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        riddles >> general problem-solving / chatting / whatever >> How to answer problems in philosophy
        
(Message started by: River Phoenix on Feb 21st, 2006, 12:48am)
Title: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by River Phoenix on Feb 21st, 2006, 12:48am
I am sorry that post is long-winded and not indented very well. It was written in reaction to certain students in my philosophy class, as well as the general manner of argument that you often see given by the average person on matters of philosophy/ethics. Most of what I say is also beneath the natural understanding of the kind of person that posts on these boards. But hopefully this will at least start a small discussion, I am interested to hear what you think.


The average intro to philosophy student thinks he's all insightful, with his style of making points that essentially boils down to an assertation followed by the reason(s) supporting it. This is silly since it almost never sees the big picture, the assumptions taken outside accepted definitions and axioms, the relative importance that his assertation would have to the main idea, even if true. My philosophy professor recently asked the question, 'what is the extent to which one can be forced/compelled to believe (religiously)'. It's easy to say: "Not at all, because belief is the domain of God/the soul only and therefore cannot be affected by man." Even sounds like a reasonably insightful (or at least worthwhile) point. But as soon as you bring God into the mix, you've basically decided to define belief as faith in the sense of destiny for heaven or hell. Only God can control the soul, almost by definition. This is extremely unmeaningful. In this case it is actually the question that's faulty. The professor might have chosen to define 'belief' more specifically, but really the question boils down to the issue of whether or not there is a soul (if so then only God can sway it; if not then just take man as a collection of atoms and there's no reason why any part of belief can't be forced by man). But the question of whether or not there is a soul, I lump with questions like whether or not there is a God (in the monotheistic sense), or whether or not we even exist (beyond the obvious fact that we exist at least in some sense, by the logic of "I think therefore I am") - in that I consider them to be in a sense mathematically invalid; that is they are probably undecidable and not even very well defined. Therefore they aren't meaningful and aren't at all worth asking. In this particular case, I suggest that a better question to ask is the question of precisely when it may be utility-maximizing in a society for its government to compel belief, (or indeed attempt to compel belief). Now at least, we are addressing a concern that is meaningful, given the construction. But now, intro-philosophy students seem even more prone to the same error: "I believe yes/no for this and that whatever ethical/practical reason". This approach doesn't look at the issue as a whole, it has no way of judging the relative importance of the ethical/practical concern, and it is not well-defined in that it takes the point-maker's own utility curve as an assumption. The only way to set out to answer this sort of a question is to first set in stone one's own precise definition of the determination of utility, and then to address all of the concerns that might affect this utility together, from the ground up, black boxing groups of factors whenever possible. Only then can you begin to truly analyze the main ideas polarizing viewpoints on the issue, to make judgements on these, and to exercise lateral thinking to simultaneously consider the implications of the opposite sides of each issue.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by towr on Feb 21st, 2006, 3:13am
I suppose the first comment to make is that in philosophy there are no 'faulty questions'. However meaningless or silly a question may be, it can be a valid starting point for something. If nothing else to dissect why it would supposedly be meaningless. Simply asserting that it is means you're doing what you accuse those 'introduction to philosophy' students of.
Also bear in mind, that if we're dealing with an introduction, you shouldn't start getting kneedeep into something like Wittgenstein's Tractatus. It's an introduction after all. So you should start with the 'wrong' question, because that's the only kind regular people know. If you want to teach someone mathematics, you don't start with integrals and limits, you start with addition and subtraction, something close to what they know. You have to open their mind, not bludgen it.

So we have the question "What is the extent to which one can be forced/compelled to believe (religiously)?". Most everyone will have some intuitive understanding of what believe is, and what believing religiously is, so it's something you can work with. You could ask straight up about maximizing utility for society, but you'd get blank looks. It's something you have to 'get to', not 'start at'.
Intuitively belief is not something that can be forced, you (dis)believe despite what you might want. I might like to believe I'm Napoleon, but I don't. No matter how much I'd want to, I can't just change my beliefs. Now, you may be right in asserting that if we are (just) our physical body, that you could, in theory, by arranging the atoms appropriately, change any belief we hold.But that's exactly one of the big questions in philosophy: the relation between mind and body.
Is there something like a soul? And if so, what is it. Can we possibly prove it? Now it seems as though you would just desmiss the question as irrelevant, meaningless, as something you can't possibly get anywhere with. But you might be surprised to know you can get somewhere with it, and it does have relevance. If you look at the artificial intelligence, then it's an important question whether we might ever create something like a human intelligence. Something that's self aware. But what is self awareness? Or intelligence for that matter? We have an intuitive idea about it, but one of the jobs of philosophy is to explore such concepts and clarify them.

And we haven't even got into religion yet.
There's much more to the question we started with than just whether or not there is a soul. If we have a soul, then why should we feel compelled to believe? We might have a soul without there being a god. Our soul might die when our bodies do. We might reincarnate. God might damn us regardless, or admit us to heaven regardless. And how controls our soul? Are we our soul and do we control ourselves? Is everything predetermined and can't we really make any choice? Can (a) god change our might, and would he?
Lots of subsequent questions that need answering if you explore the one we started with.
Philosophy is a much, if not more, about finding questions than finding answers.


Quote:
But the question of whether or not there is a soul, I lump with questions like whether or not there is a God (in the monotheistic sense), or whether or not we even exist (beyond the obvious fact that we exist at least in some sense, by the logic of "I think therefore I am") - in that I consider them to be in a sense mathematically invalid; that is they are probably undecidable and not even very well defined. Therefore they aren't meaningful and aren't at all worth asking.
I'd daresay you'd make a bad philosopher thinking like that. These questions may very well be undecidable, but that isn't the point of philosophy. They may not be well defined, but defining them properly, explicating them, is a job for philosophy. They do have meaning, by virtue of every normal person understanding them to mean something, generally along the same lines. And they are worth asking, because it's what people ask.
You presume an awfull lot to deny meaning and worth to something without making a good case for it.


Quote:
In this particular case, I suggest that a better question to ask is the question of precisely when it may be utility-maximizing in a society for its government to compel belief, (or indeed attempt to compel belief).
One may wonder in what sense this is more meaningfull. First, why utility maximizing? If you want an ethical choice, utility maximizing may not be the best choice. Surely you know the problems, "kill one healthy person, to safe five needing a transplant", "enslave a million people to serve a few million others", in each case ensuring the total utility encreases at least a little. Utility theory is in many ways contradictory to peoples moral intuition.
And then, what measure of utility do you use? There is a tractability problem in that we can't oversee all possible consequences of an action. With our every move there is the faint possibility we make that fatefull butterflies flap, and cause a typhoon in china killing thousands. "Weeeeee!" for disproportionality. The intractability alone is enough to render the usual interpretation of utility theory meaningless in any practical sense (theory is another matter, but you seem to aim for the practical).


Quote:
Now at least, we are addressing a concern that is meaningful, given the construction. But now, intro-philosophy students seem even more prone to the same error: "I believe yes/no for this and that whatever ethical/practical reason". This approach doesn't look at the issue as a whole, it has no way of judging the relative importance of the ethical/practical concern, and it is not well-defined in that it takes the point-maker's own utility curve as an assumption.
But that's just a different sum utility curve. You never specified how to calculate the total utility, so why not give mine a weight of 1 million, and the  rest the weight of a millionth? Besides which we have other ethical venues to resort to. Ethical hedonism, contract theory, categorical imperative, duty ethics, etc.
So on what grounds prefer the one above the other? For most people if they have to choice, they choose what fits best with the moral intuitions what they already have, rather than fitting their intuitions to fit a theory.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by rmsgrey on Feb 21st, 2006, 4:51am
If asking meaningless questions has no benefit, why does Zen persist?
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by Grimbal on Feb 21st, 2006, 8:28am
Life is also meaningless.  But it persists all the same.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by Three Hands on Feb 21st, 2006, 9:59am
I guess being someone who's almost finished a degree in Philosophy, I'm almost obliged to say something here. However, I apologise now for the somewhat rambling nature of this post, since it is mostly off the top of my head, rather than being properly structured and thought out. Hopefully, it will still make sense, though.

There's a lot of sense to what you've originally posted, in terms of which questions philosophers should be concerned about, and how we should go about answering them - indeed, that issue has been central to 20th Century Analytic Philosophy, especially with the Logical Positivist movement who based a lot of their arguments on Wittgenstein's early works, which seems to be, as Towr pointed out, what you are opting for.

Let me reassure you, even undergraduate students tend to be very wary about putting too much meaning into the kinds of issues you wish to dismiss. They do seem to be undecidable, due to there being no means to empirically verify such concepts, or, according to Wittgenstein, even talk meaningfully about them. I do not believe that this means such issues have no bearing on our lives, though (just ask Richard Dawkins, or the Pope), or should be completely disregarded. While we may not be able to prove definitely the answer to a lot of these questions, what our answers are can prove insightful in terms of how we perceive the world, and what kinds of things we consider more likely to be true.

You suggest that not viewing the big picture is a problem when making assertions, etc. How often do scientists view the big picture when making claims based on experimental data? Yet you are more inclined to believe them? Physics, the last I heard, is still nicely split down the middle between Quantum and Classical, with no obvious way of reconciling the two sides beyond some fairly woolly claims that "they must be". Why should the claims of physics then be consider better than those of philosophy, since they are based around an assertion followed by reasons to support the assertion? If I am mis-representing physics, then I apologise, but this seems to hold from the lay-person's view.

This is not to say that I disbelieve what physicists say. Or that I think that what they do is meaningless. I just wonder if the same claims you level at philosophy cannot be levelled at scientists. As Towr points out, philosophy is not just about answering various questions, but also clarifying what those questions are, how they differ from other questions, and then providing reasoning for any given position that you wish to support as to why you think that the answer should be x. In this way, you can talk meaningfully about such topics, although often the conclusions you reach depend on what approaches you take to deal with the question - and so what you are happier to assume to be true.

With your closing remarks about utility, how are you measuring the utility of any given position? So far as I've come across, no-one has come up with a good way of determining a fixed value of utility for anything, only abstract generalisations. Also, the better philosophers will automatically consider the implications of the arguments given (either that, or they will be quickly pointed out to them by their peers), and explain why they do not think that alternative views are as good as the one they propose, with suitable reasons. A lot of the literature, however, will be based around journal entries, where the authors generally only have space to briefly propose, defend or attack a given view, or books where they are looking to establish a more elaborate world-view, and so appears to be very one-sided in their views. This is generally due to a lot of the arguments and positions being accepted as existing, but either irrelevant to the point being made, or something to be dealt with elsewhere. Quite often, there will still be the bigger picture in the mind of the author, just that they focus more on one element, so as to keep the discussion focussed on the one narrow topic. For example, as part of my degree I'm expected to write a 12,000 word dissertation, but the first bit of advice given is to keep the dissertation focussed on one narrow topic, rather than attempting to cover something too broad. This does not mean that I do not consider broader issues relating to what I am writing about, just that not everything will apply directly to the question I am issue I am looking to explore, and so will end up not included in the essay.

In closing, however, I've generally found that philosophy is a lot more about exploring what you believe, and why you believe what you believe, than about finding concrete answers to ultimate questions. If you believe a question to be meaningless, then you are not obliged to answer it, but that doesn't mean you shouldn't have reasons for believing a question meaningless, and so forth. You might disagree with the methods adopted by people when answering questions, thinking that they are not considering enough the whole scope of the question, but that is the route to a philosophical discussion - suggesting that they may not be considering some given factor. But I've often found I've just gone with a view of "I don't believe this view is correct just because it feels wrong, or doesn't tally with this belief I hold", and that is still a perfectly valid, if infuriating, answer.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by JocK on Feb 21st, 2006, 12:25pm

on 02/21/06 at 09:59:14, Three Hands wrote:
If I am mis-representing physics, [..]


Yes you are..  ;D

I am not going to elaborate on the massive progress physics has made in the last century (a progress that has changed the world in a profound manner), nor am I going to explain that there is no single quantative observation that deviates by more than about one part in a billion from our current physics theories.

Rather I am going to ask one question:

What real progress did philosophy make in the last century?
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by towr on Feb 21st, 2006, 3:37pm

on 02/21/06 at 12:25:43, JocK wrote:
Rather I am going to ask one question:

What real progress did philosophy make in the last century?
It defined what 'good' science is, if nto to say 'the scientific method'. For example.
In approximate order of appearance: logical positivists, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos.. If you want to read up on it.

And of course there's more.
On the other hand, it depends on what you define as progress. And even what you define as philosophy, science is in a way natural philosophy.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by rmsgrey on Feb 22nd, 2006, 6:58am

on 02/21/06 at 12:25:43, JocK wrote:
nor am I going to explain that there is no single quantative observation that deviates by more than about one part in a billion from our current physics theories.

Just as well, because I'd then feel obliged to ask where you get your weather forecasts... Or about the intervals between successive neutron emissions of a small chunk of Uranium... Or about the value of G (the gravitational constant) to more than about 3 places...

And, while physics has developed incredible accuracy and precision over a wide range of phenomena, it still does so (last I heard) by appealing selectively to either of two fundamentally irreconcilable theories, with serious problems in domains where both are significant...

Besides, when you start poking around the foundations of Physics, you find out it's built on sand anyway - you get data by doing something that is roughly the same as last time, and seeing that you get roughly the same results, and that when your mate Bruce in New Zealand did roughly the same thing he got roughly the same results, then you say that the differences don't matter, and conclude not only that any time anyone does roughly that same thing, they'll get roughly the same result, but that each of an entire class of experiments will each get their particular approximate result, regardless of who does them or where or when. And the justification for making this leap? "Well, it's worked before (some of the time)" - it's not even as though "tomorrow will be like today" applies in general - physicists spend years training themselves to ignore the cases where it doesn't apply - a good empiricist who caught a plane on the 15th of each month, starting in 1990 and continuing, would have concluded by mid-2001 that airport security would be fairly light when he caught his plane on September 15th...



@Grimbal:

Life may be meaningless, but that doesn't mean it has no benefits
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by Three Hands on Feb 22nd, 2006, 7:29am
What real progress did philosophy make in the last century?

Towr doesn't even go on to mention the progress of logic developed from Frege's works by Russell, Strawson, Davidson, Quine, Tarski and Grice, among others. Then there's been developments in the Philosophy of Language - especially through contributions from Wittgenstein, Chomsky and Fodor - Aesthetics - quite a bit based around the concept of abstract art, as in what constitutes art - moral theories - especially in the reforming of virtue ethics as a viable theory - and various metaphysical concepts, such as Phenomenology, Perspectivism, and similar. And this is without going into Feminism, Modernism, Postmodernism, and other philospohical movements of the 20th Century.

Philosophy of Mind has also had a lot of new approaches taken to it following the developments of psychology and computing - questions along the lines of what it means to be intelligent have been particularly prominent. Old theories and thoughts have been reformulated, such as the Ontological argument being adapted by Plantinga, so that they become more relevant or stronger or robust - in much the same way science is considered to "progress". And this is just based on some of what I've been taught in almost 3 years.

In short, 20th Century Philosophy has not been particularly idle...
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by JocK on Feb 22nd, 2006, 10:22am

on 02/22/06 at 06:58:48, rmsgrey wrote:
Just as well, because I'd then feel obliged to ask where you get your weather forecasts... Or about the intervals between successive neutron emissions of a small chunk of Uranium... Or about the value of G (the gravitational constant) to more than about 3 places...

I didn't say physics can make predictions with the stated accuracy, my claim was that no deviations from the laws of physics are observed down to an incredible accuracy.


on 02/22/06 at 06:58:48, rmsgrey wrote:
And, while physics has developed incredible accuracy and precision over a wide range of phenomena, it still does so (last I heard) by appealing selectively to either of two fundamentally irreconcilable theories, with serious problems in domains where both are significant...

Reconciling quantum mechanics and general relativity is (arguably) the most challanging problem science has ever faced, but that doesn't mean both theories are fundamentally irreconcilable.

The domain where both are significant is (unfortunately!) not accessable to us. General relativity and quantum mechanics (the 'standard model') are complementary theories. Irreconcilable or not, there simply is no single reported observation that proves them wrong.


on 02/22/06 at 06:58:48, rmsgrey wrote:
Besides, when you start poking around the foundations of Physics, you find out it's built on sand anyway - you get data by doing something that is roughly the same as last time, and seeing that you get roughly the same results, and that when your mate Bruce in New Zealand did roughly the same thing he got roughly the same results, then you say that the differences don't matter, and conclude not only that any time anyone does roughly that same thing, they'll get roughly the same result, but that each of an entire class of experiments will each get their particular approximate result, regardless of who does them or where or when. And the justification for making this leap? "Well, it's worked before (some of the time)" - it's not even as though "tomorrow will be like today" applies in general - physicists spend years training themselves to ignore the cases where it doesn't apply - a good empiricist who caught a plane on the 15th of each month, starting in 1990 and continuing, would have concluded by mid-2001 that airport security would be fairly light when he caught his plane on September 15th...


And yet this pragmatic approach made it possible for you to rave and rant on a forum accessible on a worldwide scale...  ;D
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by JocK on Feb 22nd, 2006, 10:37am

on 02/21/06 at 15:37:54, towr wrote:
It defined what 'good' science is, if nto to say 'the scientific method'. For example.
In approximate order of appearance: logical positivists, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos.. If you want to read up on it.

No idea what 'good' science is, but I do know some examples of highly succesful science...

The little I have seen from Popper and Kuhn on this subject either is trivial, or has no bearing on real (succesful) science. (I feel that Rmsgrey's description of the scientific practice - although heavily exaggerating and overly simplyfying - is closer to the reality!)

Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by JocK on Feb 22nd, 2006, 10:52am

on 02/22/06 at 07:29:50, Three Hands wrote:
[..] the progress of logic  [..] developments in the Philosophy of Language [..] - Aesthetics - [..] the reforming of virtue ethics as a viable theory - and various metaphysical concepts, such as Phenomenology, Perspectivism, and similar. [..]

In short, 20th Century Philosophy has not been particularly idle...


Maybe I should specify my question a bit more.

What I am really mis is an example of a philosophical result that can be explained to an interested layperson and that will result in a "wow-reaction"... Is there such an example?

I am not a mathematician, but when someone explained to me Brouwer's fixed point theorem (starting from a 1-D example and then explaining the 2-D example of crumpling a sheet of paper, and ending with "it also applies in all higher dimensions") my reaction was "wow... that's amazing!".

Who gives me the equivalent of Brouwer's fixed point theorem (or Feynman's path integral approach for that matter, or ... ) in philosophy?
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by towr on Feb 22nd, 2006, 3:24pm

on 02/22/06 at 07:29:50, Three Hands wrote:
Towr doesn't even go on to mention the progress of logic developed from Frege's works by Russell, Strawson, Davidson, Quine, Tarski and Grice, among others.
As I said the bounderies between what one might consider philosophy and other fields, is a bit fuzzy.
Some might argue logic is part of mathematics, and used by philosophy (rather than being part of it).
Then again some might argue every science is in its basis philosophy.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by towr on Feb 22nd, 2006, 3:29pm

on 02/22/06 at 10:37:28, JocK wrote:
No idea what 'good' science is, but I do know some examples of highly succesful science...
Yes, and I know some examples of things falling, but that doesn't compare to a theory of gravity.
A theory of 'succesfull science' however does.
But I suppose you don't find it interesting how you can compare theories and judge which is better/more succesfull than others.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by Three Hands on Feb 23rd, 2006, 11:02am
What I am really mis is an example of a philosophical result that can be explained to an interested layperson and that will result in a "wow-reaction"... Is there such an example?

It's a bit hard for me to determine what such an example would be - I imagine you'd need at least some interest in the topic in order to gain such a reaction.

How about the famous Turing Test? This is something that is, essentially, philosophical, since it is making a claim about the nature of intelligence. For me, I'd say a lot of Wittgenstein's claims points about language are extremely interesting - the point that we cannot actually have a private language, since we need others to corroborate meaning. Tarski's Semantic Theory of Truth is also very interesting, although extremely obscure - most people struggle to really grasp it, and I've only got a tenuous grasp on it myself. The Feminist movement also generated a lot of interest in what it meant to be female in a male-dominated society, and has caused some fairly influential writers to voice some opinions, but again, this tends to lead towards obscurity.

As for your presumed scientific method, there was this chap back in the 18th Century who pointed out that we cannot really be certain that inductive principles are true (even though we assume them to be true), since we cannot define causation without some circular definition, and so cannot really state whether things are causally related, or just merely have constant spatio-temporal conjunction. Given this, science seems to run into some problems at a fundamental level, not to mention how you determine whether one theory is "better" than another.

As I said the bounderies between what one might consider philosophy and other fields, is a bit fuzzy.

Well, philosophy tends to underlie every topic, not just sciences. The boundaries do get blurred very easily, and I think are largely covered by how far the concepts are generalised, and comment on aspects of the topic, rather than being directly associated with the topic itself. Logic is certainly claimed as part of philosophy by the university department here (one compulsory module for all single-honours undergrads in 2 out of 3 years), but there are other similar blurred boundaries in other fields of philosophy.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by JocK on Feb 23rd, 2006, 12:43pm

on 02/23/06 at 11:02:55, Three Hands wrote:
How about the famous Turing Test? This is something that is, essentially, philosophical, since it is making a claim about the nature of intelligence.

I agree that it is fair to classify this example as a philosophical result. (I accept your and Towr's point that there where philosophy touches other areas, overlaps and grey areas are unavoidable.)

To be honest, I do feel that Turing's test is not really much more than a party game. True, the thought that passing the test (it never became clear to me what that means: passing after 10 questions, 100, .. 1000,...?) would define intelligence surely is an interesting thought, but nothing more than that. I am sure that in a similar game in which a woman and myself would both try to come accross as a woman, I would stand a fair chance of passing that test. Does that make me a woman?  ::)



on 02/23/06 at 11:02:55, Three Hands wrote:
[..] how you determine whether one theory is "better" than another.


I don't understand this fixation on determining whether one theory is 'better' than another. If one can device a formal system for ranking theories (from 'good' to 'bad') then such a system would constitute a solution in search of a problem. Only two 'good' theories exist. There are no competing theories, and also there is no choice between the two. And yes - most physicists - believe one day they will merge into one.

(Towr, I guess this answers your question?  ;D )
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by towr on Feb 23rd, 2006, 2:02pm

on 02/23/06 at 12:43:34, JocK wrote:
I am sure that in a similar game in which a woman and myself would both try to come accross as a woman, I would stand a fair chance of passing that test. Does that make me a woman?  ::)
No, but it does mean you're not that different intelectually.



Quote:
Only two 'good' theories exist.
What makes you say that, if you deny there is anything that determines 'goodness'.


Quote:
There are no competing theories
How about intelligent design or creationism vs evolution and the big bang?
Plenty of people have their own theories about something. If you don't define what makes science science, you can't say which theories do and don't have a place in academic research. It'll just be choice, "what shall we believe today".
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by Three Hands on Feb 24th, 2006, 6:40am
(it never became clear to me what that means: passing after 10 questions, 100, .. 1000,...?)

I think it is more conventionally done after a given period of time - 5-10mins or so. Also, there's been quite a lot to suggest that the Turing Test is not really that great a test for intelligence, although that raises the question of what qualifies as intelligence, and other related issues.

Still, the idea makes for some interesting issues, even if it is essentially a famous party game ::)

Probably one of the main reasons philosophy isn't seen as having any major advances, though, is due to it tending towards one of 2 routes - either it is in the background of other big advances (things like computing, abstract art, feminism, psychology, genetic engineering and so forth have all generated large amounts of philosophical discussion), or it's something which is immediate to the individual anyway - concepts like ethics, religion, and other everyday thinking - especially given that philosophy generally strives to keep things as common-sensical as possible (or, at least, that's what the philosophers claim)
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by rmsgrey on Feb 28th, 2006, 6:36am
QM vs Relativity:

General relativity assumes a smooth, continuous space-time, with limits on the speed of objects, etc.; QM allows objects and influences to travel faster than light, and has a space-time that's anything but smooth - the two just don't match. It's probable that each can be modified to resolve the conflicts between them, but, last I heard, there's nothing more than promising hints so far...


Turing Test:

The key idea here is that, if an entity can convince you it's intelligent when you don't know its physical form, then finding out that it's actually a very sophisticated pinball machine, or a fantastically complex model railway layout shouldn't change your mind - that the ability to host a mind needn't be limited to organic brain-like structures.

Of course, if you refuse to accept that a non-organic object/system could be intelligent, then the Turing Test will do nothing for you - no matter how convincing a machine is when you don't know it's a machine, as soon as you discover it to be one, you'll decide you've been tricked, and conclude it to be unintelligent after all...

In any case, even if it fails to convince any given person that a given machine is intelligent, the Turing Test is more than just a parlour game because it offers a reasonable starting point for discussion - instead of "is this intelligent?" ("no, it's a machine"...) you have "does this pass the Turing Test?" - which is what people working on AI generally actually want to know, rather than getting into debates over whether something that seems intelligent until you read the source code actually is...
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by JocK on Feb 28th, 2006, 11:03am

on 02/28/06 at 06:36:46, rmsgrey wrote:
QM allows objects and influences to travel faster than light


That is absolutely incorrect. What makes you think so?
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by BNC on Feb 28th, 2006, 1:49pm

on 02/28/06 at 11:03:01, JocK wrote:
That is absolutely incorrect. What makes you think so?


I believe it's a fairly common error.
I think it stems from the phenomenon of entanglement, or, as Einstein phrased it "spukhafte Fernwirkungen" (spooky actions at a distance).
For those who are unfamiliar with entanglement, it is the ability of quantum systems to exhibit correlations between states within a superposition, even when the particles involved are at a distance from on another. And this correlation takes place immediately -- measure one, and the other will react. However, it was shown that no information may be transferred using entanglement, so FTL will have to wait for another chance to come along.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by rmsgrey on Mar 1st, 2006, 6:21am

on 02/28/06 at 11:03:01, JocK wrote:
That is absolutely incorrect. What makes you think so?

The fact QM doesn't rule out time travel?

The fun little demonstration whereby a recorded piece of music quantum tunneled through a solid block, came out ahead of time for light speed transmission, and was still recognisable music rather than random noise? (OK, that one could have been faked for TV)

Hawking radiation where (in one interpretation) mass quantum tunnels across the event horizon?

Even if nothing else, quantum entanglement involves some sort of influence to travel FTL (which gets headache-inducing when you start worrying about which relativistic "now" you mean...) - OK, you need to combine it with light-speed-limited data to actually transfer any accessible information, but there is still that FTL transfer of half a Qubit or so...
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by JocK on Mar 1st, 2006, 9:40am

on 03/01/06 at 06:21:31, rmsgrey wrote:
The fact QM doesn't rule out time travel?

The fun little demonstration whereby a recorded piece of music quantum tunneled through a solid block, came out ahead of time for light speed transmission, and was still recognisable music rather than random noise? (OK, that one could have been faked for TV)

Hawking radiation where (in one interpretation) mass quantum tunnels across the event horizon?

Even if nothing else, quantum entanglement involves some sort of influence to travel FTL (which gets headache-inducing when you start worrying about which relativistic "now" you mean...) - OK, you need to combine it with light-speed-limited data to actually transfer any accessible information, but there is still that FTL transfer of half a Qubit or so...


You read too much science fiction Rmsgrey!

Indeed, as BNC points out a 'classical'  error. If one looks at quantum mechanical phenomena from a classical ('hidden variable') perspective, then one easily falls into the trap of - erroneously - concluding that non-locality plays a role in physics.

Rmsgrey, if you can transmit information faster than light - even if you demonstrate that just half a bit is possible - I am more sure you will receive that decent sum of money associated with the next Nobel Prize in Physics...
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by rmsgrey on Mar 2nd, 2006, 4:57am

on 03/01/06 at 09:40:24, JocK wrote:
You read too much science fiction Rmsgrey!


Probably true, but I also stay generally aware of "popular science" explanations - last I heard the best arguments against time travel being possible were: "so where are all the time-travellers?", "Some principle we haven't discovered will prevent it", and my personal favourite: "It's impossible because it would restrict free will"


Quote:
Indeed, as BNC points out a 'classical'  error. If one looks at quantum mechanical phenomena from a classical ('hidden variable') perspective, then one easily falls into the trap of - erroneously - concluding that non-locality plays a role in physics.

Rmsgrey, if you can transmit information faster than light - even if you demonstrate that just half a bit is possible - I am more sure you will receive that decent sum of money associated with the next Nobel Prize in Physics...

Like the people who demonstrated that parity is not conserved way back in 1928?

Anyway, since my beliefs on theoretical physics appear to be out of date, misconceptions, or fringe, and I haven't kept my sources, I'm not going to argue the point further...
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by BNC on Mar 2nd, 2006, 5:13am

on 03/02/06 at 04:57:34, rmsgrey wrote:
Probably true, but I also stay generally aware of "popular science" explanations - last I heard the best arguments against time travel being possible were: "so where are all the time-travellers?", "Some principle we haven't discovered will prevent it", and my personal favourite: "It's impossible because it would restrict free will"


Speaking of Sci-Fi, I like an explaination (sort of) I read in a book called "timescape" -- there were'nt any time travelers yet, because you have to build a receiver, and you can only do that after you discover the time traver principle. So, the earliest point in time you may travel to is the time the first time-travel-receiving-booth was built.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by Three Hands on Mar 2nd, 2006, 9:48am

on 03/02/06 at 04:57:34, rmsgrey wrote:
Probably true, but I also stay generally aware of "popular science" explanations - last I heard the best arguments against time travel being possible were: "so where are all the time-travellers?", "Some principle we haven't discovered will prevent it", and my personal favourite: "It's impossible because it would restrict free will"


While all of these arguments could quite happily be incorrect, I prefer the 3rd argument simply on the basis that I would much rather hold "I have free will" as a belief than "time travel is theoretically possible".

Of course, this would not prevent the possibility of travel to other worlds (in a philosophical sense of that understanding (other universes), rather than actual inter-planetary travel in this universe), where you could end up on a world similar in every respect to the place of origin except for your existence at a different point in time in that world than in this one. In that sense, you could "travel in time" while preserving free will, but you might consider that even more far-fetched than just being able to time-travel in a conventional sense...
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by JocK on Mar 2nd, 2006, 11:09am

on 03/02/06 at 04:57:34, rmsgrey wrote:
"so where are all the time-travellers?"


They end up as governor of California...
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by towr on Mar 2nd, 2006, 3:00pm
I don't see why free will and time travel would be at odds with each other.
It seems much more likely that either they are both possible or both true, than that they're contrary. If the timeline is deterministic, you can't go back and change it, nor had you any free will to change it. If it's not deterministic, you might travel back in time, or make up your own mind.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by JocK on Mar 3rd, 2006, 9:00am

on 03/02/06 at 15:00:48, towr wrote:
I don't see why free will and time travel would be at odds with each other.

It is the combination of free will and causality that is at odds with time travel.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by towr on Mar 3rd, 2006, 1:16pm

on 03/03/06 at 09:00:54, JocK wrote:
It is the combination of free will and causality that is at odds with time travel.
Only for some notions of causality.
Besides, causality and free will may be at odds enough as it is. (Non-determinism is hardly a solution for free will, it just means that instead of having reasons for your decision, you act randomly :P)
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by Three Hands on Mar 3rd, 2006, 3:13pm
If you have someone from the future travel back to the past, then, as far as I see it, you have something along these lines:

a) Conditions must still be achieved for the individual to travel from the future to the past at the later point, otherwise a paradox would be developed (think "Grandfather Paradox)

b) If the individual is able to travel into the past and then act as he chooses, the past will most likely differ from the past that previously existed. This would then have some potentially serious implications on the future.

Simply, if time travel is possible, then either the individual is limited in what they are capable of doing (how much they can change the past), or there is huge scope for paradox to develop, which is far too much of a headache for me to want to feel possible. I would therefore be more inclined to think that the actions would be limited, not just for the individual, but the whole world (for example, the President wouldn't be able to nuke the world without causing paradox unless such an action was required for the conditions to be met). Effectively, a time-traveller creates a set destiny which needs to be fulfilled if you consider temporal paradoxes impossible occurrances. This either results in limited will, or determinism, and I am inclined to believe that limited will would probably devolve into determinism if the issue was explored fully.

As for Towr's point about possibility of time-travelling, I would view it as more the timeline required the individual to travel back into the past and take certain actions. You might believe that you are acting freely, but you are pre-determined to do that as well. On the other hand, if you have free will, the future remains mutable. Someone travelling from the future to the past creates a certain future event, and so fixes, at least in part, the future.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by JocK on Mar 3rd, 2006, 4:05pm
You are very depressed. You are suicidally depressed. You have a gun. But you do not quite have the courage to point the gun at yourself and kill yourself in this way. If only someone else would kill you, that would be a good thing. But you can't really ask someone to kill you. That wouldn't be fair. You decide that if you remain this depressed and you find a time machine, you will travel back in time to just about now, and kill your earlier self. That would be good. In that way you even would get rid of the depressing time you will spend between now and when you would get into that time machine. You start to muse about the coherence of this idea, when something amazing happens. Out of nowhere you suddenly see someone coming towards you with a gun pointed at you. In fact he looks very much like you, except that he is bleeding badly from his left eye, and can barely stand up straight. You are at peace. You look straight at him, calmly. He shoots. You feel a searing pain in your left eye. Your mind is in chaos, you stagger around and accidentally enter a strange looking cubicle. You drift off into unconsciousness. After a while, you can not tell how long, you drift back into consciousness and stagger out of the cubicle. You see someone in the distance looking at you calmly and fixedly. You realize that it is your younger self. He looks straight at you. You are in terrible pain. You have to end this, you have to kill him, really kill him once and for all. You shoot him, but your eyesight is so bad that your aim is off. You do not kill him, you merely damage his left eye. He staggers off. You fall to the ground in agony, and decide to study the paradoxes of time travel more seriously.


Got this from: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time-travel-phys/
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by rmsgrey on Mar 4th, 2006, 4:23am

on 03/02/06 at 09:48:15, Three Hands wrote:
While all of these arguments could quite happily be incorrect, I prefer the 3rd argument simply on the basis that I would much rather hold "I have free will" as a belief than "time travel is theoretically possible".

But Time Travel doesn't eliminate free will - it merely restricts it. Walls also restrict free will - they prevent me from walking in certain places. I'm not saying you can't refuse to believe in walls simply because you prefer "I have free will" to "walls are theoretically possible", but the rest of us will probably try and make sure the walls you don't believe in are well padded...
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by Three Hands on Mar 6th, 2006, 6:12am

on 03/04/06 at 04:23:19, rmsgrey wrote:
But Time Travel doesn't eliminate free will - it merely restricts it. Walls also restrict free will - they prevent me from walking in certain places. I'm not saying you can't refuse to believe in walls simply because you prefer "I have free will" to "walls are theoretically possible", but the rest of us will probably try and make sure the walls you don't believe in are well padded...


Walls are far easier to knock down than paradoxes are to get around. While I am limited by various physical considerations (after all, I can't just will myself to defy gravity), I still think that the consequences of time travel would lead to the removal of free will. But that's mostly due to me subscribing to a libertarianist view of free will (that free actions are not in some way caused), rather than a compatibalist (that free actions are caused) as I don't feel this really grasps the true nature of freedom. If you opt for a compatibalist account of free will, then you can maintain that time travel merely restricts, rather than removes, free will.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by towr on Mar 6th, 2006, 6:47am

on 03/06/06 at 06:12:21, Three Hands wrote:
But that's mostly due to me subscribing to a libertarianist view of free will (that free actions are not in some way caused), rather than a compatibalist (that free actions are caused) as I don't feel this really grasps the true nature of freedom.
Such a libertarian notion of free will doesn't make much sense to me. If you pick goals at random, you no longer want them. They simply pop up regardless of any mental process that might cause them (since, they're causeless); any reasoning seems to go out the window.
My notion of free will would at least include that I have some say in the matter. A random will is not free.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by Three Hands on Mar 7th, 2006, 7:56am
When I say lacks a cause, I do not mean that such decisions are random. They still have reasons behind them, but do not follow the same process as causation.

Basically, there's a difference between cause and reason. I can have reasons for doing something, but not have been caused to do it. For things which lack will, we often interpret causes as "reasons" for their acting, and a similar situation arises with willed beings, where the reasons are seen as "causes" for actions.

I do not feel that we can really have free will if we are caused to do things. While I acknowledge that there are limits to what we can do, this is not the same as then being required to do some given thing, since it is causally required of us. While reflexive reactions seem causal in nature, and I accept that they could prove a difficulty to the claims of free will, there's a certain extent to which we can override even these, if we have reason to.

However, this is just how I think things are. If you disagree, and have sufficient reason to do so, then that's fair enough.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by towr on Mar 8th, 2006, 2:22am

on 03/07/06 at 07:56:37, Three Hands wrote:
Basically, there's a difference between cause and reason. I can have reasons for doing something, but not have been caused to do it.
If we were to 'replay' history. You'd have the same reasons you had the last time around, and thus make the same dicisions you had. And everything else being causal, that'd mean the exact same resulting now.
So 'free will' in this sense, seems indistingishable from a 'causal will'; except for the emotional component that we generally prefer the former.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by rmsgrey on Mar 8th, 2006, 5:19am

on 03/08/06 at 02:22:44, towr wrote:
If we were to 'replay' history. You'd have the same reasons you had the last time around, and thus make the same dicisions you had. And everything else being causal, that'd mean the exact same resulting now.
So 'free will' in this sense, seems indistingishable from a 'causal will'; except for the emotional component that we generally prefer the former.

But would you make the same decisions faced with the same circumstances?

You seem to be assuming your conclusion there...

Though it's unclear quite what you mean by replaying history - if you mean "having everything repeat exactly the same way it happened "before"" then, of course there's no sign of free will; if things aren't exactly the same, then the first variation is the only one that is significant because all future ones no longer arise from the same conditions.

There is a good reason why a number of philosophers have redefined "free will" in a way that doesn't sidesteps the issue of choice...
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by towr on Mar 8th, 2006, 5:51am

on 03/08/06 at 05:19:49, rmsgrey wrote:
But would you make the same decisions faced with the same circumstances?
If you based your decisions on your reasons, rather than being random, I think so, yes.
As I see it, either you can be rational, and have a free will in a causal sense. Or you can be irrational and have a free uncontrolled random will. In effect meaning that free will has you, rather than vice versa.


Quote:
Though it's unclear quite what you mean by replaying history
You rewind to the same state of the universe (physical, mental and otherwise), and let it run from there.


Quote:
if things aren't exactly the same, then the first variation is the only one that is significant because all future ones no longer arise from the same conditions.
Yes, but it's any change that matters, so the first one (if it can happen) is all that matters to the argument.


Quote:
There is a good reason why a number of philosophers have redefined "free will" in a way that doesn't sidesteps the issue of choice...
Well, what is choice, really.. Computers can choose in a way. Give'm some arguments, a means of reasoning, and they'll reach a choice. Completely deterministic.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by towr on Mar 8th, 2006, 6:03am
I suppose the point is, that to me, "free will" means that "I" am the one who controls the choices "I" make. And that's incompatible with those choices being in some way random, so they must be (mentally) causal (the "outside world" may still be non-deterministic, though).
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by Three Hands on Mar 8th, 2006, 6:46am
OK, I'll do my best to explain what I mean by "reason". However, this is difficult to do, simply because of the amount to which we generally think of "reason" and "cause" as interchangeable.

When we act, we generally claim we have a reason for doing so. For example, the reason for me writing this is to respond to the claim that reasons are the same as causes. While it could be claimed that this caused me to act, the reason does not cause me to act, it justifies the action I take. I could have decided not to reply due to feeling petty, superior, or some other reason for deciding not to respond. The key part is that I decide on the course of action, based on reasoning, yes, but these reasons do not follow any clear determinate causal pattern (although there are various expectations we can develop based around our concepts of the actions of others). This decision is not randomly determined either, however random it may appear. This is how I would think of free will actually operating - something other than randomness or causation bringing about effects, with some rational basis. Yes, this falls outside of the bounds of a scientific method, but I generally think of this as a positive thing, since I do not feel we should be entirely explainable by science, since that would imply that we are in some sense predictable, and hence determined, rather than able to act freely.

I hope this clears things up a bit.
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by rmsgrey on Mar 8th, 2006, 10:40am

on 03/08/06 at 06:46:07, Three Hands wrote:
OK, I'll do my best to explain what I mean by "reason". However, this is difficult to do, simply because of the amount to which we generally think of "reason" and "cause" as interchangeable.

When we act, we generally claim we have a reason for doing so. For example, the reason for me writing this is to respond to the claim that reasons are the same as causes. While it could be claimed that this caused me to act, the reason does not cause me to act, it justifies the action I take. I could have decided not to reply due to feeling petty, superior, or some other reason for deciding not to respond. The key part is that I decide on the course of action, based on reasoning, yes, but these reasons do not follow any clear determinate causal pattern (although there are various expectations we can develop based around our concepts of the actions of others). This decision is not randomly determined either, however random it may appear. This is how I would think of free will actually operating - something other than randomness or causation bringing about effects, with some rational basis. Yes, this falls outside of the bounds of a scientific method, but I generally think of this as a positive thing, since I do not feel we should be entirely explainable by science, since that would imply that we are in some sense predictable, and hence determined, rather than able to act freely.

I hope this clears things up a bit.

It sounds a bit like the distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions - causes are sufficient conditions for action, while reasons are closer to necessary (individual reasons aren't necessarily necessary, but some reason would be necessary)
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by towr on Mar 9th, 2006, 12:42am

on 03/08/06 at 06:46:07, Three Hands wrote:
I hope this clears things up a bit.
So you're saying it's neither deterministic, nor the complement, non-deterministic ?!
What's left?

On a sidenote, there is some suggestion in psychology that 'reasons' are often made up after a decision, to justify it. What would you make of that?
Where does the decision come from?
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by Three Hands on Mar 9th, 2006, 8:44am

on 03/09/06 at 00:42:30, towr wrote:
So you're saying it's neither deterministic, nor the complement, non-deterministic ?!
What's left?


The mythical third value for determinism? Well, I'm suggesting that there are many possible reasons which we have for our actions, and we choose one (or one group of reasons) in a way that is not random, but is not deterministic in the way that causality implies, but is not entirely random. There is no set of rules which define what we will choose, but we may reasonably accurately infer certain trends in given people. So I guess I'm proposing that 2 options are insufficient in this case.


on 03/09/06 at 00:42:30, towr wrote:
On a sidenote, there is some suggestion in psychology that 'reasons' are often made up after a decision, to justify it. What would you make of that?
Where does the decision come from?


I would consider that view irrelevant, since I think of reasons as important to how we make decisions in the first place. If it can be conclusively shown that "reasons" are justifications for action, rather than being reasons for action, then I will just have to concede that my view is incorrect (something which is entirely possible). Such a proof may be difficult to achieve, however.

I guess this is why philosophy counts as so complicated...
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by towr on Mar 9th, 2006, 1:31pm

Quote:
If it can be conclusively shown that "reasons" are justifications for action, rather than being reasons for action, then I will just have to concede that my view is incorrect (something which is entirely possible). Such a proof may be difficult to achieve, however.
Well, for one, it has been conclusively shown that people have a measurable readiness potential (motor cortex activation) before they're conscious of having decided to act (push a button)
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by Three Hands on Mar 15th, 2006, 7:02am
How much of this is due to expectation put on them by the experiment? It's surprisingly difficult to say when a decision is made, generally because you are so busy deciding at the time.

Also, there's a certain amount to suggest that we have reasons for actions before the time for action presents itself, simply in virtue of expecting certain results. Otherwise, why did you get up this morning? And what time are you planning to get up tomorrow?
Title: Re: How to answer problems in philosophy
Post by towr on Mar 15th, 2006, 11:09am
The following article might be interesting http://espritmetaphysique.free.fr/pacherie/Gomes-JCS-1999.pdf
(I still have to read it myself, but at least it gives the reference for, amongs others, Libet's work)


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