.
D. guarantees subgoals that need to be satisfied in order to reach a solution to the problem.

88%, .40. An algorithm is a recipe for solving a problem which specifies the elements that must be considered and how they are to be combined. Whenever a problem is soluble, correct application of the appropriate algorithm must lead to the correct solution. Sometimes the algorithm specifies only a single step to the solution; other algorithms involve intermediate steps, meaning that problem has to be broken down into subproblems, each of which must be solve in turn. However, algorithms may be time-consuming to apply, which is why people often resort to heuristic. One such heuristic involves generating and testing a hypothesis about how the problem might be solved, a strategy that can lead to phenomena like functional fixedness.

A. there are no obstacles present to reaching the goal.
B. the initial state is given but the final state is not.
C. cannot be solved by means-end strategies.
*D. the initial conditions, goals, and intermediate operations are completely specified.

90%, .11. All problems have obstacles standing between the initial state and the goal state: otherwise they wouldn't be problems. Well-defined problems admit only one representation of their initial conditions and goals, and they fully specify the intermediate operations that get the problem-solver from the initial state to the goal state. This full specification constitutes the algorithm for solving that particular problem. Often, this algorithm involves means-end analyses. Ill-defined problems admit more than one representation, because either their initial state or their goal state is not completely specified; the solution you get depends on how the problem is represented.

*A. people have little difficulty drawing logical conclusions from the premise that P is true.
B. people have little difficulty drawing logical conclusions from the premise that Q is true.
C. people have more difficulties testing logical hypothesis presented in concrete, everyday terms.
D. b and c

47%, .37. Inductive reasoning reasons from particulars to generalities. Deductive reasoning reasons from generalities to particulars, as in "All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is mortal". We can express this in syllogistic form, "If X is a man, then X is mortal". Then we can test the validity of the syllogism by seeking data of various kinds: If Socrates is a man (the premise P), then Socrates is mortal; if he is a man but not mortal, then the syllogism is invalid. People don't have any difficulty with this kind of reasoning, which is known as modus ponens. However, if Socrates is mortal (the premise Q), it does not follow that Socrates is a man, because other beings are mortal too. People have a lot more difficulty with this kind of reasoning, leading to an error known as "affirming the consequent". However, people have most difficulty reasoning with syllogisms expressed in terms of P, Q, and the like. When they are presented with the same syllogism, but couched in concrete language (All men are mortal, etc.), they have a lot less difficulty.

A. the availability heuristic.
*B. the representativeness heuristic.
C. the simulation heuristic.
D. anchoring and adjustment.

76%, .14. Craig is assuming that the instance resembles the population from which it was drawn, which is the core definition of the representativeness heuristic. I suppose that it could reflect the availability heuristic as well, but a better illustration of availability would be if Craig had met a number of Kiwis (as New Zealanders often call themselves), the most recent of whom was friendly and funny. The simulation heuristic doesn't apply. Anchoring and adjustment would apply if Craig's judgment of individual New Zealanders was biased by his judgment of the first one he ever met -- an illustration of the strength of first impressions.

A. testing more examples than are necessary to confirm the hypothesis.
B. looking for evidence against the hypothesis, rather than considering all evidence equally.
C. assuming that any hypothesis that sounds reasonable with respect to prior knowledge is true.
*D. paying more attention to evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis than to contradictory evidence.

92%, .30. Confirmation bias refers to the tendency for people to test hypotheses by seeking evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis, instead of seeking evidence that is inconsistent with the hypothesis. A variant on confirmation bias, in which the person doesn't have to seek evidence, but simply has to select among available pieces of evidence, is that people pay more attention to hypothesis-consistent evidence than they do to hypothesis-contradictory evidence.

*A. take risks to avoid losses.
B. take risks to increase gains.
C. choose options that emphasize the low possibility for loss rather than those that emphasize the high possibility for gain.
D. optimize rather than satisfice.

45%, .35. In general, people are held to be risk-averse: given a choice, they prefer a sure thing to a risk. Offered the choice between gaining $100 and a 50% chance of gaining $200, most people prefer the former. Risk aversion itself is inconsistent with normative rationality, because people should prefer risky outcomes whose value is greater than sure things. But it turns out that people are not necessarily risk-averse. They're perfectly willing to take a risk to avoid losses: suppose, for example, you were offered the choice between losing $100 and having a 50% chance of losing $200. In general, choices depend a lot on how they are framed (which is why we call them framing effects), rather than on the probabilities in question. And Simon found that individuals and organizations satisfice rather than optimize.

A. experiencing retrograde amnesia.
*B. exhibiting a problem of reference.
C. fond of shoes.
D. too young to verbalize "truck."

96%, .16. Pointing to an object and naming it is a classic demonstration of the referential property of language: that the words we use refer to objects in the real world. The mistake in question, then, is a mistake in reference.

A. 1
*B. 2
C. 3
D. 8

71%, .36. A phoneme is the smallest sound unit in a spoken language. A morpheme is the smallest unit of meaning. The word studying contains 8 letters, 5 phonemes (s-t-u-d-y-ing), and two morphemes: study- and -ing.

A. timing and intonation
B. syntax
*C. extralinguistic factors
D. inference

54%, .26. By extralinguistic factors we mean factors other than those that are contained in language and speech. Syntax is a property of language, timing and intonation are properties of speech, inference is something that the listener does with the speaker's utterance. But we also make inferences about meaning from things like the posture and facial expression of the speaker, information that is not available over the phone.

A. children are not capable of imitation at the age they acquire language.
B. reinforcement, and not imitation, appears to be the mechanism by which children acquire language.
*C. children utter sentences that they have never heard spoken by the people around them.
D. children who frequently imitate others tend to acquire language faster than children who do not imitate.

72%, .41. Children are capable of imitation from shortly after birth, so Option A can't be right. But they also utter sentences that they have never heard (Option C). So, for example, a child of a particular age will say 'I goed to the zoo yesterday", when what he or she has heard adults say is "I went to the zoo". This is decisive evidence against imitation, because the child isn't imitating anything. Rather, he or she is overgeneralized a rule that he or she has learned from exposure to the speech of people around him or her -- a speech environment in which he or she has never, never, heard the word goed.

A. no system of functional communication can be developed in the absence of auditory stimuli.
B. sign language is unlike spoken language because it has few morphemes and it lacks syntactical structure.
*C. similar developmental stages exist for the acquisition of sign language in deaf children and spoken language in hearing children.
D. sign language only permits very primitive and basic communication between individuals.

97%, .24. Deaf people have language, they just don't have oral language (unless they are specially taught). But they do have sign language, and sign language develops just like any other language does. It's a real language, after all, with syntax and everything, fully capable of expressing any idea that any other language can express.

A. Chimpanzees can learn manual signals as "words."
B. Chimpanzees are capable of some propositional thought.
*C. Chimpanzees can learn complex syntactical rules.
D. Chimpanzee vocal tracts cannot produce human speech.

89%, .29. Chimpanzees don't have a vocal tract that permits the wide variety of sounds required for spoken language. But speech isn't the same as language, and the question is not whether chimpanzees can speak (they can't), but whether they have language. They're smart little animals, to be sure, and they can learn some abstract symbols, which function as "words" for them. Thus, for a chimpanzee, a red triangle can represent a banana, just as the word "banana" represents a banana for humans. And they can even construct some simple propositions like "Eat banana now". But they can't acquire complex syntactical rules -- rules that even rather dull children acquire easily.

*A. it measures the characteristics that it was designed to measure.
B. it consistently measures whatever it is designed to measure.
C. scores obtained on the test are precise and accurate.
D. an individual's score on the test remains the same over long periods of time.

28%, .20, A BAD ITEM, because Option C is partly correct, even though Option A is more correct. Psychometric instruments, like all measurement devices, must have two properties, reliability and validity. Reliability hs to do with the stability of measurement: if you measure a table twice with the same ruler, you ought to get the same result both times. Validity has to do with the accuracy of measurement (which is part of Option C): if you want to know how long a table is, you don't put it on a scale. Put another way, a test is valid if it measures what it is supposed to measure, as opposed to something else (which is what Option A states). In the domain of personality, for example, you wouldn't use a scale of extraversion to measure a person's neuroticism. The extraversion scale might well yield a consistent measurement (Option B), and the scores might well be precise to the third decimal place (the other part of Option C), and the individual's score might remain stable over long periods of time (Option D), but these are all aspects of reliability, not validity.

*A. mild
B. moderate
C. severe
D. profound

63%, .39. I love to ask this question because it relies on knowledge of the normal (bell-shaped) curve. Mentally retarded individuals are, if nothing else, those with measured IQs more than 2 standard deviations below the mean, or below 70 on a standard scale (like the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale) with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. If follows from the shape of the normal curve that there are more people closer to the mean than far away from it. Therefore, there are far more people with "mild" retardation (e.g., with IQs between 60 and 70) than there are with more severe levels of retardation (e.g., with IQs below 60)..

*A. the positive intercorrelations for tests of different intellectual skills.
B. the fact that different tests tap different specific abilities.
C. the tendency for people to score well on either verbal or mathematical tests, but not both.
D. high reliability coefficients for the results of individual tests.

74%, .45. Spearman inferred g from the fact that different mental tests all correlate positively with each other. That is, if you are high on verbal intelligence, you tend to be high on mathematical intelligence. This coherence among different measures of IQ suggests that there is a single general ability underlying all tests, even if each different test requires some specific ability as well. If there were no general factor of intelligence, then we would expect the correlations among different mental tests to hover around zero.

A. show skills characteristic of several intelligences, not just one.
*B. are fewer in number than one would expect if intelligences were truly independent of one another.
C. don't live very long and they do not develop their other intelligences.
D. none of the above

43%, .38. Gardner's theory is that the various kinds of intelligence are modular, meaning that they are served by different areas (or systems of areas) of the brain. Retarded or autistic savants occur when one of these modules escapes the damage to the other modules that causes the retardation. But if this were the case, there ought to be more savants than there are, because there ought to be more individuals who, just by chance, escape damage to one or the other module. Moreover, there ought to be cases in which more than one module escapes damage. The fact is that there are relatively few savants in either the retarded or autistic population -- far fewer than we would expect by chance alone, given the numbers of retarded or autistic individuals in the population.

A. the intelligence scores of adopted children are correlated with the intelligence scores of their adoptive mothers.
B. the intelligence scores of fraternal co-twins are more highly correlated than those of non-twin siblings.
C. the longer children are in impoverished environments the lower their intelligence scores are likely to be.
*D. all of the above

70%, .31. If there were no environmental contribution to intelligence, the IQs of adopted children would be correlated only with the IQs of their biological mothers. Therefore, the fact that their IQs are correlated with those of their adoptive mothers as well indicates a role for the environment as well as heredity (Option A). Fraternal co-twins, like nontwin siblings, share only 50% of their genes in common. Therefore, the fact that the IQs of fraternal twins are more highly correlated than those of nontwin siblings indicates a role for the (shared) environment, which is more alike for siblings of the same age than it is for siblings of different ages (Option B). IQ is correlated with the length of exposure to improverished environments, illustrating a role for the environment as well (Option C). Because all three of Options A-C are correct, Option D is the best correct answer.

A. B refers to thoughts, feelings, and desires.
B. E refers to the social but not the physical environment.
*C. causality is unidirectional.
D. there are reciprocal causal paths between B and P, and between B and E, but not between P and E.

29%, .29. For Lewin himself, Behavior is caused by both Personal and Environmental factors. Only later did Bowers add the idea that Personal and Environmental factors interact with each other [P = f(E) and E = f(P)], and Bandura add the idea that Behavior could reciprocally affect both the Person and the Environment [P = f(B) and E = f(B)]. Therefore, in Lewin's original formulation, and as the formula is stated in the question, causality is unidirectional: from P and E to B, but not the reverse.

A. different traits tend to be significantly correlated with each other.
*B. specific behaviors are correlated with generalized traits.
C. behavior is consistent across short and long intervals of time.
D. behavior is stable across a wide variety of different situations.

53%, .14. In the doctrine of traits, "coherence" means that different subordinate traits correlate positively with each other, giving rise to superordinate traits (e.g., verbal and mathematical skill correlate with each other, giving rise to general intelligence). "Stability" means that personality remains relatively constant over time (e.g., from childhood to adulthood). "Consistency" means that personality remains relatively constant over situations (e.g., from home to work). And "Predictability" refers to the association between general traits and behavior in specific situations (e.g., that highly intelligent people do relatively well on specific intelligence tests).

A. yield more, and be more emotionally disturbed.
*B. yield more, and be less emotionally disturbed.
C. yield less, and be more emotionally disturbed.
D. yield less, and be less emotionally disturbed.

73%, .46. Asch held that people look to other people for cues as to what to think, feel, want, and do when the situation is ambiguous. Therefore, when the judgment is difficult, they will be more likely to yield to the consensus among other people, and feel OK about it. When the judgments are easy, and they yield to a consensus that they know is wrong, just to get along and not make waves, then they show more emotional disturbance.

A. the number of arguments that are presented
*B. the logic or reasonableness of the arguments presented
C. the length of the arguments
D. the expertise of the speaker

48%, .39. Central routes to persuasion require that people actively and effortfully analyze the arguments for and against some proposition. Therefore, people will pay attention to both the quality of the arguments presented to them. However, under many circumstances this just takes too much effort, and people will be persuaded by "peripheral" routes that may have nothing to do with the quality of the argument. For example, they may think that a long argument, making a lot of different points, is better than a short one, that makes only a single point; or that experts have better arguments than nonexperts. These are heuristics, "rules of thumb", that don't guarantee quality. Quality can only be guaranteed by evaluating the logic behind the arguments.

*A. to see out-group members as being more similar to each other than are in-group members.
B. to see in-group members as being more similar to each other than are out-group members.
C. to notice the presence of out-group members more rapidly than we notice the presence of in-group members.
D. to see most other people as members of an out-group.

68%, .50. This question refers to the outgroup homogeneity effect, by which members of ingroups perceive themselves as more diverse than they really are (We're individuals!), and members of outgroups as less diverse than they really are ("They're all alike!". Option C might be true, as a result of a kind of salience effect, but outgroup members may also be ignored rather than noticed.

A. the behavior was heavily influenced by the demands placed on the individual by the situation.
B. the individual is not aware of the reasons for his or her actions.
*C. the behavior was based on some underlying characteristic or quality of the individual.
D. the individual's behavior was more influenced by emotional than by rational factors.

76%, .46. Dispositions are, by definition, characteristics of individuals. According to the Doctrine of Traits, people are disposed to be neurotic, or extraverted, or whatever, depending on the traits they possess, regardless of the particular details of the situation in which their behavior takes place. Traits can be conscious or unconscious, emotional or cognitive.

A. help a person understand a particular position, but not affect her attitude toward the position.
*B. lead to increased sympathy for the role played.
C. make a person more aware of the difference between her own position and the one she's playing.
D. a and c

32%, .26. According to self-perception theory, we have no direct introspective (conscious) access to our own beliefs, attitudes, values, and the like. In fact, we don't have attitudes, etc., at all. Instead, we infer these dispositional qualities from observations of our own behavior, just as we infer other people's dispositions from observations of their behavior. Thus, if we take the role of another person, we will understand ourselves from that perspective as well, and take on attitudes that are consistent with the role we have just played (so Option A is wrong). We will understand why the person did what he or she did, because we will perceive ourselves acting the same way. Because there is no stable representation of self to compare our role-behavior to, there will be no awareness of a discrepancy between self and role (Option C).

A. emotional experience is by definition private and inaccessible.
B. overt behavior is largely the result of emotional experience.
C. different people classify the same emotions differently.
*D. emotion is the awareness of the bodily changes that result from arousing stimuli.

75%, .43. The James-Lange theory of emotions is an early example of self-perception principles. James and Lange argued that stimuli elicit certain bodily changes in a reflex-like manner, and that our perception of these changes constitutes our emotional state. Thus, emotions can be inferred from behavior; because these behavior-emotion relations are "built in", everyone has the same emotional responses to various situations, and so different people will classify the same emotions similarly. Behavior isn't caused by emotions; rather, emotions cause behavior.

*A. what is and what might have been.
B. what is and what could be.
C. what is and what should be.
D. all of the above

46%, .34. Regret is a classic example of a counterfactual emotion, which results from a comparison of the actual state of affairs with another state of affairs that did not come to pass (Option A). We don't regret things that might be different in the future (Option B); we regret things that might have been different in the past (Option A). Outrage would be a better example of an emotion that involves an assessment of what is, and what should be (Option C).

A. A bystander decides not to help a car accident victim because there are others present who will undoubtedly do so.
*B. A passerby decides the man lying on the sidewalk is not in trouble because nobody else in the vicinity is stopping to assist him.
C. Nobody in a group of bystanders helps a heart attack victim because they are not sure what to do.
D. all of the above

31%, .25. Pluralistic ignorance was defined in the context of Darley and Latane's experiments on bystander intervention, in which the presence of other people actually inhibited helping behavior. The general idea is that when the situation is ambiguous, people look to others for cues as to how to categorize it (remember the Asch experiments on conformity in perception). But if everyone else is waiting for the situation to be clarified, their behavior effectively defines the situation as a nonemergency. In Options A and B, there is no ignorance: the bystander perceives the situation clearly as an emergency, but does not act because (A) he assumes that others will do so or (B) he lacks the skills needed to help.

A. the closer two people live, the more likely that they will be familiar to one another.
B. familiarity breeds liking.
C. the more often a person encounters most anything, the more he will like it.
*D. all of the above

82%, .25. Familiarity breeds liking, not contempt. The closer two people are, physically, the more likely they will encounter each other frequently and thus become familiar with each other. So it's not proximity itself that increases attraction, but rather the fact that proximiity makes familiarity more likely to occur.

A. behavior alone; thinking
B. behavior alone; behavior alone
C. thinking; thinking
*D. thinking; behavior alone

69%, .29. The majority doesn't always influence group judgments and behavior. In the face of a consistent majority, people may conform in their overt behavior, even though their private beliefs and opinions are unchanged. But a consistent minority can have the opposite effect, getting people to think about their arguments (remember the central and peripheral routes to persuasion), and thus changing behavior by changing beliefs.

A. achieving the best outcome requires a great deal of trust.
B. each individual can act rationally and yet produce a nonoptimal outcome.
C. the prisoners' behavior is irrational.
*D. a and b

74%, .42. In the prisoner's dilemma, both prisoners will be freed if neither confesses. So, each prisoner has to trust the other to keep his or her mouth shut. Both choices available to a prisoner are rational, so it is possible for a prisoner to act rationally and still achieve a nonoptimal outcome. The prisoner's dilemma is not a matter of rationality. It's a matter of trust.

A. less than +0.10
*B. +0.30
C. +0.50
D. more than +0.70

51%, .32. Remember Mischel's "personality coefficient" of .30, the typical correlation between scores on a personality trait and behavior in some specific situation? Behavior is predictable to some degree from a knowledge of traits but the degree of predictability is at a relatively low level, closer to 0 (no predictability) than 1 (perfect predictability).

A. situational effects.
*B. differences in personal traits.
C. a person-by-situation interactions.
D. none of the above

54%, .29. If you plot out the results, you will see that the behavior is predictable by the two subjects' traits, but not by the two situations. Averaging across the situations, Mahalia displays 4 units of anxiety regardless of the situation. Martin displays 8 units. So, Mahalia is less anxious than Martin, and the difference between them remains consistent regardless of the situation in which their anxiety is measured.

A. the length of time that children could delay a desired reward did not depend on whether the reward was visible while the child was waiting.
B. children delayed gratification longer if they spent the time imagining the pleasures they would get from the reward.
*C. children delayed gratification longer if they distracted themselves from thinking about the reward.
D. children's ability to delay gratification was not related to thoughts or behaviors during the delay interval, but was highly correlated with personality characteristics such as introversion and responsibility.

75%, .41. Delay of gratification is not just a function of the child's trait of "ego strength". It varies on the situation (e.g., whether the reward is visible or invisible) as well. Even when the objective situation is constant, delay behavior can be affected by the child's cognitive transformation of the situation (e.g., whether they think about the pleasures of the reward or not). What the child thinks and does during the delay interval is at least as important as the child's traits.

*A. people change the situation by their mere presence and appearance.
B. people choose situations that are compatible with their own personalities.
C. personality determines how people will act overtly to change situations.
D. people change the way they think about situations, but not the situations themselves.

59%, .45. There are four modes by which people affect the environments to which they in turn respond: evocation (A), selection (B), behavioral manipulation (C), and cognitive transformation (D).

*A. cognitive transformations lead to behavioral manipulations.
B. people engage in disconfirmatory hypothesis-testing.
C. people take risks even though the situation can be optimized.
D. people make judgments based on expected values rather than preferred utilities.

52%, .33. In the self-fulfilling prophecy, a person acts on an objectively false belief, and this action in turn alters the situation to make the belief come true. For example, in the Rosenthal and Jacobson study of Pygmalion in the Classroom, the teachers believed that certain pupils were "intellectual late bloomers", and then treated these children in such a way as to enhance their IQ gains over the course of the school year. Thus, the teachers' construal of the child (a cognitive transformation) affected how the teacher behaved toward that child (a behavioral manipulation).

A. the analyst's training may determine what he notices.
B. the analyst's behavior may affect the patient's behavior.
C. the analyst can explain the past but cannot predict the future.
*D. all of the above

82%, .17. Clinical evidence is subject to all sorts of biases, including biases of attention (A) and self-fulfilling prophecies (B). Moreover, clinical evidence is always retrospective, explaining what the patient has done, without testing predictions about what the patient will do in the future (C).

*A. describe inner conflicts in social and interpersonal terms.
B. describe conflicts in biological terms.
C. do not put as much emphasis on childhood.
D. suggest that the Oedipal/Electra complex does not occur.

53%, .30. In classical Freudian theory, the important conflicts are about the young child's instinctual (biological) sexual and aggressive motives. But neofreudian tended to abandon biologizing, and emphasis the social, interpersonal, conflicts faced by children. From their point of view, the Oedipus and Electra complexes may occur in some societies (like Freud's turn-of-the-century Vienna), but they are not universal; and even when they occur, they may arise for interpersonal reasons rather than as a result of biologically based sexual and aggressive instincts..

A. animal needs.
B. internal needs.
C. external needs.
*D. deficiency needs.

32%, .39. Most theories of motivation emphasize deficiencies, and negative feedback loop. In hunger, for example, low levels of blood sugar lead to eating behavior that restores previous levels (homeostasis). Similarly for thirst (drinking restores depleted cell fluids). The status of sex as a deficiency need is controversial: despite what some people believe, it's not clear that individuals have to have orgasms, the way they have to have food and water, in order to survive! But that's certainly how Maslow saw it (and that's how Freud saw it as well). And, in any event, hunger, thirst, and sex are motives we share with animals; as opposed to needs for self-esteem and self-actualization, which are unique to humans. For Maslow, however, not all motives are deficiency motives. For some needs, homeostasis is not all there is to motivation, and there are some things the individual needs for their own sake, not just to restore some deficiency. Among these positive needs are the needs for attachment, love, self-esteem, and especially self-actualization. For Maslow, we are string for these things, at the same time as we are trying to avoid hunger, thirst, and sexual tension.

A. are more affected by pressures from both their in-groups, and from out-groups.
*B. have stronger bonds with their in-group.
C. tend to define their in-groups more broadly, including a wider range of individuals.
D. all of the above

62%, .39. Many cultural psychologists classify societies on a dimension of individualism and collectivism, based on the relation between the individual and society characteristic of those cultures. All societies make distinctions between in-groups and out-groups: the difference between Us and Them is at the heart of cultural identity. And there's plenty of conformity in individualistic societies -- after all, almost all the classic research on conformity was done on American college students! Rather, in collectivist societies, individuals are more likely to identify with their social group, whereas in individualistic societies individuals are more likely to distinguish themselves from members of their own group.