| Documents from the Indonesian Ad Hoc Tribunal for East Timor | ||
| Defendant Tono Suratman | Judgment | |
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BRIG. GEN. TNI. TONO SURATMAN
BINSAR GULTOM, SH., SE. .................................................Member of the Panel of Judges H.M. KABUL SUPRIYADHIE, SH., M. Hum., ....................Member of the Panel of Judges HERU SUSANTO, SH., M. Hum., ..........................................Member of the Panel of Judges AMIRUDDIN ABURAERA, S.H., .........................................Member of the Panel of Judges MATIUS B. SITURU, S.H., .....................................................Acting Clerk of Court Jakarta, May 13, 2003
The Panel of Judges of the Human Rights Ad Hoc Court at the Central Jakarta District Court presided and ruled over the Human Rights Criminal Case at the first instance according to the Regular Procedure, has pronounced the Judgment as stated under the case of the Defendant: Full Name : Brig. Gen. TONO SURATMAN
The Defendant has been represented by the team of Attorneys, consist of: RM. RAHYONO ABIKUSNO, SH., LL.M., M. RUDJITO, SH., LL.M., AMIR KARYATIN, SH., M. KAPITRA AMPERA, SH., I.A. SRI UTAMI WIJAYANTI, SH., DR. NIRMALA CHANDRA DEWI MOTIK, SH., JOAO MECO, SH., HARI MURTI DJOKO PRATOMO, SH., and HARTANTO, SH., based on the Special Letter of Power of Attorney (Surat Kuasa Khusus) dated on July 16, 2002, and the team of Attorneys of the TNI Personnel, consist of: AB. SETIAWAN, SH., MBA., NURHAJIZAH M. SH., ADNAN MADJID, SH., MH., SUBAGYA SANTOSA, SH., WIDARSONO, SH., Z. EFFENDI, SH., BAMBANG WIDARTO, SH., MH., SUBAGJO, SH., based on Surat Kuasa Khusus dated on July 8, 2002, whose all from the attorney office on Jalan Denpasar Raya Blok C 17 No. 41-42, South Jakarta. The Human Rights Ad. Hoc Court: After Reading: 1. The Letter of official turning over of Dossier of the Grave Human Rights violation case with the attachments under the name of Defendant TONO SURATMAN 2. The Decision (Penetapan) of the Head of the Central Jakarta Human Rights Ad. Hoc Court No. 10/Pid/HAM.Ad.Hoc/PN.Jkt.Pst. dated on July 2, 2002, on the Appointment of the Panel of Judges who presided and ruled over the case. 3. The Decision of the Head of the Panel of Judges No. 10/Pid/HAM Ad.Hoc/2002/PN.Jkt.Pst dated July 9, 2002 on the settlement of the days of court sessions. After Hearing: 1. The Reading of the Indictment Letter by the Ad. Hoc Public Prosecutor, Case Reg. Number: 10/HAM/TIM-TIM/07/2002 dated July 6, 2002; 2. The Reading of the Intermediate Decision of the Panel of Judges dated July 30, 2002, No. 10/Pid.HAM/Ad.Hoc/2002/PN.Jkt.Pst, mainly stated that the objection of the team of attorneys of Defendant TONO SURATMAN was not approved and therefore stated that the Central Jakarta Human Rights Ad. Hoc Court was authorized to rule over the case of the Defendant. 3. The Reading of the Charge (Requisitor) of the Ad. Hoc Public Prosecutor read on April 14, 2003, which mainly charged the Panel of Judges of the Human Rights Ad. Hoc Court to make judgment; 3.1. Declare Defendant TONO SURATMAN had legally and convincingly guilty of committing the crime acts: "as a military commander did not make any control or prevention for the crime against humanity committed by troops under his command." As regulated under criminal charges in first charge which violates article 42 paragraph (1) letter a and b jis article 7b, article 9 letter a, article 42 paragraph (3), article 37 and the second charge of article 42 paragraph 9 letter a and b jis article 7b article 9 letter h, article 42 paragraph (3), article 40 of Law No. 20/ 2000, on Human Rights Court. 3.2. Sentence Defendant TONO SURATMAN with 10 (ten) years imprisonment. 3.3. Declare the material evidence in the form of copies of Letters to be presented as material evidence in other cases. 3.4. Sentence Defendant TONO SURATMAN to pay the court financial charges of Rp. 5,000,- (five thousand rupiahs) 4. The Reading of the Self-Plea (Pembelaan Pribadi/ Self Pledoi) of Defendant TONO SURATMAN read on April 23, 2003, which mainly stated that within the condition of civilian order (tertib sipil), in case of internal conflicts in the society, the responsibilities should be in the hands of the Police, while TNI should only help when requested. Therefore Defendant TONO SURATMAN requested the Panel of Judges to observe the problem more clearly to be able to make judgments based on considerations the inner self of the members of the Panel of Judges. 5. The Reading of the Plea of the team of Attorneys of Defendant TONO SURATMAN read on April 23, 2003 which mainly considered that Defendant TONO SURATMAN was legally and convincingly proven not guilty of committing the crimes as charged by the Ad. Hoc Public Prosecutor. Therefore the Team of Attorneys of the Defendant requested the Panel of Judges to: 5.1. Declare Defendant Brigadier General TONO SURATMAN was legally and convincingly proven not guilty of committing the Grave Human Rights Violations as stated in the first indictment and the second indictment cumulatively. 5.2. Declare Defendant TONO SURATMAN free of all indictments. 5.3. Restore the rights of Defendant TONO SURATMAN of his capability, position, status and dignity. 5.4. Impose the court financial charges to the state. 6. The Replik of the Ad. Hoc Public Prosecutor read on May 1, 2003, which mainly stated to be persistent of the charges. 7. The Duplik of the Team Of Attorneys of Defendant TONO SURATMAN read on May 8, 2003, which mainly stated to be persistent of the plea. Considering that based on the Charges of the Ad. Hoc Public Prosecutor dated July 16, 2002, No. 10/Pid.HAM/TIM-TIM/07/2002, the Defendant has been charged as committing grave Human Rights Violations as follows: ONE ----- He, the defendant TONO SURATMAN as Military Post Commander Wira Dharma in East Timor who was on duty since June 10, 1998 until August 13, 1999, on April 5, 1999, April 6, 1999 and on April 17, 1999 or at least in April 1999, in Batublete or on the border of Liquisa and Maubara, at Pastor Rafael Dos Santos' residence in Liquisa Church compound and at Manuel Viegas Carascalao's residence in Jalan Antonio De Cavalho No. 13, Dilli - all of the places were located in East Timor under Article 2 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No.96/2001 concerning the Changes of PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 53/2001 on the Establishment of Human Rights Ad Hoc Court at the Central Jakarta District Court which has the authority to preside and rule over grave Human Rights violations, the defendant TONO SURATMAN as Military Commander in accordance to the guidance of general Territorial Staff of the Army Headquarters has the duty and authority to carry out the territorial guidance consisting of geographical, demography, and social condition guidance as well as has the responsibility to command and control the security and defense operations including controlling and inspecting the commands/units under his command ranks-and-file in order to guarantee the achievement of effective and successful targets, he, the defendant TONO SURATMAN who was effectively acted as military commander knew or under the circumstances, should have known that his troops under his command or control had committed or had just committed grave Human Rights violation, namely, a crime against humanity by committing a widespread or systematic attack towards civilians as on April 5, 1999, April 6, 1999 and April 17, 1999 in the form of murder, but the defendant did not take any proper and required action within his authority resulting that his subordinates together with pro integration group had committed an attack towards pro independence group or civilians in Batublete and resulted in two civilians were dead, the attack on civilians or pro independence group who were taking shelter in Liquisa Church compound resulted more or less than 20 people were dead and on civilians who were taking shelter at Manuel Viegas Carascalao's residence resulted more or less than 12 people were dead and the defendant TONO SURATMAN did not prevent and quell the attack or surrender the perpetrators to the appropriate authorities for investigation, question, and prosecution: The deeds were done by the defendant TONO SURATMAN in the form of : Asep Kuswani as Liquisa District Military Commander had reported the clash between pro-integration group and pro-independence group that happened on April 4, 5, 6, 1999 in Liquisa to the defendant as his superordinate. On April 4, 1999 a house belonged to the pro independence group in Pukelara had been burned, which was committed by pro-integration group, then the pro independence took a revenge by burning down a house owned by a TNI (Indonesian Army) officer. On April 5, 1999 Pro-Integration group masses gathered in Maubara to leave for Liquisa with an intention to attack pro independence group. The arrival of the pro integration group was seen by pro independence group. And under leadership of Jacinto Da Costa Pereira pro independence group intended to stop the integration group to Liquisa and Maubara border. It turned out pro-integration group was supported by TNI troops/ Indonesian Police among others known as Josse Matheus, Tome Diego of District Military Command 1638/ Liquisa equipped with pistols and firearms. More or less than two people from pro independence were dead in the attack and then pro independence ran away and took shelter at Pastor Rafael Dos Santos' residence in Liquisa Church compound. And pro integration masses surrounded the Church compound bringing firearms, home made firearms, arrow, machetes, samurai, knives and other kinds of stick. Based on the report, the defendant TONO SURATMAN on April 6, 1999 has ordered witness Mujiono as Military Post Deputy Commander together with Yayat Sudrajat, Commander of Tribuana Task Force to go to Liquisa to check the situation along with two units of TNI troops and three personnel of S.G.I Tribuana VIII, when they arrived at Liquisa District Military Command Headquarters at 1.00 p.m. Eastern Indonesian Time, they met with District Military Commander, District Police Commander, the Regent and Jhon Rea. During the meeting, District Military Commander reported that the negotiation with Pastor Rafael Dos Santos to surrender Jacinto Da Costa and Gregorio Dos Santos or the leaders of pro independence has failed, because Pastor Rafael Dos Santos was only wiling to surrender as long as Jacinto Da Costa Pereira was questioned and brought to the Provincial Police Headquarters on the grounds that if he was brought to District Police Headquarters, he would be killed. And based on the report, it was decided that Regent Leonita Martins was the one who should negotiate and pick up Jacinto da Costa Pereira, but the Regent did want to do it because he was afraid that he would be shot or killed by Jacinto Da Costa Pereira. To replace him, Police Lieutenant 1st Jhon Rea was appointed but before he left to negotiate and pick up Jacinto Da Costa Pereira, a fire was heard from the church compound and Pro-integration masses who were supported by around 100 personnel from TNI and Polri (Indonesian Police) among others named: 1. Zakarias (TNI), Had attacked and opened shots towards refugees from pro-independence group who were taking shelter inside Pastor Rafael Dos Santos' residence Liquisa church compound. As a result of the attack, a number of people from pro independence group were dead, among others: 1. Jacinto Da Costa Pereira On April 17, 1999, starting at 9.00 a.m. Eastern Indonesian Time, in the courtyard of East Timor Governor, Pam Swakarsa rally was held and attended by around six hundred participants consisted of Pro-integration group: Besi Merah Putih (BMP), Aitarak, Mahidi, Darah Merah and Halilintar which was attended by Governor, District Police Commander and Joao Tavares the commander of Pro Integration Forces (PPI) acting as the leader of the rally. In the big rally Eurico Guterres as Deputy Commander of the Pro Integration Forces as the 2nd speaker and whose speech was broadcast live by Dilli Radio, gave a "command" that was: - All CNRT leaders should be exterminated/killed And at around 11. p.m Eastern Indonesian Time after the big rally was over pro integration masses equipped with home-made firearms, and arrows moved towards Leandro Isaac's house and destructed Leandro Isaac's house until it was destroyed and then they headed towards Manuel Viegas Carrascalao's house which was occupied by around 136 refugees from Maubara, Ainaro, Turiscai, Alas, Liquisa. When Manuel Viegas Carrascalao and his daughter Maria Christiana Carrascalao came back from Comoro airport and headed towards their house had received a phone call from his son Mario Viegas Carrascalao alias Manelito not allowing his father to return home because the house was already surrounded by pro integration masses. Based on the report Manuel Viegas Carrascalao and his daughter went directly to the defendant TONO SURATMAN's home to report what was happening and also to seek help from the defendant, but the defendant answered that "TNI is neutral". And then Manuel Viegas Carrascalao asked for firearms to protect the refugees and the defendant replied "ask for it from other place". In the attack pro integration masses which was supported by a number of TNI troops from Maubara Subdistrict Military Command among others: 1. Jisse Mateus Resulted in more or less than 12 people including Mario Viegas Carrascalao (Manuel Viegas Carrascalao's son) from pro independence group were dead, among others: 1. Raul Das Cansela. The defendant TONO SURATMAN's deeds was a grave Human Rights criminal violation ruled and criminally charged under Article 42 paragraph (1) a and b jis Article 7 b, Article 9 a, Article 42 paragraph (3), Article 37 Law No. 26/2000. TWO ----- He, the defendant TONO SURATMAN as Military Post Commander Wira Dharma in East Timor who was on duty since June 10, 1998 until August 13, 1999, on April 5, 1999, April 6, 1999 and on April 17, 1999 or at least in April 1999, in Batublete or on the border of Liquisa and Maubara, at Pastor Rafael Dos Santos' residence in Liquisa Church compound and at Manuel Viegas Carascalao's residence in Jalan Antonio De Cavalho No. 13, Dilli - all of the places were located in East Timor under Article 2 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No.96/2001 concerning the Changes of PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 53/2001 on the Establishment of Human Rights Ad Hoc Court at the Central Jakarta District Court which has the authority to preside and rule over grave Human Rights violations, the defendant TONO SURATMAN as Military Commander in accordance to the guidance of general Territorial Staff of the Army Headquarters has the duty and authority to carry out the territorial guidance consisting of geographical, demography, and social condition guidance as well as has the responsibility to command and control the security and defense operations including controlling and inspecting the commands/units under his command ranks-and-file in order to guarantee the achievement of effective and successful targets, he, the defendant TONO SURATMAN who was effectively acted as military commander knew or under the circumstances, should have known that his troops under his command or control had committed or had just committed grave Human Rights violation, namely, a crime against humanity by committing a widespread or systematic attack towards civilians as on April 5, 1999, April 6, 1999 and April 17, 1999 in the form of abuse, but the defendant TONO SURATMAN did not take any proper and required action within his authority resulting that his subordinates together with pro integration group had committed an attack towards pro independence group or civilians in Batublete and resulted in 7 civilians were injured, the attack on civilians or pro independence group who were taking shelter in Liquisa Church compound resulted more or less than 21 people were dead and on civilians who were taking shelter at Manuel Viegas Carascalao's residence resulted more or less than 5 people were dead and the defendant TONO SURATMAN did not prevent and quell the attack or surrender the perpetrators to the appropriate authorities for investigation, question, and prosecution:
Asep Kuswani as Liquisa District Military Commander had reported the clash between pro-integration group and pro-independence group that happened on April 4, 5, 6, 1999 in Liquisa to the defendant as his superordinate. On April 4, 1999 a house belonged to the pro independence group in Pukelara had been burned, which was committed by pro-integration group, then the pro independence took a revenge by burning down a house owned by a TNI (Indonesian Army) officer. On April 5, 1999 Pro-Integration group masses gathered in Maubara to leave for Liquisa to attack pro independence group. The arrival of the pro integration group was seen by pro independence group. And under leadership of Jacinto Da Costa Pereira pro independence group stopped the integration group to Liquisa and Maubara border. It turned out pro-integration group was supported by TNI troops and Indonesian Police among others known as Josse Matheus, Tome Diego of District Military Command 1638/ Liquisa equipped with pistols and firearms. More or less than 2 (two) people from pro independence were dead in the attack and then pro independence ran away and took shelter at Pastor Rafael Dos Santos' residence in Liquisa Church compound. And pro integration masses surrounded the Church compound bringing firearms, home made firearms, arrow, machetes, samurai, knives and other kinds of stick. 1. Zakarias (TNI), Had attacked and opened shots towards refugees from pro-independence group who were taking shelter inside Pastor Rafael Dos Santos' residence Liquisa church compound. As a result of the attack, as many as 21 people from pro independece group were injured: 1. Fransisco Das Santos. - All CNRT leaders should be exterminated/killed And at around 11. p.m Eastern Indonesian Time after the big rally was over pro integration masses equipped with home-made firearms, and arrows moved towards Leandro Isaac's house and destructed Leandro Isaac's house until it was destroyed and then they headed towards Manuel Viegas Carrascalao's house which was occupied by around 136 refugees from Maubara, Ainaro, Turiscai, Alas, Liquisa. When Manuel Viegas Carrascalao and his daughter Maria Christiana Carrascalao came back from Komoro airport and headed towards their house had received a phone call from his son Mario Viegas Carrascalao alias Manelito not allowing his father to return home because the house was already surrounded by pro integration masses. Based on the report Manuel Viegas Carrascalao and his daughter went directly to the defendant's home to report what was happening and also to seek help from the defendant, but the defendant TONO SURATMAN answered that "TNI is neutral". And then Manuel Viegas Carrascalao asked for firearms to protect the refugees and the defendant replied "ask for it from other place". In the attack pro integration masses which was supported by a number of TNI troops from Maubara Subdistrict Military Command among others: 1. Jisse Mateus Resulted in more or less than 5 people were injured: 1. Florindo Da Jesus. The defendant TONO SURATMAN's deeds was a grave Human Rights criminal violation ruled and criminally charged under Article 42 paragraph (1) a and b jis Article 7 b, Article 9 h, Article 42 paragraph (3), Article 40 Law No. 26/2000. Considering making a concise explanation on the Judgment, the Panel of Judges did not include all the testimonies of the witnesses contained in the Court's Deposition Document (Berita Acara Persidangan), the Panel of Judges would only presented the main parts of the testimonies related to the charges of the Ad. Hoc Public Prosecutor, as follows: The facts revealed in court based on the testimonies of the witnesses who gave their testimonies under oath:
In the examination in court, the witness gave his testimonies under oath, and mainly explained as follows: · It is true that the witness has known Defendant TONO SURATMAN and had occupied the post of WADANREM (Deputy Commander of the Military Post) 162/Wira Dharma, East Timor started on June 5, 1998, up to May 13, 1999; · It is true that Liquisa case was the last part of a chain of previous incidents, which peaked on April 6, 1999, at the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS in Liquisa Church Compound. · It is true that the witness was ordered by Defendant TONO SURATMAN to check the incident on the afternoon of April 5, 1999 but departed on April 6, 1999 instead; · That the incident happened sporadically, a few seconds after JOHN REA left for renegotiation, after hearing the sound of gunshots; · That Liquisa case was a conflict between the Pro-Independence and the Pro-Integration; · That the witness did not give orders to disarm or disperse the Pro-Integration people who surrounded the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS in Liquisa Church Compound. · That the witness did not know whether there were TNI soldiers involved as TNI had been assigned to only back-up POLRI; · That Defendant TONO SURATMAN, after the incidents, gave instructions to DANDIM (Military District Commander) of Liquisa and the witness to take care of the wounded victims, safe Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS, and secure the refugees.
· That the distance between the Liquisa MAKODIM (Military District Headquarters) and the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS was more or less than 50 meters; · The witness knew because he received reports from DANDIM of Liquisa, that in the incident, there were the wounded and five people were dead. · That Liquisa KODIM provided aids of logistics to the Pro-Independence who were rescued and provided medications for the wounded at MAKODIM. · That the incident on April 17, 1999 at the residence of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO, the witness heard the report of DANDIM of Dilli, and at the time the witness was at Liquisa; · That during the incident in Liquisa or at the residence of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO, Defendant TONO SURATMAN was in Dilli and there were no involvement of TNI members in both incidents; · That during the incident at the residence of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO based on the report of the DANDIM of Dilli, Lieut. Col. ENDAR PRIYANTO, the number of the dead victims were twelve people after their arrival at the hospital. · The background of the incident was due to the two conflicting powers of the Pro-Integration and the Pro-Independence groups; · That TNI, in the framework of territorial accommodation of the people did not take side with any of the groups. · That TNI had several times facilitated activities of reconciliation among the conflicting parties such as the DARI I and DARE II meetings; · That Defendant TONO SURATMAN had distributed pocket books on Guidelines of Exercising Human Rights (Petunjuk Penyelenggaraan HAM) to all members of TNI on assignments in East Timor; · That KOREM had no authorities to issue permits on festivities. · That on the testimony of the witness, Defendant TONO SURATMAN had no objection;
In the court examination, the witness gave his testimony under oath, and mainly explained as follows: · The witness knows Defendant TONO SURATMAN, has no family relationship, and had been assigned as KAPOLRES (District Police Commander) of Liquisa since the end of June, 1998 until the early July 1999; · That on April 4, 1999 there was an incident in Pukelara Village (clashes of people), but was settled/ reconciled by the KAPOLRES and DANRAMIL (Sub-district Military Commander); · That on April 5, 1999, the Pro-Independence group led by JACINTO DA COSTA threatened members of the police at the scene of the crime (TKP), and then ran away to seek protection in the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS; · That on April 6, 1999, the witness received a phone call from Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS who reported that there were many people surrounding the pastoral who made attacks into the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS, then the witness ordered KASAT SABHARA to go to the pastoral to negotiate instructions to the perpetrators of the riot to give in to the authorities; · That the witness ordered JOHN REA to make negotiations with Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS to hand over JACINTO DA COSTA but Pastor RAFAEL refused because he was afraid of being killed; · That the witness heard gunshots coming from the pastoral house; · That the witness never issue a warrant for the arrest of JACINTO DA COSTA, because the process was long and complicated and required a preliminary report from the police; · That the isolation surrounding the pastoral compound of more or less than 100 personnel consisted of one platoon of BRIMOB and more or less than 40 members of POLRES and TNI officers. · That the witness was summoned by DANDIM at KODIM and on his arrival at KODIM there were already present; WADANREM, DANREM, the Regent and the Pro-Integration represented by EURICO GUTERRES; · That the ability of the witness to secure the TKP was limited, therefore required aids of TNI officers; · That the incidents on April 4, 5 and 6, 1999, were due to the problems on maintaining the security and order under the authority of POLRI; · That there were no preliminary information on the occurring clashes on April 6, 1999; · That Defendant TONO SURATMAN said no objection on the testimonies of the witness;
In the court examination, the witness gave his testimonies under oath, and mainly explained as follows: · It is true that the witness had been assigned in East Timor as DANDIM of Liquisa started on September 1997 through September 1999; · It is true that the witness, during the incident of attacks to the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS in Liquisa Church Compound on April 6, 1999, was assigned as DANDIM 1638 of Liquisa with duties to maintain the stability of security and territorial establishment; · It is true that the incident on April 6, 1999 according to the witness, is the conflicts between the two groups of Pro-Integration and Pro-Independence resulting in five people were dead and more or less than twenty-five people wounded, due to the attacks using guns. · That on April 5, 1999 there were the destructions and burnings in the villages of Pukelara and kidnappings, and kidnappings committed by the Pro-Independence (CNRT) which were then overcome by the security officials; · That the witness clarified that there were no members of KODIM who were involved in the clashes at the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS, they were, instead, made preventive measures and accommodated the clash victims. · That the witness refused the opinion that TNI had let the incident to happen, because the witness knew that TNI made preventive measures; · It is true that in the witness opinion, there were no TNI members involved in the clashes, TNI personnel in MAKODIM were always ready to help the police when asked; · That the incidents on April 4,5 and 6, 1999 in the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS in Liquisa Church compound had been reported to DANREM through verbal report (telephone), prior to the written report; · It is true that SGI TRIBUANA VIII personnel replacements after the month of May 1999 included as many as four people and they were done under the authority of the commander; · That the visit of the Inspector General of the Indonesian armed forces ABRI to Liquisa was to prove whether or not there were soldiers involved, the fact was that there were no soldiers involved; · That the ones who saved Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS were members of KODIM; · That KAPOLRES visited MAKODIM to request security back-ups; · That FALINTIL and CNRT were the Pro-Independence groups; · It is true that Defendant TONO SURATMAN had no objection on the testimonies of the witness
In the court examination, the witness gave the testimonies under oath, and mainly explained as follows: · That the witness knows Defendant TONO SURATMAN as DANREM; · That the witness was a former member of the Provincial Legislative Council DPRD of East Timor province and then joined the Pro-Independence organization; · That the witness' residence prior to the incident of April 17, 1999 had been used to shelter as many as one hundred and thirty-six people of the Pro-Independence groups; · The witness said that the reason of attacks to his home was because his residence was used as a place to protect people who ran away from threats by the Pro-Integration groups from their areas; · The witness knew that his house was under attacks by the Pro-Integration groups and reported straight to Defendant TONO SURATMAN to ask for assistance and asked for guns to defend the refugees; · That due to the attacks on April 17, 1999, to the witness' residence, the number of refugees formerly one hundred and thirty-six people, were only sixty people left, according to the witness, the rest were probably dead, wounded or missing, and the result of the attacks was that the house and its contents were completely destroyed and lost; · It is true that one of the dead victims resulting from the attacks was the witness' son named MARIO MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO alias MANUELITO; · That the witness did not know whether the attacks on his house were ceased by TNI/ Police personnel; · That Defendant TONO SURATMAN had no objection over the testimonies of the witness, except on the part related to the request of guns;
In the court examination, the witness gave his testimonies under oath and mainly explained as follows: · It is true that the witness knows Defendant TONO SURATMAN, but has no family relationship. · It is true that at the time of the attacks on Liquisa Church Compound, the witness had been assigned as KAPUSKODAL OPS in POLRES Liquisa who was responsible on the control of police operations in POLRES Liquisa jurisdiction; · It is true that the witness in carrying out his duties was in coordination with TNI officials; · That it is true that the reasons of the attacks were because prior to that incidents on April 4 and 5, 1999 there were destructions, burnings and abuses by the Pro-Independence groups on the Pro-Integration people. The Pro-Independence groups was led by JACINTO DA COSTA (Dato village chief); · It is true that after the incident JACINTO DA COSTA and his friends ran and seek protection at the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS and the Pro-Integration party had asked Pastor RAFAEL to let JACINTO DA COSTA surrender; · That the witness saw both groups carried homemade firearms, bows and arrows, and lances; · That the witness had been assigned by KAPOLRES of Liquisa to negotiate with Pastor RAFAEL to hand over JACINTO DA COSTA for investigation; · That POLRI, prior to the incident had secured the area surrounding the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS by adding thirty personnel (one platoon) led by FRANS SALAMALI; · It is true that for the surrender of JACINTO DA COSTA, Pastor
RAFAEL proposed prerequisites: · The prerequisites were finally approved and when the witness got instructions from WADANREM to extend the information to Pastor RAFAEL, suddenly there were shots from automatic guns, coming from unclear directions, which then followed by spontaneous attacks of BMP people onto the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS in Liquisa Church Compound; · That the result of the attacks were that five unidentified people died, and after visum et repertum examinations were buried in Maubara burials; · That the isolation measure separating the two groups had been done by BRIMOB and POLRI, while TNI members were standing by at KODIM office for closed security measures; · That the witness was telling the truth on the numbers of Police and TNI personnel were far below that of the power of the masses; · That the situation changed rapidly so that it was impossible to request more back-up troops; · After the incident on April 6, 1999 the witness helped investigating the scene of the crime (TKP SERSE) on April 7, 1999, and the witness knew that KAPOLDA (Provincial Police Commander), DANREM, and Bishop BELO were present for a visit to the TKP; · It is true that Defendant TONO SURATMAN had no objection on the testimonies of the witness;
In the court examination, the witness gave his testimonies under oath, and mainly explained as follows: · It is true that the witness knows Defendant TONO SURATMAN, but has no family relationship; · That the witness, during the attacks on the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS at Liquisa Church Compound on April 6, 1999, was on duty as KASAT SABHARA of POLRES Liquisa; · It is true that the witness had orders from KAPOLRES of Liquisa to apply security measures surrounding the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS to prevent attacks by BMP groups on the masses of the Pro-Independence groups sheltering inside the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS; · That in relation to the task, the witness had received orders from KAPOLRES to make negotiations to overcome problems among the two groups; · That the Pro-Integration group threatened to attack Liquisa Church Compound, if JACINTO DA COSTA from the Pro-Independence group refused to go out, and therefore the witness called out the Pro-Integration not to make the attacks; · That the witness said there were around three hundred people surrounding the pastoral compound, but the witness did not know from which group they came from; · That Pastor RAFAEL, though had been ensured by the witness on the safety of JACINTO DA COSTA, but Pastor RAFAEL still refused to hand over JACINTO; · That on April 6, 1999 the witness heard of occurring fights among the groups of people in the pastoral residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS, and the witness heard of the five dead victims; · That Defendant TONO SURATMAN had no objections on the testimonies of the witness;
In the court examination, the witness gave his testimonies under oath and mainly explained as follows: · The witness knows Defendant TONO SURATMAN, but has no family relationship; · That on April 5, 1999 the witness as the DANTON (Platoon Commander) had orders to depart for Liquisa due to the occurring turmoil; · That the witness went on duty with one platoon (thirty people), equipped with standard armaments (SKS) and tear gas, and then on April 6, 1999 was ordered to secure and stand by at the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS, and at around 7 a.m. WITA (Central Indonesia Time) they were already standing on guard in the premises of Liquisa Church Compound to secure the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS; · That the witness, together with JOHN REA,reported the results of the negotiation with Pastor RAFAEL to KAPOLRES, and KAPOLRES went straight to KODIM and there were no further instructions until the time of the attacks; · That the officials on guard at the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS, according to the witness were members of BRIMOB and POLRES while other officials were not present, and their numbers were inadequate; · That the incident at the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS in Liquisa Church Compound caused five people dead, based on the information received by the witness, and KAPUSKODAL OPS, JOHN REA; · That the witness saw no TNI officers that joined in the attacks into the Liquisa Church Compound. · That the witness ordered to shoot the tear gas upwards, and causing the masses inside the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS rushing out, and some of them crying; · That Defendant TONO SURATMAN had no objection on the testimonies of the witness;
In the court examination, the witness gave his testimonies under oath and mainly explained as follows: · It is true that on April 17, 1999 the witness was present at the residence of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO to seek refuge because he was chased by the Pro-Integration groups; · It is true that TNI and the Pro-Integration group attacked the residence of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO; · That all members of TNI who attacked the residence of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO were from KORAMIL (Sub-district Military Command) of Maubara; · That after the rally at the Governor's office was over, they (TNI and the Pro-Integration group) went into the house of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO, trashed the entrance door of the house then entered the house, the witness ran to the back of the house, and hid onto bamboos, but he was spotted by two men from the Pro- Integration, the witness was then gashed with a dagger by MATHEUS (Militia); · That the witness knew of the big rally through the radio in the residence of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO; · It is true that the witness showed the wounds on his body consisted of two scars of shot wounds, one scar of arrow wound, and a scar from a cut of a dagger; · That the witness saw no security officials were present around the residence of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO; · That the witness estimated that the numbers of people who attacked more or less than two hundred people; · That based on the information received by the witness and the other refugees, the number of refugees who died in the incident were twelve people, and the witness did not know where they were buried; · That Defendant TONO SURATMAN said that the witness testimonies were not true;
In the court examination, the witness gave testimonies under oath, and mainly explained as follows; · That the witness had stayed in the residence of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO since January 1999; · That the witness on April 17, 1999 was present at the house of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO, and saw the attacks on the house of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO committed by more or less than 200 people consisted of Militia (BMP and AITARAK), assisted by TNI; · It is true that the witness recognized TNI members; they were ANTONIO BESIKAU, CARLOS AMARAL, THEOFILO, JOSE MATHEUS BALITZAR, ANTONIO GOMES, and MEQUEL; · It is true that they trashed the door with a blue Kijang car but the door was not opened then they came back with a yellow truck and the door was opened. · It is true that when the gate was hit by a truck, the witness was present in front of the house inside the front yard; · That the witness suffered cut wounds caused by slashed of machetes, and showed the wound marks which left long stitched scars along the right side of the back through the left side of the ribs; the right hand that was paralyzed because of the peeled-off meat in the area, and its fingers that could not be used normally; · That the witness said that the dead victims in the incident on April 17, 1999 were twelve people, while the wounded were four people; · That the witness, during the attacks, was lying down in a nap when the car broke in, the witness ran to the back, climbed the wall, and stood there on the fenced wall for around 2 to 3 hours; · That according to the witness, the one who got shot was EDUARDO DE JESUS and ALFREDO SANCHES; · That the witness, when wounded and unconscious was helped by BRIMOB and the Red Cross, and was brought to Wira Dharma hospital, which was the army hospital and was treated there for three days. · The witness admitted as a member of CNRT and the witness' friends from Maubara did not aware that such action (?) was against the law of the legitimate RI government; · That Defendant TONO SURATMAN declared he could not accept the testimonies of the witness;
In the court examination, the witness gave the testimonies under oath and mainly explained as follows: · It is true that the witness was the former Commander of the Pro-Integration of East Timor, and the witness knows Defendant TONO SURATMAN as a friend; · That the witness was present at the big rally on April 17, 1999 was invited by EURICO GUTERRES to become the inspector of the ceremony, but did not know the purpose; · That among the people present at the big rally, some carried homemade firearms, and the number of people who were there more or less than five thousands; · That the witness did not see Defendant TONO SURATMAN present in the rally, and neither his deputy or other TNI members; · That the witness did not know about the attacks on the residence of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO, because when the rally was over, the witness went straight home to Maubara; · That during the big rally, the witness, as the inspector made the speech which mainly emphasized the need to have the spirit of love for the country, and the witness did not listen to the speech of EURICO GUTERRES about the threatening to kill CARASCALAO family which was broadcasted through state radio station RRI in Dilli; · The witness has had a good relationship with MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO, and the witness said that the man had been a member of the Legislative Council DPR for twenty years after the integration of East Timor with RI; · That the witness, who has been also a member of KPS chaired by DJOKO SUGIANTO; · That Defendant TONO SURATMAN had no objection over the testimonies of the witness;
In the court examination, the witness gave the testimonies under oath, and mainly explained as follows: · That according to the witness, in performing its duties, TNI organized territorial operations, and such operations in East Timor were called TATOLI Operations. Besides that, there were other operations of maintaining security and order, performed by POLRI; · That the ones who were responsible in TATOLI operations was DANREM, and in the TATOLI operational organization, DANDIM was the Commander of the Sub-sector of the operation, and KAPOLRES was the Deputy Commander of the Sub-sector of the operation; · That in the case of attacks on the house of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO, according to the witness, was included in the operations in maintaining security and order, and not territorial operations; · That at the time of the big rally of PAM SWAKARSA, the witness was not present, but the officials of the closed-security operations were assigned at the location, and later reported to the witness, then the witness reported further to Defendant TONO SURATMAN, through verbal reports, as well as written ones; · That according to the witness, since the announcement of the option by the Minister of Foreign Affairs ALI ALATAS, the clashes between the opposing groups spread out, and become more critical; · That Defendant TONO SURATMAN had no objections over the testimonies of the witness;
In the court examination, the witness gave the testimonies under oath and mainly explained as follows: · That the witness on April 6, 1999, was in Liquisa on the request of Bishop BELLO to become the mediator in negotiations with Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS, to settle the conflicts between the Pro-Independence and the Pro-Integration groups, in which JACINTO DA COSTA and his friends from the Pro-Independence group seeking protection inside the residence of Pastor RAFAEL in Liquisa Church Compound; · That the witness carried out the task, on April 6, 1999 by having a meeting with Pastor RAFAEL and he was received in the churchyard. When the witness came, around the church, gathering masses yelled that JACINTO was inside carrying guns; · That when the witness came to meet Pastor RAFAEL, he saw the police and TNI troops were present around the church premises performing security measures; · That the witness, as the negotiator, failed because Pastor RAFAEL refused to hand over JACINTO and his friends, and he planned to report it to Bishop BELLO, but canceled his plan after he met WADANREM and other officers on the way; · That the witness knew that WADANREM 164/Wira Dharma, at the time of the clashes between the Pro-Integration and the Pro-Independence groups, was in Liquisa, but the witness did not aware that there were orders of preventive measures, and also did not aware/know whether there were TNI members being investigated; · That according to the witness, the organizing committee of the big rally of PAM SWAKARSA on April 17, 1999 was the Local Government, and the witness, in the occasion, was only an invitee, and denied contacting JOAO DA SILVA TAVARESA to attend the big rally to become the ceremonial inspector in the rally; · That according to the witness, the big rally was attended by around four thousand people, and it was attended by only the Pro-Integration groups, and the rally was guarded by security officials, and preventive measures were also applied during the convoys of processions after the rally; · That Defendant TONO SURATMAN had no objections on the testimonies of the witness;
In the court examination, the witness gave testimonies under oath and mainly explained as follows; · That the relation of the two activities was coordinative. KAMTIBMAS (the security and order maintenance) task force with the implementation of orderly community and law enforcement within critical regions that could not be maintained by the police, were performed by TNI with territorial operations (TATOLI Operations); · That to make effective coordination, KAPOLRES, within the structural organization of TATOLI operations, occupied the post of Deputy Commander of the Sub-sector of TATOLI Operations, and DANDIM was the Commander of the Sub-sector of TATOLI Operations; · That according to the witness, there were specific characteristics of East Timor as a Military Operation Area (DOM), among others, in the structural organization of KOREM, in addition to KOREM having a WADANREM, there were special divisions of East Timor regions such as Sector A and Sector B, each of which, led by a Colonel. Due to the specific characteristics, TNI in East Timor had extensive authority to implement security measures; · That for the big rally of PAM SWAKARSA on April 17, 1999 in Dilli, there were no special security measures; · That according to the witness, the clashes of the two groups had been going since 1976, but had not been crystallized in forming organizations with specific names. Before April 1999, the condition of East Timor started to become critical with many forced evictions of non-native residents including the civilian officials. Due to the lack of staff, many of TNI members, besides having main duties, also carrying out non-military tasks; · That Defendant TONO SURATMAN had no objections over the testimonies of the witness;
In the court examination, the witness gave testimonies under oath, and mainly explained as follows: · It is true that the witness knows Defendant TONO SURATMAN, but had no family relationship; · It is true that the witness explained about two KOREM commanders under his command, who were Defendant TONO SURATMAN, then replaced by Col. NUR MUIS; · It is true that after the first option and the second option, further policy was the signing of Tri-partite Agreement on May 5, 1999; · It is true that the implementation of the Tri-partite Agreement was the responsibility of the police; · It is true that on April 6, 1999, there were reports saying there were mass turmoil at the residence of Pastor RAFAEL DOS SANTOS resulting in five people dead, twenty people wounded, and the problem was settled by DANREM as DANREM had assigned WADANREM to go to the location, and Pastor RAFAEL could be evacuated to safety; · It is true that the witness knew of the Liquisa incident through telephone reports from DANREM and before the incident, there were reports related to later incidents; · It is true that on April 17, 1999 the witness was in Denpasar, while on April 18, 1999 the witness went to Dilli to check the incident; · It is true that on April 18, 1999 the witness was ordered by ABRI Commander to go to East Timor to gather leaders of the Pro-Integration and the Pro-Independence groups to seek agreements to reach reconciliation for the conflicting parties on April 19, 1999; · It is true that the security operations in the area had been the responsibilities of the witness, but not included the clashes at the residence of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO, because they were committed by civilians, who were the responsibilities of the police; · It is true that in the Liquisa case, TNI had made checks on the incident, if the preventions were not executed, there would be many more casualties; · That the handing over of firearms before the popular consultation/ ballot were implemented by many of the Pro-Integration groups, while the Pro-Independence refused to hand over their guns; · It is true that on April 17, 1999, the incident at the residence of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO caused twelve people dead, and Liquisa case on April 6, 1999, caused five dead people; · It is true that every time the witness made checks to DANREM on the incidents, was always answered as under control; · It is true that the witness explained about several-time changes of KODAL commands, started in prior to the Tri-partite Agreement (May 5, 1999) to the Army Commander/ PANGADAM (sic), after May 5, 1999, to the police (KAPOLDA), and returned back after the popular consultation/ ballot on September 6, 1999, at 24.00 midnight WITA, under PANGDAM; · It is true that STR signed by the witness' assistant Col. BUDI, explained that the witness reported to PANGDAM, then formed an investigation team from TNI Headquarters (MABES), to check on Liquisa incident, and the result was that there were no TNI members involved; · That Defendant TONO SURATMAN said no objections over the testimonies of the witness;
In the court examination, the witness gave testimonies under oath, and mainly explained as follows: · It is true that the witness knows Defendant TONO SURATMAN and has no family relationship; · It is true that before retirement, the witness occupied the post as Minister of Defense and Security (MENHANKAM), and after retirement occupied the post of Coordinating Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs (MENKO POLSOSKAM); · It is true that there had been a rising escalation after the announcement of the options, within the Pro-Independence, as well as the Pro-Independence (sic!) groups; · It is true that the noticeable cases included the clashes happened on April 4, 5, and 6, 1999, in Liquisa, and on April 17, 1999 in the house MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO; · It is true that the Liquisa problem was quite important because there were dead casualties. MABES TNI sent an investigation team led by an Inspector General from MABES TNI, Vice Admiral Tamtama (Laksdya) ADI to conduct the investigation; · It is true that the Liquisa case was handled under KODIM/POLRES levels, and MABES TNI would not intervene over matters in the lower levels; · It is true that the witness explained the chronology of the incidents of April 4, 5 and 6, 1999, in Liquisa in which there were conflicts between the Pro-Integration and the Pro-Independence groups; · It is true that there was a TNI member, ranked Sergeant, among the victims, who got shot from shots coming from the direction of the residence of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO, there were also civilian victims; · It is true that the incident in MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO house caused twelve people died, which was reported to the witness, due to conflicts between the Pro-Integration and the Pro-Independence groups; · It is true that after the second option to choose independence forwarded, there was rising escalation, conflicts occurred, TNI specifically made prevention by sending battalions (seven battalions) or approximately seven thousand personnel; · It is true that the responsibilities of the respective POLRI and TNI were clear, POLRI maintain the security and order (KAMTIBMAS), while TNI was in the defense sector; · It is true that prior to the incidents in Liquisa and MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO house, there were orders from the witness to make precautions to prevent such incidents from spreading, in written orders, and the witness had tried to find them; · It is true that before the options on the principal change of policies, it was ABRI to act neutral to capture as many GPK (Separatist Movements), and after the options, ABRI maintained its neutrality by standing in between the conflicting parties to promote reconciliation; · It is true that the existing cases, according to the witness, should be followed up with measures to prevent them from spreading, and the actors were legally processed; · It is true that the witness was persistent in his testimonies in BAP, on question over who was more dominant in TATOLI operations, whether it was TNI or POLRI, the witness suggested that they should not be entrapped on who was the commander, they should be consistent with the job description that the state security operations (KAMDAGRI) were under POLRI, while the security and defense operations were under TNI; · It is true that the incidents in Liquisa and in MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO house were about attacks on each other; · It is true that there were no policies of orders to attack civilians during the POLSOSKAM meeting; the witness, at the time, was only a member, as MENHANKAM PANGAB; · It is true that the Contingency Plan meant anticipation to the worst situation (it applies to all military forces throughout the world). The witness could not remember the orders toward the functions of each institution; · That Defendant TONO SURATMAN had no objections over the testimonies of the witness;
In the examination of the court, the witness gave testimonies under oath and mainly explained as follows: · It is true that according to the witness, in the month of June 1998, the president and his cabinet approved the proposal over East Timor to be given special status with extensive autonomy. The proposal was well received by the United Nations (UN), but Portugal approved with conditional requirements, they would become the temporary settlement, and gave the freedom of choice to the people of East Timor; · That the consideration behind the birth of the Option II policy was the high financial cost of East Timor related to the ongoing monetary crisis, and an estimation in the Plenary Cabinet Meeting, that the Pro-Integration group would have won; · That the Option II policy was meant to settle the East Timor issue, to be legally accepted in the national, as well as international levels; · That the East Timor problem had been in the spotlight and had become the target of criticism from inside, as well as outside the country, the accusations toward Indonesia was, at first, an act of what was called as an annexation (invasion) to a small country, but it was then changed to Human Right violations; · That according to the witness, the attacks on Liquisa Church and the house on April 6, 1999 and the attacks on MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO house in Dilli on April 17, 1999 led to reactions from Portugal government and UN. The problems had been widespread through the press and NGOs. The incidents had become the agenda in the state's Politics and Security Meeting; · That according to the witness, the proposal of settlement on East Timor with the policy of granting the special status of having extensive autonomy, led to the opinion that the Pro-Independence party felt they had won, and all that led to riots and terror; · That in April, POLRI was still a part of ABRI; · That Defendant TONO SURATMAN had no objections over the testimonies of the witness;
In the court examination, the witness gave testimonies under oath, and mainly explained as follows; · It is true that the witness, as the chief of KOMNAS HAM (the National Commission on Human Rights), on April 17, 1999, visited East Timor to establish the Independent Commission of Human Rights of Timor Lorosae (KIHAMTIL), related to the heating up situation after the Option II; · That upon the arrival in Dilli, and just arrived at the hotel, saw a parade passing the street, followed by masses, some of whom, carried guns with unclear specifications, and some of them were in uniforms. Then the witness was informed that people were parading after attending a big rally of PAM SWAKARSA, in front of the Governor's office, then they made the attacks and destructions on the residence of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO and the office of the local newspaper SUARA TIMOR TIMUR (Voice of East Timor); · That in the attacks on MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO house, there were twelve people died, they were all the Pro-Independence members, including MARIO MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO, alias MANILETO (sic) (the son of MANUEL VIEGAS CARASCALAO); · It is true that Defendant TONO SURATMAN had no objections over the testimonies of the witness;
(Contained in the Interrogation Deposition Documents (Berita Acara Penyidikan/ BAP) 1. RAFAEL DOS SANTOS; 2. ANTONIO DA CONCEICAO SANTOS; 3. JACINTO DA COSTA; All the testimonies of the witnesses read in court were mainly denied by the Defendant;
In the court examination, the witness gave the testimonies under oath, and mainly explained as follows: · It is true that the witness knows Defendant TONO SURATMAN, but has no family relationship; · It is true that the witness was the President of the Republic of Indonesia since May 21, 1998 until October 19, 1999; · It is true that the witness explained that East Timor problem had been brought to the international situation, the UN Plenary Session (Security Council) still denied it though it had become part of the Indonesian territory, as there was a decree of the People's Consultative Council (MPR), in 1978 that ratify the integration of East Timor into RI, with the consequences that TNI could be present there to secure RI territory. · It is true that at the time, RI state is in difficult situation due to the economical and monetary crisis, and if continued to take care of East Timor for five to ten years, then granted it independence, it would be a heavy burden; · It is true that the witness received a phone call from English Prime Minister TONY BLAIR, UN Secretary General KOFFI ANNAM (sic), Australian Prime Minister JOHN HOWARD, and besides that, JOHN HOWARD requested to meet in Bali, whereas at the time, each of them was accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense and Security; · It is true that the witness then received a letter from JOHN HOWARD requesting East Timor to be treated like New Caledonia as the French colony; · It is true that the witness declared East Timor issue had been in the state of prolonged uncertainty, and had become a burden to the country and state of the Republic of Indonesia; · It is true that around January 1999, the Minister of Foreign Affairs ALI ALATAS received a letter from JOHN HOWARD with an attached disposition from the witness as the president of RI, written in red ink, and was completed on 01.30 a.m. WITA; · It is true that the Indonesian fights were not the invasion of East Timor, because the witness believed that with the constitution of BALEBO declaration, the people of East Timor wanted to join to/ integrate with Indonesia; SUMMARY OF TONO SURATMAN'S VERDICT, P.43-P.92 No Name Identity Incident Facts LEGAL FACTS 3. Element: A military commander or someone effectively acting as a military
commander can be held accountable for the crimes committed by the troops
under his/her effective command and control. Opinion of Ad Hoc Prosecutor Opinion of Defense
Liquisa Dili The panel would also take into account the situation in East Timor pre-referendum,
starting from the issuing of the 2nd option on January 27, 1999 up to
April 1999, before the Three-Parted agreement on May 5, 1999, to determine
the extent of TNI's role accordingly to its function in security. Liquica Dili That Tono Suratman as Danrem 164/WD never issued a policy or order to
his subordinate or troops under his effective control to resort to participate
in the scenes where the violence occurred. He issued a "Pocket Book"
to all TNI soldiers and officials in East Timor and he was also pro-active
in negotiations to establish peace in East Timor, such as the pact on
April 21, 1999 signed by the conflicting parties, namely 1) Xanana Gusmao
and Leandro Isaac from CNRT and Falintil 2) Domingos Soares and Joao da
Silva Tavares from pro-independence 3) Acknowledging the pact, the Regional
Government of East Timor: a) the Governor of East Timor, Abilio Jose Soares
b) Head of DPRD (Regional Representatives Assembly) Armindo Soares Mariano
c) Danrem 164/WD Col. Inf. Tono Suratman d) Chief of Regional Police Col.
Pol. Drs. Timbul Silaen e) Minister of Security and Defense, The High
Commander of TNI Armed Forces, Gen. Wiranto f) Dili Diocese Archbishop
Mgr. Filipe Ximenes Belo and Bacau Diocese Archbishop Mgr. Basilio de
Nacimento e) Chairman of Komnas HAM H.R. Djoko Sugianto Panel of Judges: |
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