Every few years we get a sovereignty referendem whose results are too close for comfort. Fortunately, this issue has been dormant since the cringe-inducing 1995 referendum. Despite successive terms of Bloc Québecois (whose primary goal is to take Québe out of Canada) serving as Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition in Parliament (only in Canada...), separatism feels like a relatively dead issue these days. However, Canadians should remain vigilant as ever before. Originally written for professor Thomas Barnes's spring 1994 History 103n seminar at Berkeley, the following essay may shed some light. For the assignment, we were encouraged to write an editorial, as opposed to a report or a carefully argued and researched thesis paper. It was written in the wake of the failure of Charlottetown, and about a year before the aforementioned 1995 referendum, and the polls did not look too promising for Canadian unity back then. I apologise for being too lazy / busy to transfer my footnotes into HTML script, so they have been incorporated into the main body of the text.

INTRODUCTION

he history of Canada has been starkly dominated by two main themes: its survival amid the overwhelming presence of the United States; and the perennial conflict between French and English Canada, the two founding societies. Canada is currently undergoing an especially critical period in the latter component of its history. Even though the British Empire decidedly defeated the French North American colonies way back in 1763, the two cultures have somehow remained distinctly separate, and the rift between these two peoples has been increasingly widening since World War II, and particularly in recent decades. The bifurcation undoubtedly accelerated with the election of a separatist Parti Québécois government in 1976. In the aftermath of the recent failures of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, the current round of constitutional crises is the closest Canada has ever got to the formal political dissolution between Québec and the rest of Canada. Furthermore, quantifiable, statistical differences (especially those found at the ballot box) between the two founding societies have never been greater. The rapid urbanisation of Québécois society, the tremendous growth of its economy in the post-war period, the 'Quiet Revolution,' the subsequent enactment of restrictive language laws, and Québec provincial government's epic confrontations with Ottawa have all accentuated these differences and contributed to the ongoing polarisation which currently threatens the survival of Canada as a multicultural, bilingual nation. If Québec had remained a primarily agrarian society, and not experienced the tremendous surge in economic growth in the post-war period, Québec's position in the Confederation would be much more secure than it is today. Strangely enough, economic and social progress does not necessarily equate with national unity with respect to Québec and the rest of Canada.

THE QUIET REVOLUTION

he so-called 'Quiet Revolution,' which began in the early 1960s, not only marked the coming of age of Francophone society in Québec, but it also accelerated the drifting apart of the two founding societies as Québec became more québécois in character, while the rest of the country somehow became more entrenched than ever in the realm of a pluralistic, but generally English-speaking, distinctly-Canadian nation, confident in its newfound identity as an emerging multicultural society on the world stage. Even though the post-war period from 1945-1967 (100th anniversary of Confederation) is generally acknowledged as an era of stability, growth, prosperity, strengthening sense of national idenity, and Canadian federalist unity relatively free of sectionalism, the province of Québec, particularly its French-speaking majority, silently but radically steered itself by moving further away from the rest of Canada, while actively achieving a sense of empowerment and self-sufficiency. Québec altered into a decidedly different society after this 'révolution tranquil' in which Francophones successfully became the true 'maîtres chez nous.' Instilled with this strong sense of confidence and determination, Francophone Quebeckers would eventually be able to elect a nationalist Parti Québécois government in 1976, while considering alternatives to remaining in the current, albeit yet to be completed, Canadian constitutional framework.

The most obvious changes which transformed the province include the following: the institutionalisation of the French language as the primary language of government, commerce, and education; the tremendous growth of the provincial civil services sector which became dominated by well-educated, urbanised Francophones for whose interests it now primarily serves; the secularisation of education, healthcare, and welfare, which were previously domains of the Catholic Church and which are now firmly in provincial government control; the establishment of a modern welfare state whose infrastructures are relatively free of interference from Ottawa; the provincial government takeover of several industries such as (highly profitable and exportable) hydroelectricity; the advent of a significant, well-educated, urbanised, secularised, cosmopolitan middle class (which also began to make significant inroads into the previously Anglophone-dominated business sector); a generally higher standard of living for Francophones; the rise of Francophones into positions of management and leadership in corporate, educational, and research sectors; the adoption of new labour and pension codes; the emergence of a politically astute electorate (not content to follow whatever the Church dictated); and most dramatically, a new sense of cultural awareness among Francophones, which often led to various vigilant legislative measures to preserve québécois society from becoming engulfed by the English-speaking world that surrounds the province. What may not be immediately apparent is its ever-attenuating ties with the rest of Canada.

Several factors contributed to the 'Quiet Revolution,' which could be viewed primarily as a long-overdue reaction against the socially regressive and economically backward society under the leadership of Premier Maurice Duplessis and his Union Nationale ancien régime. Although Duplessis and his party always held a staunch provincial-rights stance against the federal government, they did very little to legally or socially further the advancement of Francophones or the French language in the province, and they certainly were not advocates for an independent Québec. However, demographically, the province was already changing. Like elsewhere in North America, the post-war period saw an unprecedented rise in population. The province tripled its population between 1941 and 1971 (Behiels 22), and a dramatic number of them moved to cities and suburbs to power the steadily growing economy. While the province had a solid French-speaking majority, the Anglophone minority dominated business, industry, research, philanthropy, and the support of the arts and culture. Basically, the people in power spoke English, and this posed an increasingly troubling disconnect with the changing populace.

By the late 1950s, the Union Nationale under Duplessis was beginning to seem too reactionary and anachronistic for its increasingly urban constituents, and its party platform was still based upon traditional rural agrarian values, as well as staunch support of the Catholic Church, which still controlled the healthcare, welfare, and education sectors. The party stood for economic laissez-faire, anti-labour union policies, rabid anti-communism and labour reform, social stability to attract private investment to the province, and cooperation with the Anglophone elites who completely dominated the province's economy. As a matter of fact, the province's vast natural resources in mining, forestry, and hydro were allowed to be ruthlessly exploited by American and Anglophone interests with accommodations such as unusually low corporate taxes and negligible royalties back to the government (Jones 17). Duplessis summed-up his essentially conservative philosophy when he said, "Agriculture is an element of economic stability and social order. We must maintain and protect our rural base." (Jones 12) It didn't really matter that business leaders in Montréal spoke only English; the government's supporters were content to remain on the farms and in the churches. Union Nationale, despite occasional nationalistic rhetoric, supported the moribund status-quo, and presented itself as the defender of traditional Québécois values and provincial rights against a perceived ever-encroaching Ottawa (McNaught 273). Its party platform was based entirely on protecting those traditional Catholic values at any cost, and Québec's changing electorate felt that the price was holding the province back.

By the advent of the Duplessis regime in 1936, urban Québec for the most part had been industrialised for over thirty years. However, the mentality of the people in the province remained characteristically rural and conservative. People didn't feel the need to overturn the foundations of their society, its long litany of inequities notwithstanding. While Francophones gradually migrated to urban areas and provided labour for the growing economy, management and leadership in commerce and industry were still overwhelmingly English. For the most part, urban business was conducted in English. An industrial society existed side by side with the traditional, Church-oriented community, but the two worlds rarely interacted with each other. (cf. the title of Hugh MacLennan's noted 1945 novel-- Two Solitudes, which explored the bifurcating nature of Québec society) In his essay "A Half Century of Cultural Evolution in Quebec," Guy Rocher noted:

Quebec was industrial in its production methods and yield, its division of labour, the development of its territory, and the urban concentration of its population; it was pre-industrial in its mentality, its ideology, its morality, and its ethos, so much that one hesitated to call Québec an industrial society. (290)

This strange dichotomy was probably attributed to the fact that Francophones were ultimately not responsible for the industrialisation of Québec. Instead, it was carried out under the auspices of Anglophone or foreign capital using Francophones only at the lower levels of employment. Until recently, any profits that Francophones gained were not as shareholders or partners, but only as subordinates in the form of wages. Consequently, the leaders of the 'Quiet revolution' attempted to correct this economic inequity, which they felt hindered the modernisation of Québec, and obviously conflicted with Francophones' nascent nationalistic aspirations. As economic empowerment of Francophones progressed in the 1960s, their expectations began to rise, and they began to increasingly demand for more (e.g., mandatory use of French as the only language of work and communications, full employment, increasing benefits, etc.). Ever higher aspirations and ambitions were inevitable.

While the Union Nationale held on to the provincial government it had controlled since the 1930s, Québec experienced its most dramatic economic growth spurt, prompted by wartime industries and ancillary enterprises, which in turn attracted an ever-increasing segment of the rural population to the cities. In fact, about two-thirds of the population lived in cities in 1950, but by 1971, over 80% of Quebeckers lived in urban areas (Renaud 48). Because most of the rural population was and remains Francophone, this transfer of population represented an encroachment of French speakers into regions that were economically dominated by Anglophones. The rapid development of industry and commerce in the province inevitably led to the formation of an emerging class of educated urban Francophones, some of whom would later move into the ranks of the middle class. The disparities between Anglophones and Francophones became increasingly harder to ignore. Since most of the white-collar jobs and positions above the managerial level in the private sector were occupied by Anglophones who restricted Francophones from rising into their ranks, most French Canadians were relegated to role of blue-collar workers or low wage earners. As a result, many well-educated urban Francophones naturally gravitated toward the public sector, since the provincial civil service sector was the only institutional base that could provide prestigious and well-paid jobs for educated Francophones. Eventually French Canadians overwhelmingly dominated the administrative bureaucracy, and logically, they sought to sustain themselves, as well as to increase their powers and influence in society, by expanding the government bureaucracy and extending its role to areas previously controlled by the Church or by the private sector. This became their first leverage for change.

This emerging urban class of relatively sophisticated French Canadians, as well as many in the Francophone intellectual community (which included the editors of Montréal's Le Devoir and the influential review Cité libre, edited by a young Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Gérard Pelletier since the famous Asbestos labour strike-- an important foreshadowing precursor to the Quiet Revolution as the Francophone miners involved revolted against their Anglophone bosses and owners), reasoned that Québec needed to catch up with the rest of North America culturally, economically, and especially politically. In a society dominated by Anglophone businesses and industries, as well as by anachronistic Church-run infrastructures, they viewed the Union Nationale government as a corrupt and reactionary obstacle to the advancement of Francophones. They felt that the party certainly did not adequately address the grievances of the growing urban class. An economic depression in 1957, combined with political pressures induced by rapidly changing demographics, helped to precipitate the demand for changes in government that many felt would ensure economic growth, full employment, equal opportunities, and social stability among the rising generation of middle class Francophones. As a result, the scales finally tipped in 1960 when the emerging new electorate installed a new Liberal party government under the leadership of Jean Lesage. The new regime was ready to modernise Québec, advance the cause of Francophones in the economic and cultural sectors, address the concerns of the educated and urban baby-boom generation, improve the standard of living of French Canadians, reform the educational system, and (not surprisingly) expand the role of the provincial civil service apparatus, while limiting the role of the Church. In other words, the Parti libéral du Québec agreed to execute the mandate to make Francophones 'les maîtres chez nous.'

The election of the social-democratic Liberal government promptly launched a series of measures which would drastically alter character of Québec. While strongly federalist in orientation, the new party in power enacted reforms that would eventually allow nationalism to develop. The most important component of these reforms is the tremendous expansion of the civil service. During the period from 1960-1965, provincial government expenditures increased by 32 times (Renaud 48-49). The structurally decentralised provincial government apparatus became a highly centralised modern bureaucracy relatively free of the parochial and paternalistic style (based largely upon patronage) which characterised previous Union Nationale administrations. The new government took over from the Church the human services sectors of education, health, and welfare, and then (naturally) expanded them. It also reorganised all ministries, intervened directly in the economy and private sectors by creating state enterprises and planning agencies, and established a multitude of government boards and agencies. As a result, the number of people, mostly Francophones, employed in the public sector swelled considerably from 36,000 employees in 1960 to 350,000 by 1971; this represented a shift from 2% to over 15% of the total labour force in the province (Renaud 49). The dramatic rise of the public sector often grew at the expense of the Anglophone-dominated private and corporate sector. Francophonces replaced their English-speaking bosses with French-speaking ones. They increasingly worked in entities created and run by their elected officials. Needless to say, all these socialistic programmes would eventually contribute to the antagonism and anxiety of the Anglophone business community, to the extent of permanently driving many of them out decades later. Montréal would lose its position as the foremost business and finance centre of Canada to Toronto after the latter received the fleeing corporations of the former. Intensified separatist threats of the 1970s and early 1980s eventually drove out most of Montréal's Canadian and multinational headquarters, but Québec's largest city is now a decidedly French / bilingual-speaking metropolis run by Franophones.

The rise in dominance of government coincided with the dramatic decline of the Catholic Church, which before 1960 was the primary institution of social control; it wielded much political influence as well as the undisputed moral authority. Within ten years it had been almost wholly relegated to its spiritual role as the new government took over the human services it had once provided. Furthermore, Quebeckers practising the religion and entering its orders reduced drastically in numbers as well. Even though about 80% of the population were practicing Catholics in 1960, only 15 to 35% of the urban population remain in the Church a decade later (Renaud 48). The decline in religious observance was so dramatic that by the end of the 1960s, a large majority of Quebeckers claimed to be agnostics or atheists. They were also a lot less likely to allow religion to interfere with their political or personal decisions than any other North American society (Dickinson 369). Before the 'Quiet Revolution,' the province had one of the highest birth rates in the western world; by the 1980s, it had one of the lowest. Before 1960, only about 30% of women used contraception; by as early as 1970, over 90% used contraception (Dickinson 307).

This shift of the most vital institution of Francophone society from the Church to the government (which also became Québec's largest employer) marked not only a significant change in demographics (i.e., the province had transformed into a decidedly urban society), but also in terms of sensibilities and outlook as well. Quebeckers were becoming cosmopolitan, and large government ventures such as the Montréal métro (inaugurated in 1966), Expo67, and the Olympics in 1976 epitomises this. By the end of the 'Quiet Revolution,' Quebeckers definitely became a part of the fast-paced, dynamic, secular, and rapidly-changing North American consumer culture, which naturally instilled them with rising expectations. Instead of turning toward the Church for guidance and support as they would have done a few years ago, Quebeckers would more likely acknowledge the provincial government as the primary foundation of their society, and it now dominates almost every aspect of Québécois life as the Church once did. In fact, the government also started to heavily subsidise the strengthening of Québécois identity by providing funding to promote Francophone arts, culture, music, heritage preservation, and historical research. Ultimately, this powerful public sector gradually fostered a new generation of astute technocrats like Parti Québécois leader René Lévesque, who would later dominate that sector, and plan to move Québec even further away from the rest of Canada and toward building a powerful and self-sufficient Francophone nation state. The provincial government was becoming a powerful national government. Writing in his essay "Quebec's New Middle Class in Search of Social Hegemony: Causes and Political Consequences," Marc Renaud added:

Because the Québec state is virtually the sole institutional basis for the middle class, this class has evolved a unique nationalist and social-democratic political culture. The old all-encompassing rhetoric of bishops in the Church has been superseded by an equally far-reaching rhetoric of elite members of the new middle class in the state, but with a different content. (74)

In other words, a technocratic and nationalist public sector replaced the Church as the ostensible primary pillar holding up the society. The decline of the Church and the Union Nationale, which certainly did not entertain any notions of independence, coincided with the rise of a powerful, and eventually nationalistic, government. The emerging new order fuelled the people's nationalistic aspirations. Consequently, the government attributed to the urbanisation of Québec also would contribute to the worsening polarisation between the Francophones of the province and the rest of Canada. The 'Quiet Revolution' built a new society with a mentality that it can do it alone, without Canada.

POLITICS OF LANGUAGE PRESERVATION: NOT-SO-QUIET

n the 1970s the momentum which had driven the 'Quiet Revolution' during the early 1960s continued in the form of increasingly restrictive measures to retain French as the dominant language in Québec. Before the 1960s, French speakers were definitely disadvantaged compared to English speakers of English origin. As logical successors to the reforms of the 'Quiet Revolution,' the language laws attempted to establish a balance of power between Anglophones and Francophones, particularly in the areas of employment and economy. In addition to their role as catalysts to create a more economically egalitarian society, reform-minded Francophones also viewed these laws as a matter of cultural survival, preservation of their identity, and asserting their new sense of sovereignty gained during the 'Quiet Revolution.' However, these contentious measures also engender a tremendous amount of tension between Francophones and the rest of Canada. In the face of declining birth rates among Francophones after the 1960s, and pervasive use of English in commerce, industry, media, and sometimes even in provincial government before the advent of the 'Quiet Revolution,' a series of legislation were enacted in the 1970s to ensure that schoolchildren, especially the children of immigrants to Québec, who would increasingly make up a large portion of the province's population in the near future, were instructed in French whenever possible, and that businesses and all levels of provincial government function in French only.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the French language in Québec, let alone the rest of Canada, did indeed seem heading toward the state of eventual extinction. In fact, many Francophone parents, as those of immigrants, were sending their children to English-language schools in order for them to become more competitive in the Anglo-dominated economic sector of Québec and in the rest of North America. English was the language of advancement and power. As a result, the provincial government, pressured by the ever-rising tide of nationalism, felt compelled to implement drastic measures to preserve the French language. Think affirmative action for French language usage. First came Bill 22, a law passed in 1973 under Robert Bourassa's Liberal government. It specified a series of measures designed to make French the language of work and communications, in addition to restricting access to English-speaking schools to Anglophones only. It stipulated that official government documents, codes, and legislation will henceforth be in French only, and that it would only deal with entities outside of Québec in French (Coleman 245). Then came the infamous Bill 101 of 1977, a law passed under the nationalist Parti Québécois government in reaction to the relative unpopularity of Bill 22, which was deemed too weak by the nationalists (who led the successful drive to oust the federal-minded Liberals in 1976, and who contended that Bill 22 contained too numerous loopholes and did very little to ensure bringing immigrants into the French-language fold). This law strengthened the measures specified in Bill 22, in addition to dictating that only French could appear on signs in public, and that hitherto English-language organisations would have to communicate with the government and among themselves in French. This also dramatically altered the physical environment of Québec, as English signs on private businesses, transport, and roads disappeared. Although English-speaking schools could continue to operate under the Bill 101, only children with at least one parent who had had his or her primary education in Québec in the English language were eligible (Jones 536). Like Bill 22, Bill 101 stipulated that all pupils must have a command of the French language in order to graduate from secondary schools. However, unlike the former, it did not ensure that instruction of students in English as a second language was available (Coleman 248). The legislation clearly aimed to phase out the English language from the province.

Not surprisingly, these ostensibly draconian measures were extremely unpopular to the rest of Canada, since they were not only unconstitutional and totally in violation of the subsequent Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982, but also unfair to all Anglophones of Canada when considering that the federal government has to provide all services and official documentation in both French and English under the Official Languages Act. The federal government had already contributed a considerable amount of effort toward advancing the cause of the French language and linguistic equality at the federal level, and various other provinces in turn started in the 1970s to accommodate their Francophone minorities with bilingual services. Yet the Québec government just seemed to respond antagonistically by passing anti-English ordinances. For example, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism established in 1963 ("to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races" (Jones 526)), and the Official Languages Act passed under Pierre Trudeau in 1969, were all important milestone efforts to bring a larger percentage of Francophones into the federal civil services, increase the use of French within the working environment of the federal government (thereby reiterating the federal government's role as an institution for all Canadians regardless of linguistic background), and address the Francophone demand for greater linguistic equality within Canada. Albeit sincere but highly symbolic as well, these measures implemented by the federal government were essentially intended to appease Québec and therefore strengthen overall Canadian unity. (Prime Minister Trudeau thought that these acts were necessary in order to prevent the government of Québec from successfully portraying itself as the real and the only legitimate representative of Francophones, a situation which may ultimately undermine national unity.) However, federal efforts at institutionalised bilingualism and multiculturalism may seem rather inappropriate, when seemingly ungrateful Francophones are allowed to undermine the rights of English speakers in Québec. The populace in the rest of Canada reasoned that they were bending backwards to accommodate the French language and sincerely build a bilingual nation, on the federal as well as on provincial levels, and yet Francophones in Québec were doing everything they could to alienate the English-speaking populace by instituting a decidedly unilingual state. In the end, the restrictive language legislation might have had the unintended effect of exacerbating the increasing resentment against Québec that is widespread among the rest of Canada. Like all forms of affirmative action, these language laws would experience tremendous backlash from the rest of Canada, and cause enormous problems when the federal government sought to bring Québec into the constitutional fold in the 1980s.

Although Quebeckers may be justified in trying to preserve an endangered language and culture, the language laws are unequivocally divisive since they irrevocably widened the rift between Anglophones and Francophones. Despite being serious points of contention outside the province, the language laws eventually prove to be quite effective, since today Québec is essentially a French-only province (except central Montréal and the Eastern Townships) where the it is spoken at almost all levels of society (albeit a society that is further removed from the rest of Canada). It was certainly more than possible for Anglophone elite living in Québec before the 'Quiet Revolution' to not know French and still live and work effectively, but now it is virtually impossible for anyone to not know French and still integrate himself into his neighbourhood, let alone advance, in Québec. However, the language laws, combined with the election of a Parti Québécois government in 1976, naturally led to an exodus of Anglophone Canadians and a considerable number of businesses and corporations in the late 1970s. These English-speaking Quebeckers and enterprises left because their future as Anglophones was obviously being undermined. New immigrants to Canada also avoided permanently settling in Québec due to language considerations (particularly due to opportunities for advancement outside of Québec). This is why today Toronto has surged passed Montréal as Canada's largest city and leading corporate, transport, and communications centre. Concessions to Anglophone business interests that ended in the Lesage-era didn't help either. Anglophones faced a seemingly hostile government dedicated to eradicating the English language, as well as to taking the province out of Canada when Québec elected a separatist government in 1976. Although the federal government was trying to build a tolerant, bilingual, and multicultural Canada, the province of Québec, on the other hand, was trying to impose a unilingual society for the benefit of essentially one ethnic group. Linguistic legislation had the effect of mild ‘ethnic cleansing.

Meanwhile, other factors outside of Québec have also undermined the union it has with the rest of Canada. Francophone minorities living outside of Québec are assimilating at an astonishing rate. Out of practical considerations, those parents are sending their children to English-speaking schools. On a day-to-day level, and despite efforts to provide federal government services in French, English is a required means of survival and advancement in the rest of Canada. As a result, in recent years, the province of Québec has become more French in character, while the rest of Canada, with recent waves of massive immigration from Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and Eastern Europe, have transformed into a multicultural, pluralistic, albeit still Anglophone society. Ultimately, the Québec language laws strengthen Québec nationalism at the expense of Canadian national unity.

QUÉBEC PENSION PLAN

hen Québec decided in 1964 to not participate in the federal pension-plan in order to establish its own system (and its own system of taxation to support it), it again had the effect of moving the province further away from the rest of Canada. To many Canadians, it was not merely a rejection of mere legislation, but a rejection of Canada. This action was one of the first in a long litany of exceptionalism that fuelled the perennial "distinct society" debate. Whenever the federal government tries to placate Québec in such instances, it in turn fuels resentment from the other provinces. Especially in the west, this resentment became directed toward the federal government itself for its preferential treatment of Québec. What Québec was trying to foster was a sense of self-sufficiency and sovereignty over what it considered as its own internal affairs, but this bold new attitude also clearly hindered efforts to build a more coherent federalist nation. Before the 'Quiet Revolution,' the other provinces viewed Ottawa rather differently than Québec, because they instinctively and reflexively tended to entrust any decisive government responsibilities to the federal government. In fact, Anglophone provinces generally had faith in the federal system, and they certainly would not fight to retain their decision-making autonomy to the point of provoking a federal vs. provincial crises. On the other hand, even before Duplessis, Québec tended to take a hostile stance toward Ottawa, and from the point of view of the other provinces, Quebeckers always seem to want to have the privilege of being the exception to the rule (a stance which the Anglophone provinces, out of respect for the federal system, would never take). This recalls the controversy over the inclusion of the "distinct society" clause in the Constitution. Premier William Vander Zalm of British Columbia summarised the sentiment of the rest of Canada when he proposed that all provinces should be declared "distinct." (McRoberts 548) Québec, however, continued to provoke conflict with the federal system and the rest of Canada again and again: when it rejected the Victoria Charter in 1971; when it enacted the first of many unconstitutional restrictive language laws in the 1970s; when the Lévesque government refuse to ratify the 1982 Constitution Act, thereby leaving Québec outside the Canadian constitutional fold; when Liberal Premier Robert Bourassa invoked the "notwithstanding clause" in 1988 to keep restrictive language laws in the books after the Supreme Court declared them unconstitutional; and when its electorate inexplicably rejected the Charlottetown Accord, which was, essentially, a conciliatory agreement to placate Québec after the rest of Canada decidedly rejected Meech Lake's efforts to bring Québec into the constitutional fold.

Not surprisingly, these manoeuvres and confrontations with Ottawa not only angered the rest of Canada, but they also hindered the federal government's efforts to bring Québec into a new constitutional framework. Québec always demands that it be treated differently from Ottawa, thereby undermining the whole federal system. Whatever direction the federal government takes, it would inevitably be the wrong one for either one side or the other. It has to decide between alienating increasingly separatist-minded Quebeckers, or alienating the people in the rest of Canada. Furthermore, the federal government now would not only have to deal with an obstinate Québec, but it would also have to tackle with an increasingly impatient and demanding rest of Canada as well. There was even talk among populace in Alberta of joining the States. Writing in his essay "Separate Agendas: English Canada and Quebec," Kenneth McRoberts observed:

In sum, the last three decades have produced a profound change in English Canada's vision of Québec, of Canada, and of itself. In the 1960s, there was a certain openness to Québec's new claims that the constitution had to be formally altered to recognise the dualistic, if not bi-national, nature of Canada, and to provide the Québec government with the status and powers needed to assume its new responsibilities as a "national" state. Now this openness has disappeared. Within Ottawa's new constitutional vision, even a largely rhetorical recognition of these twin notions is unacceptable. (552)

When the majority of Anglophone Canadians rejected Meech Lake, it was a clear sign that they had had enough of Québec's seemingly perennially uncooperative attitude and double-standards, and that they were not going to try to appease Francophones ever again. Canadians outside of Québec are tired. This is the reason why the western provinces today would support someone like Preston Manning and his Reform Party, which claims that it would not care if Québec leaves Canada.

LES MAÎTRES CHEZ NOUS

uring the post-war period, Québec radically transformed from a conservative 'province' to a dynamic 'nation.' Even though the province was already a distinct society before the 'Quiet Revolution,' it was still a 'province.' Now Québec views itself as a 'nation' with its own set of agenda to execute and impose. According to Kenneth McRoberts:

During the 1960s, French-Canadian nationalism was recast as a distinctly Québécois nationalism in which the boundaries of the province defined the nation, and the provincial government of Québec became the nation's central institution. In fact, the very term "province" fell into disrepute: the government of Québec became a "nation" state. (544)

This is why in Québec, unlike the rest of Canada, its provincial institutions are now prefixed with "national." That's why it has an "Assemblée nationale" instead of a mere provincial legislature. Visitors to the province would be surprised to find the conspicuous lack of Canadian flags outside of Montréal. As a matter of fact, Québec even arguably has its own foreign policy, carried out by its Departments of Education and Cultural Affairs (which seriously undermined Ottawa's Department of External Affairs in the 1960s when Québec entered talks with Charles de Gaulle's Fifth Republic government). This sense of nationhood was probably always there before the post-war years, but the Catholic Church and the Union Nationale (which was extremely popular with the farming community) kept it from becoming political and held it in check. To a largely agrarian society, these traditional institutions adequately provided the basic services, while competently upholding traditional Québécois values. To many Francophones, that was enough.

The tremendous surge in economic growth, which uprooted large portions of the population from the countryside, eventually rendered these traditional institutions irrelevant. Québec became an essentially modern society that is much more complicated and pluralistic, draconian unilingual language laws notwithstanding. For Quebeckers living in this new urban environment, new wants, new sensibilities, new outlook, and new aspirations inevitably developed. Since urban Québec was dominated by the Anglophone elite, Francophones naturally wanted them out of the picture. They wanted to be 'les maîtres chez nous.' They wanted a society worthy of the progress they had achieved. This was where an active government apparatus and nationalism came into the picture-- in the form of technocratic administrations like that of Jean Lesage and later culminating in a separatist Parti Québécois. These became the new pillars of society, and unfortunately, their agenda often conflicts with that of the rest of Canada. In the end, the economic growth and urbanisation of Québec eventually engendered the dangerous polarisation that exists today.

FIRST NATIONS

Questions rarely raised in Québec but nonetheless should warrant deliberation include the future of the First Nations peoples living in Québec. Their status significantly complicates the process of separating the province from Canada. Would the land on which they live be a part of an independent Québec despite their strong ties to Anglophone Canada? The Cree of Nouveau Québec originally gave their allegiance to the monarch of the British Empire, not to the Parti Québécois. First Nations simply cannot be traded like properties between nations, but the Québec government appears to place nationalist aspirations above aboriginal rights. After the 'Quiet Revolution,' there has also been a rise of native consciousness, and it peaked in 1990 with the events at Oka.

Tensions have not subsided between separatists and the natives after the Mohawks blockaded the proposed expansion of a golf course in Oka near Montréal. Members of the tribe considered the expansion a violation of their sacred burial grounds, and the standoff erupted in violence between them and the provincial authorities. Lasting throughout the summer, the blockade was not resolved until the intervention of federal troops. Québécois nationalists considered the action as a federal action to not just subdue the natives, but also show of force to provincial authorities. Some nationalists even felt that it was a federalist conspiracy to permanently quell the matter of Québécois independence after the humiliation of the rejection of Meech Lake Accord (Dickinson 371). This sentiment has some rationale in the sense that the plight of the natives of Québec also generated considerable public support for the Mohawks in the rest of Canada. It reminded all Canadians that the First Nations have to be taken into consideration before there's any talk of separatism. In fact, the Cree tribe in Nouveau Québec voted in a 1995 referendum amongst themselves that they would not be part of an independent Québec nation. The nationalist Parti Québécois government has not decided whether it would recognise such as decision. What about that region's invaluable Hydro-Québec's James Bay projects? Who gets to keep the management and reap the economic benefits of that massive project? Needless to say, these are issues that all Canadians must examine.

EPILOGUE

future of uncertainty is the only certainty. Canadian unity is more fragile than ever since the Parti Québécois is expected to be back in power to stage another sovereignty referendum, and the designated opposition in the federal House of Commons is the Bloc Québécois of souverainistes. (Canada is unique in the sense that the official opposition in the federal parliament is a party whose primary goal is to split the country apart.) Although Lord Durham's recommendations to assimilate Francophones were implemented more than 150 years ago, the differences between the two founding societies are ironically more ingrained than ever. However, history seems to suggest that Canada can survive this latest round of constitution crises intact with Québec remaining in the Confederation. If Québec really wants to leave Canada, it probably would have left years ago. Canada shows an extraordinary sense of resiliency to bounce back from the brink and remain united after overcoming threats of dissolution (e.g., 1838 rebellions, Riel and the Métis rebellions, the conscription crises during the two world wars, the FLQ crisis, the 1980 referendum). The current sluggish economic situation would not help the cause of independence either since as an independent upstart, Québec would be unable to pick up its share of Canada's horrendously massive debt burden. In terms of federal equalisation payments, Québec currently gets more benefits from the federal government than it contributes in its share of tax revenues. Furthermore, it would not be prudent for Canada or Québec to jeopardise their international credit ratings by showing signs of instability during this period of recession. These messy questions are just on the tip of the iceberg, and there are certainly much more complicated and disturbing issues that must be addressed before any discussions on sovereignty association take place. Québec and Canada are still mutually dependent on each other, and the Dominion probably can survive if enough people value this dependence. Even though the federal deficit is the most pressing issue that all Canadians should probably worry about (but aren't), Canadians (particularly westerners) should also not take the current crisis too lightly if they don't want to go through another round of wearisome referendums that are certain to weaken the overall economy.

NOTES

Behiels, Michael D. "Quebec: Social 
   Transformation and Ideological Renewal, 
   1940-1976." Quebec Since 1945.
   Ed. Michael D. Behiels. 
   Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1987. 
   21-45.

Bergeron, Gérard. "The Québécois State 
   under Canadian Federalism."
   Quebec Since 1945.
   Ed. Michael D. Behiels. 
   Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1987. 
   178-195.

Coleman, William D. "From Bill 22 to Bill 101:
   The Politics of Language under the Parti Québécois."
   Quebec Since 1945.
   Ed. Michael D. Behiels. 
   Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1987. 
   241-261.

Dickinson, John. 
   A Short History of Quebec (Second Edition). 
   Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993. 

Jones, Richard. "Duplessis and the Union 
   Nationale Administration."
   Quebec Since 1945.
   Ed. Michael D. Behiels. 
   Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1987. 
   6-20.

---. "Politics and the Reinforcement of 
   the French Language in Canada and Quebec, 
   1960-1986."
   Readings in Canadian History: Post 
   Confederation.
   Eds. R. Douglas Francis and Ronald Smith.
   Toronto: Harcourt Brace Canada, 1994. 
   525-543.

McNaught, Kenneth. The Penguin History of 
   Canada.
   Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1988.

McRoberts, Kenneth. "Separate Agendas: 
   English Canada and Quebec."
   Readings in Canadian History: Post 
   Confederation.
   Eds. R. Douglas Francis and Ronald Smith. 
   Toronto: Harcourt Brace Canada, 1994. 
   543-556.

---. "The Sources of Neo-Nationalism in 
   Quebec." Quebec Since 1945.
   Ed. Michael D. Behiels.
   Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1987. 
   80-107.

Morin, Claude. "Quebec and Canadian 
   Federalism." Quebec Since 1945.
   Ed. Michael D. Behiels.
   Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1987. 
   196-208.

Renaud, Marc. "Quebec's New Middle Class 
   in Search of Social Hegemony: Causes 
   and Political Consequences."
   Quebec Since 1945.
   Ed. Michael D. Behiels. 
   Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1987. 
   48-79.

Rocher, Guy. "A Half Century of Cultural 
   Evolution in Quebec."
   Quebec Since 1945.
   Ed. Michael D. Behiels. 
   Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1987. 
   289-299.

11 May 1994