Write your name at the top of every page.

Also, please indicate your Discussion Section # (or time, or GSI) here:_____________.

Write your answers in ink. Answers written in pencil will not be eligible for regarding. And write legibly, or we won't be able to appreciate how wonderful your answers are.

Answer the following 25 questions. Each question is worth 2 points, so that this portion of the exam totals 50 points. Do not provide long-winded answers. You have approximately 2 minutes, on average, for each question, and we are grading accordingly. Use only the space provided for your answer. Just one or two sentences will do – three at the most. Get right to the point.

Section 1: Anesthesia and Coma.

1. What is the rationale for the bispectral index (BIS) as a measure of consciousness in general anesthesia?

93% of the class answered this question; mean score = 0.62.  a bad item.  The bispectral index is based on EEG activity, and seeks to minimize the amount of alpha and beta activity, as these bands are closely tied to normal waking consciousness. The BIS index has also been validated against post-anesthetic recall of material presented during anesthesia. [Lecture]

2. How do we know that the ostensibly "anesthetized" patient is not conscious all along, but simply cannot communicate his awareness during surgery, and has a sort of amnesia for surgical events afterwards?

97% answered, mean = 1.02.  The isolated forearm technique precludes paralysis in one arm, permitting the patient to respond to the anesthetist's commands. These responses disappear quickly within a few minutes after the induction of anesthesia begins. [Lecture]

3. How does the anatomical locus of brain damage in coma differ from that in the locked-in syndrome?

97%, 1.28.  In coma, the damage is to the posterior portion of the brainstem, including the reticular formation; or to the thalamus. In the persistent vegetative state, the damage is to the anterior portion of the brainstem, sparing the reticular formation but essentially paralyzing the skeletal musculature (except for certain muscles around the eyes). [Lecture]

4. How do we know that patients in the minimally conscious state are, at least, minimally conscious?

96%, 1.10.  Even with paralysis of the skeletal musculature, brain-imaging techniques such as fMRI can show that the patient can understand, and deliberately attempt to respond to, instructions from the investigator. MCS patients are what Revonsuo calls inverse zombies – they have consciousness, but can't engage in overt behavior. [Lecture; Revonsuo, Chapter 8]

5. Why is the "thalamocortical loop" critical to anesthesia (and, for that matter, coma)?

93%, 0.97.  The reticular formation projects upward through the thalamus, and the thalamus itself is densely connected to a wide variety of locations in the cerebral cortex. Any decrease in the activity of the thalamus, then, will have widespread consequences for activity in the cortex itself, especially in the parietal cortex where these connections are richest. [Revonsuo, Chapter 8]

Part 2: Sleep and Dreams

6. What is the EEG criterion for the onset of sleep?

97%, 1.04.  The transition from "descending Stage 1" sleep to "Stage 2" is marked by the disappearance of alpha activity, and also by the appearance of "sleep spindles" and "K-complexes", which disappear with the transition from "Stage 2" to "Stage 3" NREM sleep. [Lecture]

7. What are the effects of sleep on learning and memory?

97%, 1.47.  Sleep appears to aid the consolidation of memories for pre-sleep experiences. However, sleep also impairs memory for events that take place while the subject is asleep (as defined by the absence of EEG alpha activity) -- which is why Simon and Emmons quipped that "sleep learning is possible, so long as the subject stays awake". [Lecture]

8. Why do we forget our dreams?

97%, 1.26.  Not, apparently, by virtue of Freudian repression. Dreams appear to occur in short-term or working memory, and the conditions of sleep prevent us from transferring, or consolidating, that information in long-term memory. [Lecture]

9. What are the dimensions in Hobson's AIM model?

92%, 1.62.  Full credit only in the student gets all three. A stands for cortical activation, or alertness. I Stands for input source, preventing external inputs and outputs during REM sleep. M stands for neuromodulatory balance, with aminergic activity dominant during REM, and cholinergic activity dominant during NREM. [Lecture; Revonsuo, Chapter 13]

10. Why does Hobson's AIM model imply that dreams lack the symbolic associations that Freud attributed to them?

95%, 1.55.  Hobson argues that dreaming is, in essence, epiphenomenal – the accidental byproduct of neural networks randomly activated according to an innate biological rhythm that generates "PGO waves". They don't refer to anything other than themselves. [Lecture; Revonsuo, Chapter 13]

Part 3: "Hysteria" and Hypnosis

11. What makes the dissociative and conversion disorders pathologies of consciousness?

97%, 1.39.  In all the dissociative disorders, the patient is unaware of information that nonetheless influences his experience, thought, and action in the form of implicit memories and percepts. In the dissociative disorders, the patient lacks conscious access to personal identity and/or autobiographical memory. In the conversion disorders, the patient lacks conscious access to visual, auditory, or tactile percepts. [Lecture]

12. What are the effects of hypnosis on pain? What aspects of pain might not be affected by hypnosis?

97%, 1.17.  Hypnotic suggestions modulate the conscious perception of pain, including both sensory pain and suffering, in both the laboratory and in tightly controlled clinical settings. However, hypnotic analgesia might not have the same effects on "implicit" expressions of pain perception, mediated by the autonomic nervous system, such as changes in blood pressure, heart rate, sweating, or tear-production, which are more or less reflexive responses to the pain stimulus. [Lecture]

13. What is the "state-nonstate" controversy surrounding hypnosis?

89%, 1.04.  The question is whether hypnosis represents an actual altered state of consciousness, involving the monitoring and controlling functions of consciousness, or whether the subject's is simply behaving according to expectations and a culturally defined "role" of hypnotic subject, in the absence of convincing changes in phenomenal experience or the experience of voluntary behavior. [Revonsuo; Kihlstrom hypnosis chapter]

14. What is the evidence regarding dissociative identity disorder (multiple personality disorder) as a form of post-traumatic stress disorder?

95%, 0.32.  A bad item.  DID/MPD is often portrayed as a "dissociative" response to childhood sexual abuse or some other form of psychological trauma. But these claims are based largely on self-reported histories of trauma and abuse that lack independent corroboration. Moreover, "psychogenic" amnesia is extremely rare in victims of any sort of trauma. [Kihlstrom dissociative disorders chapter]

15. What considerations suggest that hypnosis should be considered a nonpathological dissociative state?

97%, 1.06.  The phenomena of hypnosis appear to reflect alterations in conscious perception, memory, and the control of action similar to those seen in classical "hysteria". Moreover, they typically entail dissociations between "explicit" and "implicit" expressions of perception and memory, as in posthypnotic amnesia and hypnotic blindness. [Kihlstrom hypnosis chapter]

Part 4: Daydreaming, Absorption, and Meditation

16. How do daydreaming and mind-wandering differ from absorption and flow?

97%, 1.49.  In absorption and flow, the person's entire attentional capacity is devoted to whatever he's involved in. In daydreaming and mind-wandering, there is a lapse of attention, in which attention is shifted from the primary task to personal goals. You can be absorbed in your daydreaming, but the whole point of daydreaming is that you're supposed to be paying attention to something else. [Lecture; Revonsuo Chapter 15]

17. What are the cognitive costs of daydreaming and mind-wandering?

95%, 0.99.  Both states consume attentional resources, and therefore can impair performance on the subject's manifest task – but only if the manifest task itself draws on attentional resources. Daydreaming and mind-wandering may not impair performance on a task that has been automatized, which makes more resources available for the daydream.

18. What are the effects of meditation on consciousness?

97%, 1.18.  It depends on the type of meditation. Hereafter, only one example is necessary for full credit. For example, it has been claimed (but not confirmed) that yoga and Zen meditation have different effects on the orienting response and habituation. Yoga and Zen meditation are supposed to lead to the de-automatization of thought; but the same physical exercises, practiced in the context of Benson's relaxation response or Kabat-Zinn's mindfulness-based stress reduction, may only have physiological effects on the stress response. "One point" meditation reduces binocular rivalry, but compassion meditation does not. "One-point" meditation may result in reduced Stroop interference, but compassion meditation may result in increased positive emotionality.

19. What is the naturalistic (as opposed to supernatural) hypothesis of the near-death experience?

93%, 1.09.  The naturalistic hypothesis is that the NDE is triggered by the physiological changes that occur in the dying brain. Hereafter, only one example is necessary for full credit. For example, the release of endorphins may result in both a feeling of peacefulness and seizure-like activity. Alternatively, anoxia may induce various visual hallucinations and other distortions, including tunnel vision, [Revonsuo, Chapter 15]

20. What is Metzinger's "self-model theory" of the virtual out-of-body experience?

83%, 0.75.  A bad item.  Metzinger has induced an OBE by providing subjects with information about the location of their body that does not match their internal body image. This gives rise to two competing body images, one experienced from an internal, first-person perspective, and the other experienced from an external, third-person perspective. [Revonsuo, Chapter 15]

Part 5: Origins of Consciousness

21. What evidence suggests that mirror self-recognition is not simply an evolved characteristic of certain species?

96%, 0.89.  An evolved trait would be characteristic of all individuals in a species. All normal infants recognize themselves in a mirror by the time they are 18-24 months of age. Some, but not all, chimpanzees also show mirror self-recognition, and those that do have been raised in groups, as opposed to isolation, which suggests that there are environmental determinants as well. [Lecture]

22. Chimpanzees appear to lack a theory of mind. Comment.

96%, 1.31.  Chimpanzees do not pass nonverbal versions of the false beliefs test that are passed readily by young human children. However, the behavior of chimps in the artificial confines of the laboratory may not adequately represent the mental abilities that they display in naturalistic field conditions. Chimps in the wild do seem to display some aspects of a ToM. Moreover, the typical nonverbal false belief task requires chimps to make interspecific judgments about the beliefs of another species, namely humans. [Lecture; Penn & Povinelli]

23. What is the difference between phenomenal consciousness and reflective consciousness?

93%, 1.44.  Phenomenal consciousness refers simply to the existence of qualitative mental states – that is, states composed qualia. Reflective consciousness has to do with how the person understands his qualitative experiences – in particular, that they are "about" something other than themselves, and that one's own mental states might differ from someone else's. [Revonsuo Chapter 6]

24. What could Julian Jaynes possibly have meant when he speculated that human consciousness had its origins in historical time, sometime around 1000 BCE?

95%, 1.35.  Jaynes obviously wasn't talking about phenomenal consciousness. He assumes that humans always had qualitative states corresponding to sensations, feelings, motives, thoughts, etc. But he argues, based on his reading of mostly literary evidence, that ancient humans didn't experience their mental states as such. That is, they didn't understand that their mental states were representations of things in the world outside the mind. And they didn't understand that everyone doesn't have the same mental states. This recognition that our mental states are ours appears to have arisen long after homo sapiens established itself – sometime after the advent of written language, but sometime before the age of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

25. How do either the "mirror" and "mark" tests or the false-beliefs test provide evidence for consciousness?

97%, 1.83.  Students may choose one test or the other. No extra credit for doing both. The mark test, derived from Darwin's mirror test, is a test of self-recognition. In order to recognize themselves in a mirror, animals must have some awareness of what they look like, that the image they see in the mirror represents themselves, and that they have awareness of their own behavior (like touching the mark) that they can match to what they see in the mirror. [Gallup et al. chapter]

The false beliefs test requires the subject to recognize his mental states as representing beliefs, desires, or emotional responses to something in the world outside the mind – in other words, that they have some sort of intentionality. It also requires the person to recognize that his beliefs are his alone, and might not be shared by everyone else – that is, that his thoughts are part of a personal consciousness. [Penn & Povinelli chapter]

Answer each of the following 10 questions, which are worth six (6) points each -- except for the last two, which are worth one (1) point each, to bring this portion of the exam up to 50 points. There is no choice. Your answers can be more expansive than in the noncumulative portion, as appropriate, but they should still be very brief. You have approximately six (6) minutes, on average, for each question, and we are grading accordingly. Of course, you have a full three hours to complete this two-hour exam, so you can take more time if you wish. But again, use only the space provided for your answer. For some questions, just a single paragraph will do.

26. What are the problems with introspection as a scientific approach to consciousness, and how did the 19^th-century psychophysicists propose to address at least some of them?

97%, 4.74.  A bad item.  Introspection consists of carefully describing one's experiences in response to some stimulus. Historically, it was very popular among philosophers, and was the favored method of William James. But it has its problems. (1) We can only report on an experience we've already had ("All introspection is retrospection"), so our report may be affected by forgetting. (2) Because memories are reconstructions, the reconstructed experience may differ from the experience as it originally occurred. (3) Introspective reports may be contaminated by confabulations, as the observer fills in the gaps of a poorly remembered experience. (4) Qualia are ineffable, so it may be very difficult for even the most sensitive and articulate observers to describe their experience accurately. (5) The very act of introspecting and reporting may create experiences that would not occur otherwise, so that the introspective report is a distortion of the person's actual subjective experience. (6) The "demand characteristics" of the experimental situation may lead observers to report what the experimenter wants to hear, rather than their actual experience. (7) Observers may censor their experiences, so as not to embarrass themselves. (8) Because conscious experiences are private, there is no way to assess the accuracy of introspections. Any three of these will do for 1 point each.

Both the psychophysicists and the structuralists addressed these problems, first, by training their observers carefully, to assign numbers to their experiences (e.g., of the intensity of a stimulus); or, in the case of the structuralists, to give careful verbal descriptions. They then varied the physical properties of the stimulus to determine the effect of this experimental manipulation on the subject's reports. This yielded mathematical relationships such as Weber's and Fechner's laws. By connecting private, internal, mental states to publicly observable, external physical stimulus conditions, they were able to show that their observers' introspections were reliable and externally valid. Put bluntly, they made the private public. Up to 3 points.

27. Thomas Nagel wrote that "Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Without consciousness, the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness, it seems hopeless." What does he mean by this. And is he right?

97%, 5.06.  For explicating the quote, give up to 3 points. If "mind" refers to everything that occurs between environmental stimulus and organismal response, then it should be relatively easy, at least in principle, to construct an information-processing machine that will perform the relevant computations and transformations. That's what thermostats and computers do. But it's one thing to design a system that will generate the appropriate response to some stimulus, and it's another thing entirely for that system to generate a new category of thing along the way – that is, the subjective experience of perceiving the stimulus and selecting a response. So there we have the problem of consciousness -- or, put better, the problems, plural, of consciousness. First, how do physical structures generate mental states – how do you get from body to mind? Second, why do physical structures generate mental states – as Chalmers puts it, why doesn't it all just go on in the dark? Third, given that it doesn't all just go on in the dark, what difference does consciousness make? Does conscious awareness make any difference to how we behave, or how we adapt to the world? Fourth, what about conscious control – to what extent do we have free will over our actions? And fifth, if we do have free will, how does that work? How can consciousness play a causal role in a physical universe consisting of particles in fields of force? These are some of the problems of consciousness raised by Nagel.

When he says that consciousness seems to make the mind-body problem insoluble, he's echoing mysterianism – the idea, articulated by Owen Flanagan and Colin McGinn, among others, that the mind-body problem, with consciousness, is simply intractable in principle – because, according to McGinn at least, we lack the cognitive capacity to achieve closure on the problem. Some elements of the mind-body problem may indeed be intractable, but at least we ought to be able to figure out what the neural correlates of consciousness are – even if we can't quite figure out how the brain produces conscious mental states, or how free will can be compatible with determinism. But any reasonable response to Nagel's quote will suffice, for up to 3 points.

28. What is a neural correlate of consciousness? What assumptions underlie any attempt to identify a NCC? Briefly describe one approach to identifying such a correlate that you think is most promising, and why you prefer it.

95%, 4.83.  Koch defined an NCC as "the minimal neuronal mechanisms jointly sufficient for any one specific conscious percept". Identification of a NCC depends on the principle of covariance, a corollary to identity theory, which states that, for each and every conscious event, there is a corresponding brain event. And it would also seem to depend on "type" identify theory, such that the same brain events would be found in each and every individual who is experiencing a particular conscious event. Identifying a neural correlate of consciousness requires, first, a definition of what consciousness is. The neural correlate of consciousness defined as wakefulness or alertness may be very different from the neural correlate of consciousness defined as intentional mental states. If we identify consciousness with wakefulness, or alertness, then the neural correlates of consciousness might be found by comparing comatose or vegetative patients with neurologically intact controls; or by comparing the physiology of sleep and waking, or of REM and NREM sleep. The neural correlates of conscious memory might be determined by examining the differences in brain states associated with explicit and implicit memory for the same event; a similar logic applies to the neural correlates of conscious perception. Or we could compare normal consciousness with one or another "altered state" of consciousness. Or, we could look at the changes in brain function that are associated with passing the mirror or false-beliefs test. Any of these will do, as will others, provided that they are plausible and described reasonably completely. Give up to 2 points for the rationale, another 2 points for a reasonable choice, and a final 2 points for the rationale.

29. How do we know whether some mental process is automatic? What grounds are there for thinking of automatic processes as unconscious processes? And what are we to make of the proposition that conscious processing plays only a very limited role in our ordinary experience, thought, and action?

97%, 4.68.  An automatic process is defined by four features: (1) inevitable evocation by some appropriate stimulus; (2) incorrigible completion, in a "ballistic" fashion, once evoked; (93) efficient execution, meaning that the process consumes little or no attentional capacity or cognitive resources; and (4), parallel processing, in that execution of an automatic process does not interfere with other ongoing mental processes. Automaticity can be thought of as a discrete category, defined by these four features; or it can be thought of as a continuous dimension, depending on how many features the processes possesses, and/or to what degree. Because they are executed very quickly, and do not draw on attentional capacity, unconscious processes are unconscious in the strict sense of being unavailable to conscious awareness and control. Some theorists have made strong claims about the "automaticity of everyday life", but these claims are based on rather weak evidence. In many cases, "automaticity" is defined very loosely. In other cases, there is no direct comparison between automatic and controlled processes – just a demonstration that automaticity plays some role in task performance. When such comparisons are made, as with Jacoby's process-dissociation procedure derived from the method of opposition, researchers generally find a balance between automatic and controlled components of processing, except under circumstances – like extremely brief response windows – that effectively preclude controlled processing. Give 2 points for the definition of automaticity, 2 points for characterizing automatic processes as automatic, and 2 points for discussing the claim about the automaticity of everyday life. A student can take a contrary position, so long as it's clear that s/he understands the issues.

30. What are the features that define an altered state of consciousness (ASC), and distinguish one ASC from another? Illustrate your answer with references to three (3) different ASCs.

96%, 5.16.  Revonsuo defines an ASC as a temporary, reversible deviation from normal pattern of subjective experience, more or less global in nature, that is subjectively recognized as such by the subject himself. Furthermore, an ASC represents a change in intentionality – i.e., in the relation between the content of our experience and the real world. According to Kihlstrom's chapter on "Consciousness in Hypnosis", each different ASC can be characterized in terms of four features: (1) an induction technique, (2) a change in subjective experience, (3) changes in objective behavior, and (4) physiological changes. Either of these definitions can serve as the basis for the student's response. Considering Revonsuo's definition, for example, in dreams and hypnosis the subject has perceptual experiences – dragons riding bicycles, for example, or a visual hallucination of a familiar person – that are not congruent with objective reality. Considering Kihlstrom's definition, hypnosis is induced by a particular psychological procedure, while dreams appear to occur automatically, as a product of cyclical activation of certain forebrain structures. Anesthesia is induced by certain drugs, while hypnosis is induced by verbal suggestion. Anesthesia involves a loss of consciousness, while REM sleep involves dreaming. In meditation the person sits motionless, while in hypnosis the person may behaviorally respond to the suggested experience. In anesthesia there are reductions in autonomic activity indexed by the PRST score, while in NREM sleep delta waves predominate in the EEG. An alternative answer might focus on qualia, intentionality, and subjectivity. For example, certain psychedelic drugs alter the appearance of various sensory stimuli. States like anxiety and depression don't seem to involve intentionality. And states of absorption or meditation appear to blur the distinction between subject and object. Give 3 points for defining an ASC, and 1 point each for the three comparisons.

31. What is the best approach to monitoring consciousness in human surgical patients undergoing general anesthesia? List at least two monitoring systems, and then weigh the advantages and disadvantages of one of these systems over one of the others you have listed.

96%, 5.44.  We discussed a number of different indices of anesthesia. (1) Clinical, based mostly on post-surgical reports of surgical awareness. (2) The PRST score, based on autonomic signs of stress. (3) Event-related potentials (auditory or somatosensory). (4) EEG power spectrum. (5) Bispectrial analysis. (6) The isolated forearm test. (7) McSleepy, the anesthesia robot, which combines the bispectral index with autonomic signs. As for comparisons, here are a couple of examples. The standard clinical assessment cannot assess awareness during anesthesia, as opposed to afterwards, when it's too late - -unless it is supplemented by something like the isolated forearm test. Autonomic signs may be too far removed from the central nervous system, and may measure unconscious reflexes as opposed to conscious experience. The EEG measures of central nervous system functioning are probably better, especially the bispectral index, which can be automated. Give 1 point for each method, 2 points for comparing assets, and 2 points for comparing liabilities.

32. Consider the related problem of other minds as applied to nonhuman animals, extraterrestrial beings, plants, robots, or even thermostats, whose nervous system (such as it is) might differ radically from ours. Based on what you've learned in this course, what test would you use to determine whether that entity is consciousness, the way you (apparently) are?

96%, 4.95.  Almost any reasonable answer should start out with 3 points, including the obvious choices of mirror self-recognition and the false-belief test (at least in a nonverbal version). But there must be more than a simple statement that "I'd use the mirror test". The answer should be accompanied by a reasonable defense of the proposed index. There are other possibilities, but these should exclude criteria like merely adaptive or complex behavior, such as those rejected by Romanes or Washburn – again, unless they are accompanied by a defense that understands that even complex adaptive behaviors can be performed automatically and unconsciously. Add up to 3 more points, depending on the quality of the rationale.

33. If you were the director of the Holt-Belling Centre for Cognitive Science, what image would you add to Max Karinthy's mural, and why?

91%, 5.46.  Give 2 points for the image. Any relevant image, plausibly defended, will do -- except for the following, which are already represented in the mural (see Lodge, pp. 50-55).

Thomas Nagel's bat

Altruism (empathy is different, and OK)

The Prisoner's Dilemma

Searle's Chinese Room

Lawrence Davis and Ned Block's "Chinese Nation"

Mary the Color Scientist

Zombies

Schrodinger's Cat

Also exclude representations of individual philosophers, psychologists, and other cognitive scientists as such -- even Descartes and William James! – except when they're used to refer to something other than themselves, as when David Chalmers is depicted as a zombie twin and Roger Penrose as a Magician – or, for that matter, as a quantum mechanic, dressed in quantum overalls with a quantum wrench in his hand.

My own choice would be Thomas Eakins' depiction of the first successful use of ether for anesthesia, shown in lecture. Philosophers are always citing pain as an example of qualia or some other feature of consciousness, and W.T.G. Morton was hailed as the man who "abolished pain" – and the rest of consciousness with it!

34. Who wrote the following? "The essential feature of consciousness is its secrecy, the fact that our thoughts are known only to ourselves".

95%, 0.45.  Ralph Messenger (slightly edited), in an e-mail to Helen Reed in Thinks… (p. 187). This is intended to be a give-away, worth one (1) point.  "David Lodge" doesn't count, either her or in the next item.

35. And who said the following? "Understanding consciousness… is to modern science what the Philosopher's Stone was to alchemy: the ultimate prize in the quest for knowledge."

90%, 0.44%.  Helen Reed, in her "Last Word" speech at ConCon, also from Thinks…. This was also intended to be a giveaway, worth one (1) point -- still an irresistible way to end this exam, and the course!